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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to generate a 
sociological conception of academic freedom from an 
examination of the social context in which it operates. 
Three variables are analyzed: academic freedom, the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) 
as an advocate of academic freedom, and academic organi­
zation. Academic freedom is treated historically and 
analytically in reference to its practice in the United 
States. The AAUP is analyzed in terms of the Associ­
ation's impact on the practice of academic freedom.
Two types of academic organization are distinguished: 
formal or official organization and informal, reference 
organization. Post-World War Two cases of AAUP censure 
of administrative officers and trustees of colleges and 
universities are analyzed to demonstrate the interplay 
of the three variables.
The idea of academic freedom in the United 
States was not a domestic creation but was transplanted 
from Germany by American scholars in the nineteenth 
century upon their return from study abroad. The 
largely paternalistic and proprietary character of
xi
American collegiate education, particularly in religious 
colleges, was inimical to the development of academic 
freedom, only with the rise of research and graduate 
education after 1850, styled largely on German models, 
did academic freedom emerge as a forceful ideal in 
American higher education* Collective promotion of 
principles of academic freedom culminated in the 
formation of the AAUP in 1915.
The AAUP, a voluntary association of faculty 
members in accredited U. S. colleges and universities, 
promotes academic freedom through codification and 
implementation of principles. As an agency of codifi­
cation, the Association has sponsored statements of 
principles in 1915, 1925, and 1940. These principles 
(1940) have been endorsed by numerous other educational 
associations. The Association seeks to implement its 
principles of academic freedom through several means, 
chief among which is censure of institutional officers 
found upon investigation to have violated these princi­
ples. Censure is removed upon reform of organizational 
policy by the offending institution.
The formal or official organization of an aca­
demic institution is comprised of role definitions and 
norms governing role interaction. The roles are
xii
differentiated according to function and hierarchy. 
Academic freedom is dependent on the nature and extent 
of authority vested in the faculty. Prescribed patterns 
of faculty autonomy are considered to promote academic 
freedom. The composition of the academic community, 
according to the reference groups with which the members 
identify themselves, also affects the practice of aca­
demic freedom. Following Robert Merton a distinction 
between "cosmopolitans" and "locals" is applied hypo­
thetically to academic organization. Cosmopolitans, 
who subscribe primarily to external values, are con­
sidered to lend more support to norms of academic freedom 
than do locals, who adhere to the particularistic values 
of their institution. Locals are hypothesized to be 
overrepresented among administrators and trustees, cosmo­
politans among the faculty.
From the perspective of academic organization, 
academic freedom, conceived as a set of norms governing 
the action of academic citizens, includes the following:
(1) freedom of the faculty member in his role 
as an academic specialist to criticize and to challenge 
accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related to 
his field of competence;
(2) freedom of the faculty member in his role
xiii
as a citizen of the institution in which he serves to 
criticize official policies and practices of his insti­
tution, including actions of administrative officers 
and trustees? and
(3) freedom of the faculty member in his role 
as a member of the academic profession to defend his 
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations 
of, their academic freedom.
AAUP censure cases from 1945 to 1965 are 
analyzed. The findings with respect to patterns of 
conflict, AAUP intervention, and censure resolution 
support the viability of the conceptual analysis outlined 
above.
xiv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom is not one freedom, but many.
To the sociologist, academic freedom is not one norm, but 
a complex of norms attached to the role of faculty member 
in institutions of higher learning. The norms which com­
prise academic freedom may be viewed as role prerogatives 
of the faculty member in the performance of his role.
These norms reside in the relationship between the 
faculty and the administrative officers of an insti­
tution. If norms of academic freedom are "rights" of 
faculty roles, they are also, conversely, obligations of 
administrative roles, institutional administrative 
officers are the guarantors of faculty role prerogatives 
of freedom.
For the purpose of a preliminary definition 
academic freedom may be considered to include the 
following normative components for faculty roles: (1)
freedom to criticize and challenge accepted theories, 
beliefs, and practices related to one's field of compe­
tence (in teaching, research, and publication);1 (2) 
freedom to criticize the policies, programs, administration,
2
and governing board of one's institution; and (3) freedom 
to defend one's colleagues against perceived threats to, 
or violations of, their academic freedom.*
I. STATEMENT OP PURPOSE
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to
generate a sociological conception of academic freedom. 
The essential tasks in this endeavor are; (1) to isolate 
a set of norms which comprise "academic freedom" in con­
ventional usage: (2) to determine which elements of the
social organization of colleges and universities have a 
bearing on the practice of academic freedom (that is, 
which seem to have some causal relationship to academic 
freedom); and (3) to outline the interrelations between 
norms of academic freedom and patterns of academic organ­
ization. After surveying the published literature on the
subject of academic freedom, the author is not aware of 
any previous attempt to analyze the subject in this 
manner.
II. PLAN AND APPROACH OP THE STUDY 
Academic freedom is by no means a precise 
concept. Historical analysis indicates the lack of 
clarity that has surrounded the idea and its application. 
Chapter two, "The Idea of Academic Freedom; its Develop­
ment in the united States,"is concerned with clarifying
3
various usages of the concept. An attempt is made to
3summarize the history of the idea in American experience.
Zn the latter part of that chapter the concept is analyzed 
in some detail and is distinguished from some related 
ideas with Which academic freedom is often confused.
The organization which has been the primary 
advocate of norms of academic freedom in the united 
States is the American Association of university Pro­
fessors .4 The AAUP is a national voluntary association 
of college and university faculty members, founded in
51915. On the national level the AAUP promotes academic 
freedom through several means, the chief of Which are:
(1) published policy statements pertaining to "standards” 
of academic freedom; (2) gaining the endorsement of other 
professional and educational associations for its standards;
(3) investigation of selected cases of alleged violations 
of its standards; and (4) published lists of institutional 
administrations "censured" for violations of its standards.6
Academic freedom has been the major concern of 
the AAUP since its inception. Because of the importance 
of its role in the development of norms of academic freedom, 
Chapter Three, "The American Association of university 
Professors: Advocate of Academic Freedom," is devoted
exclusively to the policies, programs, and procedures of 
the AAUP as a national organization (as opposed to the
4
activities of the Association's local chapters). In that 
chapter attention is focused also on the evolution and 
implementation of the Association's policies and procedures.
As stated at the outset, the norms which comprise 
academic freedom may be looked upon as prerogatives of 
certain professional roles in colleges and universities.
In this fact lies the relationship between academic freedom 
and the social organization of the university. Whether, 
and to what extent, academic freedom exists in practice 
depends upon the nature of the academic organization, 
particularly the definition of faculty roles, if, at a 
given college, faculty roles are defined as analagous to 
occupational roles of employees in the business world, 
then it is not likely that academic freedom with respect 
to criticism of the administration and its policies, for 
instance, will exist in practice, if, on the other hand, 
faculty roles are imbued with professional status, such 
that the faculty is considered the primary decision­
making unit of the university, then the probability of
academic freedom in practice is greatly enhanced. How
1faculty roles are defined will depend on how the goals 
and purposes of the college or university are conceived 
and on the general role of the administration with respect 
to those goals. Chapter Four, "Academic Organization and
5
Academic Freedom,1 includes a detailed examination of 
the social organization of the academy and its bearing 
on the conditions of academic freedom.
Academic freedom is not entirely a function of 
the social organization of academic life. Personalities 
of individual administrators, trustees, and faculty 
members will have, quite obviously, a bearing on the 
extent of academic freedom in given situations, one 
college president may be quite "tyrannical” or authori­
tarian, whereas another may be rather "democratic." It is 
not the purpose of this study, however, to delve into 
individual personality inventories or biographies, nor 
to seek out evidence of individual influences on academic 
freedom in particular situations. Such individual factors 
are assumed to exist; they are taken as given. This study 
employs a sociological frame of reference, which neces­
sarily limits the range of factors to be considered and 
rules out the possibility of any "total" explanation of 
academic freedom. The purview of this study is limited 
to patterns of academic life, its structure or organi­
zation, and the relevance of these patterns to the norms 
of academic freedom.
Chapter Five, "Academic Freedom Challenged:
Some Post-War Cases,” contains an analysis of some actual
6
cases of violation of principles of academic freedom.
The cases are all those of censure and subsequent^removal 
from censure by the AAUP, from 1945 to 1965, of college 
and university administrations for infractions of princi­
ples of academic freedom and tenure as set forth in the
7Association'8 1940 statement. These cases represent a 
wide variety of types of colleges and universities and 
a diversity of infringements. There are some cases of 
censure imposed during this twenty year period which are 
still in effect; that is, censure has not been removed, 
as of 1966.8
There are two important reasons for limiting the 
analysis to those cases which have been removed from 
censure. First, those cases still on the censure list 
are "open" cases, yet to be resolved, and are "sensitive" 
in the eyes of the AAUP. Second, and more importantly, 
the "closed" or resolved cases exemplify the maximum 
influence of the AAUP (as compared to the "open" cases) 
on the academic organization of given colleges and 
universities. In the closed cases, one may examine the 
"successful" procedures of the AAUP and the response 
(i.e., the change or adjustment) of the internal organi­
zation and policy of an institution. For in order to be 
removed from censure an institution must satisfy the AAUP 
that specific changes have been made in organization and
7
policy to conform to the principles of the Association's 
1940 statement.
In the preface to their historical work on aca­
demic freedom in the united States, Hofstadter and Metzger 
state:
One of our earliest decisions in 
planning this work was to make it 
more than a running account of 
"cases." To write only about the 
outstanding violations of freedom 
would be to treat the story of 
academic freedom as though it were 
nothing but the story of academic 
suppression. The cases are, in a 
sense, the pathology of the problem.
The distortions that would arise 
from dealing with them alone are 
comparable to those that would be 
found in a history of the labor 
movement telling only of strikes, 
a history of science telling only 
of the encroachments of theology, 
or a history of political democracy 
devoted only to its defeats.^
The same objection might be raised against the approach
used in Chapter Five of this study. That is, is it merely
a pathology of academic freedom, a distorted view, to
analyze cases of violations of principles? The objection
is met, the author believes, in that the cases treated in
Chapter Five had "successful" outcomes; the violations
were in some sense "rectified" and censure removed.
Furthermore, in examining such cases, one is enabled to
see better the conditions which promote, as well as retard,
academic freedom in practice. Therefore, the pathological
8
element, per ae, is nonessential to the analysis. The 
cases simply offer a convenient framework in which view 
the interplay of academic freedom and academic organi­
zation .
Chapter Five, then, is concerned with the actual 
interplay among the three variables discussed separately 
in the three preceding chapters: the concept of academic
freedom, the AAUP as advocate of academic freedom, and 
academic organization, the framework within which the 
practice of academic freedom must be imbedded, if it is 
to exist as anything other than a fiction or an abstraction.
XII. THE STUDY VARIABLES
At this point it is possible to conceptualize the 
relationship among the three variables which comprise the 
subject of this study. The following discussion will 
serve as a guideline for the analysis carried out in 
detail in later chapters.
Figure 1 represents the elementary relationships 
among the three variables. In general terms academic 
freedom is conceived to be a dependent variable, subject 
to influence by both academic organization (the structure 
of the college or university) and the American Association 
of University Professors. The main independent variable 
is the AAUP which "operates upon" academic freedom both
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
ACADEMIC AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
ORGANIZATION UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
Figure 1. Relationships of three variables, Academic 
Freedom, Academic organization, and the American 
Association of university Professors. Arrowed line 
indicates direction of relationships.
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directly and through academic organization. The Associ­
ation exerts direct influence, for instance, through 
promulgation of ideal standards or principles of academic 
freedom. The AAUP also promotes academic freedom in­
directly (through academic organization) by encouraging 
changes in academic structure (e.g., institution of a 
faculty senate) which are intended to enhance .academic 
freedom. In either type of case, of the three variables, 
the prime mover is the AAUP.1-®
If a distinction is made between the practice of 
academic freedom and the ideals or principles of academic 
freedom, which are imperfectly represented in practice, 
it is possible to refine the representation of the 
variables of Figure 1 (see Figure 2). in Figure 2, the 
basic relationships among the three variables are retained. 
The AAUP still represents the primary independent variable 
and academic freedom, whether ideal or practice, is a 
dependent variable. It is to be noted here, however, that 
the AAUP exerts no direct influence on the practice of 
academic freedom. The influence of the Association is 
always mitigated, or at least channeled through, the 
structure of the university. Again, as in Figure 1, 
this influence may consist in, for instance, (1) es­
tablishing "principles" of academic freedom, which it 
then seeks to have adopted or "put into practice" by
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (PRACTICE)
ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM (IDEAL)
ACADEMIC AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
ORGANIZATION UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
Figure 2. Relationship of four variables. Broken line 
indicates absence of direct relation. Arrowed line 
indicates direction of influence.
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colleges and universities, or (2) promoting changes in 
academic organization, such as greater faculty partici­
pation in academic policy making, designed to promote 
academic freedom in practice.
If the representation in Figure 2 has any merit 
there are some interesting implications. First, for the 
understanding of academic freedom the internal organi­
zation of academic life is of vital importance as an 
intermediate variable because the practice of academic 
freedom is dependent upon its structure. Second, there 
is no direct relation between academic freedom as an 
ideal or set of standards, on the one hand, and the 
practice of freedom in the organizational and behavioral 
nexus of academic life on the other. The link between 
ideal and practice in this case is academic organization. 
Therefore, to be viable, the principles of freedom must 
be supported by, or rooted in, the organization of the 
college or university. Third, as noted earlier, the 
AAUP does not exert any direct Influence on the practice 
of academic freedom; rather all its influence is mediated 
by academic organization. Therefore, an association 
such as the AAUP has to take into account, in its 
promotion of academic freedom, the nature of academic 
organization, both in general and in its many particular 
varieties. Finally, the foregoing would seem to imply
13
that a sociological approach, which by definition focuses 
on organizational patterns and relationships, is especially 
appropriate to the study of academic freedom.
Figure 3 is Identical to the previous one except 
for the broken vertical line which bisects the figure, on 
the left is the "actual" college or university situation, 
including the internal academic organization and the system 
of practices related to academic freedom. To the right of 
the vertical line are the "abstract" set of norms and ideals 
of academic freedom and their sponsor, the AAUP. Together 
these may be taken to represent the "academic profession." 
The relationship among the variables is unchanged from 
Figure 2. It is to be noted that the AAUP, as a unit in 
the academic profession is "external" to the actual 
college or university situation and seeks to promote the 
practice of academic freedom through college and uni­
versity organization.
THE TIME SETTING
The two decades following the end of World war 
Two have been selected as the time span in which to 
examine a variety of problems of academic freedom in 
their contemporary forms. Chapter Five, as noted 
earlier, is an analysis of post-war cases of AAUP-imposed 
censure for violations of academic freedom. The most
THE ACADEMIC 
PROFESSION
COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (PRACTICE)
ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM (IDEAL)
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
ACADEMIC
ORGANIZATION
ACTUAL IDEAL
Figure 3. Relationship of variables within context of
colleges and universities and the academic profession.
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important reason for selecting this-period as opposed to 
others is the establishment by the AAUP of a relatively 
clearly defined set of principles of academic freedom and 
tenure in 1940, which it has sought to promote since then 
throughout the academic world. Allowing for the disruptions 
of the war and some early AAUP efforts to have its princi­
ples of academic freedom made known and approved, it seems 
well to use the year of the war's conclusion as the 
starting point for the analysis of current problem of 
academic freedom in the united States, viz-a-viz the 
1940 AAUP standards.
The post-war period has been characterized by 
several general trends of some relevance to higher edu­
cation in general and to academic freedom in particular.
Some of these trends had their origin long before the 
war, to be sure. First, a substantial increase in the 
total U.S. population, especially in the younger age 
categories.1,1 Second, general economic prosperity, 
interrupted by occasional downswings in business cycles. 
Third, increased public demand for education, including 
higher education. Fourth, various manifestations of 
anti-intellectualism, the most dramatic of which was the 
McCarthy era of Comidunist "witch-hunts." Fifth, con­
tinuing concern, intensified by the "Cold War," with 
national security, as exemplified by loyalty oaths in
16
higher education. Sixth/ the relatively greater growth 
in facilities of public, as opposed to private, higher 
education as the result of local, state, and federal 
financial support. Seventh, increased public sensitivity 
to social issues such as civil rights for minority groups. 
Eighth, closer ties between colleges and the economic 
needs of community and nation, such that universities 
have become valued increasingly as training centers for 
occupational roles. Ninth, more emphasis on applied 
knowledge and research in the universities to serve 
specific needs of industry, commerce, agriculture, and 
government. Tenth, the burgeoning bureaucratization of 
the universities.
Each of these trends has left its impact on the 
character of academic life in higher education. Several 
of these elenfents are related and usually have acted in 
conjunction, rather than singly, upon the structure of 
the academic world. For instance, the growth in the 
size of the universities is closely tied to the trend of 
bureaucratic organization. The impact of some of these 
trends on problems of academic freedom is made evident 
in the analysis of censure cases in chapter Five. More­
over, these trends have served as the backdrop for the 
recent development of academic freedom in the united 
States.
17
In summary, the main concern of this study is 
to examine the concept and practice of academic freedom 
from a sociological viewpoints Academic freedom is con­
ceived as a complex of norms in relation to academic 
organization* Attention is focused on the extent and 
manner in Which academic freedom is a dependent variable 
of academic organization as well as on the policies and 
programs of the American Association of university Pro­
fessors in regard to academic freedom. Chapter Two deals 
with the historical development and contemporary usages 
of the concept of academic freedom in the united States. 
Chapter Three contains an analysis of the functions of 
the AAUP as advocate of academic freedom. Chapter Four 
is concerned with the variables of the internal academic 
organization of colleges and universities and their 
bearing on conditions of academic freedom. Chapter Five 
is devoted to an analysis of resolved post World War 
Two cases of AAUP censure of institutional administrations 
for violations of principles of academic freedom. The 
analysis of the cases provides the framework for elabo­
ration of the ideas and hypotheses developed in the 
previous chapters. A statement of summary and con­
clusions completes the study.
18
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE
^For the social sciences and the humanities this 
norm entails freedom to criticize prevalent beliefs and 
practices of one's community and society insofar as these 
are the subject of one's competence.
2The list of academic freedom norms could be 
extended and specified in detail. See Chapter Two for a 
discussion of the concept of academic freedom.
^For an extensive historical analysis of the 
problem of academic freedom in America, see Richard 
Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, The Development of 
Academic Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia
university Press, 1955).
4Because of the unwieldy length of the organi­
zation 's name, abbreviations such as "AAUP" or the 
"Association" will be used often throughout the disser­
tation .
^Association membership as of January 1, 1966, 
was approximately 77,000. The Association has organized 
chapter affiliates on some 900 college and university 
campuses. Cf. the AAUP Bulletin, vol. 52, no. 1 (March 
1966), pp. 64, 72.
^The medium of publication is the Association's 
official Bulletin, issued four times a year, and circulated 
to all dues-paying members of the organization.
7This statement of principles, because it is so 
germane to this study, is reproduced in full in Appendix C.
9Some descriptive and tabular data on these cases 
as compared to those removed from censure are found in 
Chapter Five.
9Hofstadter and Metzger, o£. cit., v.
l^The author does not intend to imply that the 
AAUP is the only positive force for academic freedom in 
the world of higher education. There are other organi­
zations, such as the American Civil Liberties union, which 
exhibit some concern for academic freedom, as well as more 
subtle, "non-organizational" elements, such as the force
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of academic traditions in particular instances (e.g., 
the concept of the faculty as a "guild" in the old 
English sense). The AAUP is considered by the author, 
however, to be the greatest "visible" force for academic 
freedom in the United States,
•^The trends cited are widely known matters 
of fact; therefore, no footnote citations are given.
The relation of certain of these trends to conditions 
of academic freedom is clarified in the analysis of 
censure cases in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER II
THE IDEA OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM:
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Unlike civil liberties, academic freedom in this 
country has never enjoyed a specific meaning established 
by law. Having no legal status, its scope and appli­
cation have been repeatedly in doubt. Nor has tradition 
been of much assistance. As an idea academic freedom was 
not a domestic creation. When it was implanted finally 
into the American pattern of higher education from abroad, 
the notion of academic freedom struggled with largely 
inimical traditions of academic practice. With little 
support from tradition and no footing in law, the concept 
of academic freedom has been the subject of incessant 
controversy, among its champions no less than among its 
detractors.
Because of lack of consensus on the meaning and 
applicability of academic freedom, particularly in the 
earlier stages of its American experience, the evolution 
of the concept is difficult to trace. The purposes of 
the present study, however, do not seem to require a 
comprehensive accounting of the origin and history of 
academic freedom. Only three facets of the historical
20
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development of the concept of academic freedom have been 
selected for brief analysis In this chapter: (1) the
bearing of structural features of early American higher 
education on the development of the Idea of academic 
freedom; (2) the Introduction of the German conception 
of academic freedom Into American education after 1850; 
and (3) the subsequent development of the concept in 
conjunction with intellectual-scientific and academic 
trends beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and continuing into the twentieth. The concluding 
section of the chapter draws analytical distinctions be­
tween academic freedom and some related ideas in an attempt 
to clarify contemporary usage of the concept.
I. FREEDOM IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
The twentieth century concept of academic freedom 
is hardly applicable to higher education in the united 
States prior to 1860. The prevailing contemporary con­
ception of academic freedom is intimately tied to the type 
of university structure and function that came into being 
mainly after the civil War. There are, however, elements 
of early American academic history that fostered and re­
tarded the emergence of academic freedom in more recent 
times.
In his Academic Freedom in the Age of the College,1
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Richard Ho£stadter divides the educational history of the
pre-Civil War era roughly into three periods: the period
of the colonial college, beginning with the founding of
Harvard in 1636; the Revolutionary and early national
period, comprising the latter decades of the eighteenth
centure; and the period of the old-time (denominational)
2college, 1800-60. Each of these periods had distinctive 
characteristics in relation to the subject of freedom 
within the academy.
in the entire colonial period there were only 
nine colleges, from the founding of Harvard to the es­
tablishment of Dartmouth in 1769.3 The colonial colleges 
had virtually no permanent professional faculty. Instead 
they relied primarily on a small staff of amateurish, 
young tutors (often future ministers) for such instruction 
as they were able to offer. The college president was 
typically regarded as a "professional," perhaps because 
of his clerical identity. In the absence of any sub­
stantial body of professional faculty it is difficult to 
speak of the problem of academic freedom in its modern 
sense. Assuredly, there were related issues of insti­
tutional autonomy and administrative power of the presi­
dent. These issues, tied to patterns of denominational 
sponsorship and lay government of higher education, are 
discussed below.
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'The latter decades of the eighteenth century* 
designated as the Revolutionary and early national period, 
were distinctive in some ways. There was moderate expansion 
of colleges to 1799, Including the establishment of sixteen 
new institutions.* Three related developments during the 
period have a bearing on the subject of academic freedom. 
First, there was a growing trend of religious toleration 
in the society at large. Second, in connection with the 
founding of the Republic there was a substantial concern 
with civil liberties of the individual citizen. Each of 
these trends made itself felt in academic circles, although 
neither had its origin in the college. The third major 
trend was more specifically, perhaps generically, academic: 
the secularization of knowledge and learning, of this 
trend HOfstadter says:
The most significant trend in 
collegiate education during the 
eighteenth century was the secu­
larization of the colleges. By 
opening up new fields for college 
study, both scientific and practi­
cal, by rarefying the devotional 
atmosphere of the colleges, and 
by introducing a note of skepticism 
and inquiry, the trend toward 
secular learning inevitably did 
much to liberate college work.5
Between 1800 and 1860, an astoundingly large
number of new Institutions,about five hundred,6 were
founded across the expanding nation, only a small minority
7of which survived until the Civil War. Hofstadter
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8characterized this period as "the great retrogression."
9This was the period of the "old-time college." The limited 
capacity of the society to support higher education became 
fragmented to the detriment even of well-established insti­
tutions. The majority of the new institutions, being 
sponsored by religious denominations and sects, were 
regarded, perhaps, as a type of status symbol by church­
men and townspeople. Hofstadter elaborates on the causes 
and consequences of the new trend:
The two factors that were far more 
important than geography in de­
termining that American education 
should be fragmented were denomi­
national sponsorship of colleges 
and local pride. The multiplicity 
of colleges was a product of the 
multiplicity of Protestant sects 
compounded by the desire of local 
bodies, religious or civil, to 
promote all kinds of enterprises 
that gratified local pride or 
boosted local real-estate values.10
* * *
. . . This fragmentation of higher 
education was devastating in its 
consequences both for the quality 
of academic work and the position 
of the professor. . .i;L
* * *
. . . From the outset the severely 
denominational institutions neither 
aspired to nor pretended to foster 
academic freedom. . .12
In spite of the differences among these ante­
bellum periods in the development of academic freedom, and
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the rather encouraging trends of the latter eighteenth 
century, the entire era exhibited two prevalent charac­
teristics which were uniquely American and ultimately 
worked, on the whole, to the detriment of academic 
freedom. The first was the role of religion in education, 
and the second was the system of lay control. Although 
these were related trends, they may be examined separately.
Religion and Education.
The basic pattern of the relation between church 
and college was set during the colonial period. Most of 
the early colleges developed under religious sponsorship 
and control, and served important religious functions, 
including the training of clergy. In spite of their 
liberal arts curricula, the colleges commonly were 
handmaids of orthodox religious institutions and values.
It should be noted that while many eighteenth 
century colleges were founded and supported by a single 
denomination, they often assumed something of an inter­
denominational character in the composition of boards of 
control and student bodies. There was apparently enough 
competition among the various colleges for student en- 
roIlment and support to justify, if not require, this 
type of "open door" policy as a matter of expediency.
This type of policy soon became formulated as religious
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freedom for students, constituting the first evidence of
13freedom of thought as a conscious goal in academic life.
The denominational identity of the college, however, was 
almost always reflected in the religious affiliation of 
the president.14
Whatever the trend toward genuine religious 
toleration and secularism in the latter part of the century, 
this course was soon reversed in the early nineteenth 
century when roost of the new colleges were rigidly sectarian 
in control, policy, and appeal.
The critical question in regard to academic 
freedom is the extent to which the religious and sectarian 
character of the colleges operated to stifle free inquiry 
and expression. A clear and specific answer probably is 
not possible. There were not many "academic freedom cases" 
in the colonial era because apparently, as Hofstadter 
states, most teachers ". . . lived and worked placidly 
within this f r a m e w o r k O r t h o d o x  religious values and 
beliefs were challenged rarely in the colleges perhaps 
because of the orthodoxy of the college personnel them­
selves. This orthodoxy seems to have been virtually 
guaranteed by the recruitment process, as explained by 
HOfstadter:
The candid examinations of pro­
spective appointees suggest that
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the consideration of doctrinal 
acceptability was all but uni­
versal; and where a president, 
professor, or tutor was installed 
without prior examination, the 
omission is more plausibly 
explained by the presumption 
that his principles were already 
well known than by the assumption 
that the board of governors was 
liberal or indifferent to such 
matters. In interdenominational 
colleges more latitude existed 
for variety of belief, but no 
one seems to have contested the 
principle that a college officer's 
beliefs could properly be scanned 
before his appointment.
Fundamentally, the colleges, as wards of the church, were
not "free" with respect to religious matters; they lived
in an atmosphere of orthodoxy, though with little, if any,
feeling of external constraint on academic inquiry, in
any case, the colleges, having no corporate autonomy from
religion, were not anxious "to bite the hand that fed them."
Lay Government of Education.
The nature and extent of religious control of 
collegiate education was complicated by, as well as mani­
fested in, the system of lay government. This pattern 
also originated in the colonial colleges and has persisted 
as a basic trait of American higher education.
The pattern that emerged in the eighteenth century 
usually consisted in designating a number of persons to
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serve as "trustees" of the college. Trustees, in the 
legal sense, were the college, and possessed total au­
thority over the affairs of the college, including the 
legal power to hire and fire faculty and administrative 
personnel. The trustees were "lay" in the sense that 
they were external to the college, being legal guardians 
rather than employees, and in the further sense that 
they were not professional educators. Early trustees 
were usually men of established status in the eyes of 
church and community, often being clergy.
As with the issue of religion, the crucial 
question concerning academic freedom in the pattern of 
lay control is the extent to which such control actually 
worked to the detriment of free work and expression in 
the colleges, of the long run effect of lay government, 
Hofstadter notes that it has " . . .  hampered the develop­
ment of organization, initiative, and self-confidence
among American college professors, and it has contributed
17. . . to lowering their status in the community."
Faculty personnel (as well as administrators) tend to be 
regarded as employees, who serve at the pleasure of the 
trustees, to whom the faculty is thereby beholden. Insofar 
as this is actually the case, teachers are not likely to 
question or challenge values and beliefs associated with 
the interests, religious, economic, or political, of the
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trustees.
In point of fact, however, trustees have seldom 
chosen to augment, on a continuous basis, the full measure 
of their legal powers over the minute affairs of the 
colleges. Even as early as the colonial period con­
siderable authority was delegated to the administrator, 
sometimes at the demand of the president. The first 
issues of academic freedom and institutional autonomy 
probably resided in conflicts between president and
18trustees over questions of policy-making for the college. 
Only after the formation of substantial professional 
faculties did academic freedom, in the guise of faculty 
authority, become an issue of any magnitude or signifi­
cance.
It is important to note, with Hofstadter, that
American Protestants did not 
consider that they were destroying 
Intellectual freedom by extending 
the policy of lay government from 
churches to colleges, indeed they 
considered it one of their con­
tributions to civilization that 
they had broken up the priestly 
autonomy of advanced education 
and had brought it under the 
control of the community.19
Nevertheless, the net effect of the system of lay govern­
ment of higher education has tended to obstruct academic 
freedom by restraining faculty authority. From colonial 
times to the present, the division of authority among
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trustees, administrators, and faculty has been a problem 
that has evaded permanent resolution and has preoccupied 
those involved in any of the three roles.
The Limits of Freedom.
in the entire pre-Civil War era the dominant
pattern consisted of a linkage between religion and
education, church and college, that resembled a parent-
child relationship. The child enjoyed little autonomy
from the often heavy hand of parental authority. The
relationship drew very close, perhaps bordering on incest,
in the denominational old-time college of the early
nineteenth century. To be a "church-related" college
was to be a church-controlled one. The parental church
took great pride in giving birth to institutions of
learning, and in the accomplishments of its fledgling
offspring, but seldom would permit its children to be
weaned. As a result, the mortality rate was high; many
colleges died from the suffocation of paternal-sectarian
20possessiveness. Others hobbled along to a delayed 
maturity.
On the whole, then, the college was subservient 
to church and community as represented by the board of 
trustees. The degree of religious control was never 
absolute, being mitigated, in part, by sectarian rivalries
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that occasionally resulted in religious toleration. lay 
government was not as stifling as it might have been, 
considering the extensiveness of its legal powers. 
Nevertheless, it is tenuous to speak of "free inquiry" 
under these ante helium circumstances in view of the lack 
of "inquiry," on the one hand, and the rarity of open 
challenges of religious and community authority, on the 
other, in short, the limits of academic freedom were 
never tested in an overt and comprehensive fashion. Aca­
demic freedom was never a consciously formulated ideal of
academic life, Thus, the "age of the college" in the
United States represents the pre-history of academic 
freedom.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN GERMANY:
A MODEL FOR THE UNITED STATES
The German System of Higher Educations Modern Trends.
The seminal forces in the development of con­
ceptions of academic freedom in the united States were 
derived from patterns of practice in German higher education 
in the nineteenth century. The general structure and 
functions of German universities provided the framework 
and the rationale for the German ideal of academic freedom, 
later Imparted to American education.
The modern era of German higher education, which 
culminated in the nineteenth century, is usually considered
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to have been ushered in by the foundation of the university
•I 21of Halle in 1694 and the university of Gottingen in 1737. 
Two features of Halle gave substance to its claim to dis­
tinction as the original modern university: (1) its
assimilation of modern science and philosophy and (2) its
22advocacy of freedom of thought and teaching. From its 
foundation Halle became known for its rejection of of­
ficially established systems of doctrine in theology, 
philosophy, medicine, and law. Its espousal of free 
teaching usually meant in practice a stout antagonism 
toward the traditional dogmas still prevalent in other 
universities. Some of its faculty were leading pioneers 
of the German Enlightenment, and Halle became a strong­
hold of rationalism.
Founded in 1737 by the state of Hanover, the 
University of Gottingen was an offshoot of Halle and 
became a formidable rival, eventually surpassing its 
model in prestige and originality. Freedom of thought 
and teaching were taken for granted and the ideal of 
research in all fields of knowledge was fostered to a 
greater extent than at Halle, older teaching methods 
gave way to the modern lecture and the seminar in con­
junction with the new emphasis on research.
By the end of the eighteenth century, according 
to Paulsen,23 virtually all German universities had
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instituted new patterns of university structure and 
function fashioned on the models of Halle and Gottingen.
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the fact 
that these changes represented a rather radical departure 
from prior traditional conceptions of knowledge and proper 
university function, the most decisive changes were yet 
to come. That is, even though original research, particu­
larly in the humanities, was incorporated into the role 
expectations of the academic scholar in the eighteenth 
century, it was not until the next century that the 
research function of the university became dominant.
Three major universities were founded in the 
early decades of the nineteenth century: Berlin (1810),
Breslau (1811), and Bonn (1817). At these universities, 
from the beginning, scientific research was the dominant 
university function, whereas Halle and Gottingen had 
introduced research as a proper function of the university 
teacher, the research function remained for them a sub­
sidiary requirement until much later, in the nineteenth 
century original research in Increasingly specialized 
fields of science and scholarship became the foremost 
expectation of a university professor. Thus, Berlin, 
founded under the guidance of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and 
the other universities mentioned became the prototypes 
of the modern university and served as International
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models.
The remolding of the German universities into 
workshops of scientific research constituted nothing less 
than a revolution in patterns of university organization. 
Just as radical changes were wrought in the functions of 
the university and the role of the professor, so also was 
there a new conception of the role of the student. Paulsen 
explains:
For the new idea was also formed 
of the ultimate purpose of academical 
studies, the object in view being no 
longer the acquisition of encyclo­
pedic learning or of dogmatic 
propositions, but the gaining of an 
independent grasp of scientific 
principles, the lifting of the 
student into the region of ideas, 
and his initiation at the same 
time into original scientific 
research.^4
These complex and radical developments in the 
structure and function of German universities, sketched 
here in only barest outline, were the framework for the 
formation of the ideals of Lernfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit. 
These ideals, which were later to influence American 
notions of academic freedom, have been singled out for 
brief attention.
The ideals of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit.
During the course of the nineteenth century 
German universities became noted, for, among other
25features, the ideals of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit.
Each of these ideals eventually was grafted into American 
academic structure in modified form. The notion of 
Lernfreiheit pertained to the student and the learning 
situation. Under this conception university students 
were free to choose a university and to "transfer" from 
one to another at will. With few exceptions, they could 
choose their curriculum and take courses in any preferred 
sequence, class attendance was optional. The only 
examination for which they were responsible was the 
final examination which culminated the regular period 
of university study. Their private lives were subject 
to a minimum of university regulation.
The ideal Lehrfreiheit was considered to be the 
professional prerogative of university professors. In­
cluded in the concept of Lehrfreiheit were freedom of 
inquiry and the right to report findings both in the 
classroom and through publication. The rationale for 
both Lern- and Lehrfreiheit was tied to the purpose of 
the university. If the universities were to perform the 
vaunted research function, then, so the argument went, 
the professors needed freedom to investigate all evidence 
and to report all findings. Similarly, students, being 
potential research workers, deserved freedom to choose 
their training. These ideals were definitional requirements
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of the true university, equally as much as the research 
function itself.
German influence on American Scholars.
The vessels of the transfer of the German ideals
of freedom to the United States were, on the one hand,
German expatriates, and on the other, native Americans
studying in German universities. The greatest influx of
German-trained scholars and scientists occurred in the
latter decades of the nineteenth century and continued to
a lesser extent into the twentieth. Some eight to nine
thousand Americans studied in German universities during
26the nineteenth century. Those who became the leading
champions of academic freedom in this country were often
German-trained. As Metzger points out, eight of the
thirteen signers of the 1915 "Report on Academic Freedci "
of the American Association of University Professors had
27studied in German universities.
Whether American students received an accurate 
or representative impression of the nature and extent of 
academic freedom in German universities is not an issue 
here. What is important to note is that American students 
in Germany were almost universally awed by the ideals 
of Lehr- and Lernfreiheit and became enthusiastic 
promoters of these ideals upon their return to the united
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States. American students in Germany were also impressed 
lay the rationale of academic freedom. The functional 
necessity of freedom for research, teaching, and learning 
in a true university was an appealing idea to the American 
visitors.
III. LATER DEVELOPMENT OP THE 
CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES
The second half of the nineteenth century in the
united States witnessed a twin revolution in the academic
world that enhanced the prospects of academic freedom.
The first revolution was an intellectual one, centering
on the controversy related to the Darwinian theory of
evolution. The second, based partly on the first, was
more specifically an academic revolution, the rise of
the university as a new (to the united states) form of
academic organization. Although the two can be separated
analytically, it is well to remember that they acted upon,
and supplemented, one another.
The Contributions of the Darwinian Debate.
Intellectual historians have dealt comprehensively
and minutely with the Darwinian controversy and its impact
28on American thought. in his Academic Freedom in the 
Age of the University, Walter Metzger discusses the
t
consequences of this controversy for the rise of the concept
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2Qof academic freedom. Metzger contends that two patterns 
of events held particular significance for the development 
of academic freedom. The first of these were "inflamma­
tory events," the dismissals and harassments of evo­
lutionists among college faculties. The second was the 
attack, led partly by the evolutionists, on religious 
authority in science and education. Out of these two 
patterns emerged a new rationale, though not entirely 
overtly expressed, for academic freedom.
Metzger views the new rationale for academic 
freedom contributed by the Darwinian revolution as three­
fold, consisting of (1) a formula for tolerating error,
(2) limitations upon administrative power, and (3) a set 
of positive values or morality. The formula for toler­
ating error evolved from the evolutionist notion that 
all beliefs are tentatively, rather than categorically, 
true or false, and only verifiable through disciplined 
inquiry. Since truth can never be fully known, a man 
should not be penalized for holding nonconformist ideas, 
as long as he has followed systematic rules of science 
in reaching his conclusions.
As a result of the Darwinian controversy 
limitations upon administrative power in judging the 
professional standing of professors could not be 
justified on the grounds of the judicial incompetence
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of the board of trustees or administrators. Only experts 
among professional peers are capable of evaluating, with 
any wisdom, the professional standing of a faculty member. 
Says Metzger, " . . .  the argument for scientific compe­
tence, used in the Darwinian debate as an answer to
clerical presumptuousness, has been turned to useful
30account as reply to trustee presumption."
Finally, of all the values associated with 
scientific activity, universalism and neutrality, emerged 
from the Darwinian era to form the basis for a scientific 
morality, universalism means that particularistic criteria, 
such as race, creed, nationality, are irrevelant in judging 
the value of a scholarly or scientific work. Neutrality 
implies a positive attitude of disinterestedness in the 
pursuit of knowledge. On the relation of these values 
to academic freedom, Metzger states:
By assimilating the value of uni- 
versaliam, academic freedom has come 
to signify the brotherhood of man in 
science that is akin in aspiration to 
the brotherhood of man in God. . . .
By acquiring the value of neutrality, 
academic freedom has come to stand for 
the belief that science must transcend 
ideology . . .  As the symbol and the 
guardian of these two values, academic 
freedom has come to be equated not 
only with free intellectual activity, 
but with an ethic of human relations 3 
and an ideal of personal fulfillment.
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The Rise of the University.
Although It is apparent that the Darwinian 
controversy made an impact on the structure of the aca­
demic world and fostered the underpinnings for a new 
concept of academic freedom, it was essentially an intel­
lectual revolution, a revolution of ideas and world-views. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, in partner­
ship with this intellectual revolution, and concomitant 
with the German influence on American students, occurred
the academic revolution, the rise of the university
32structure with its new academic functions.
In the present context perhaps it is unnecessary 
to explore the complex "causes" of the rise of the uni­
versity; instead, attention is called to the structural 
and functional features of the new mode of academic 
organization as these are relevant to academic freedom.
As with the concept of academic freedom, Germany provided 
a model of the university for selective adaptation by 
American educational reformers. Upon their return to the 
United States from Germany, some Americans became en­
thusiastic promulgators, not only of the ideal of Lehr­
freiheit , but also of the idea of the university as a 
center of research and original contribution to knowledge. 
Indeed, it was primarily the latter idea that had 
attracted them to Germany in the first place. On the
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whole, they simply looked upon academic freedom as a 
functional requisite for the performance of the research 
function, broadly defined, in the university setting.
JohnsHopkins University, founded in 1876, was 
deliberately patterned on the essential features of the 
German model. The key structural element was the 
graduate school, the rough equivalent of the German 
faculty of Philosophy, " . . .  broad in its range of 
specialties, non-utilitarian in its objectives, devoted 
to the tasks of research."*^ The primary functions were 
research and graduate training. The original faculty of 
Johns Hopkins, the Gottingen of Baltimore, had received 
German training, almost to a man. The lecture, the 
seminar, and the laboratory were the German-inspired 
modes of instruction.
Following the lead of Johns Hopkins, fifteen
major graduate schools were founded over the next two
35decades and graduate enrollment soared. With each new 
graduate program the original model became blurred and 
compromised. Often graduate schools were tacked onto 
existing undergraduate colleges with no sharp lines 
demarcating them. Metzger points out that
In answering the question: 'What
should the new university be?' every 
need clamored for satisfaction, 
every craft hoped for inclusion.
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Our post-war institutions of higher 
learning were therefore not merely 
motley, but mongrel; not only 
different from each other in size, 
quality, independence, and so­
phistication, but eclectic in_fi 
their character and purposes. 16
in spite of the variability and hodge-podge 
character of the new university movement, which included 
the establishment of land-grant colleges under the 
Morrill Act of 1862, the quintessence of the new uni­
versity was its dedication to the German-inspired functions 
of academic research and graduate training. Associated 
with the rise of the university in the latter decades of 
the nineteenth century and passing over into the twentieth 
were three elements of special significance for the long- 
run development of the concept of academic freedom. These 
were: (1) new attitudes toward the pursuit of knowledge
through scholarly and scientific research; (2) the pro­
fessionalization and specialization of academic roles; 
and (3) the growth of increasingly secular social 
sciences.
The new attitudes toward knowledge were con­
tributed, in part, by the evolutionists, and partly also 
by the returning German students. Truth was no longer 
absolute; knowledge was neither final nor complete. The 
word "research" meant many things to many people, but to
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all it symbolized the tentativeness of present knowledge 
and the need to extend its frontiers. Knowledge was not 
the ward of past authority, but was to be gained by frontal 
assault, with an offensive posture. Knowledge was to be 
acquired by positive action, with the tools and procedures 
of the new science and secular scholarship. This new 
conception of knowledge arose primarily from the Darwinian 
revolution. However, those academicians who had been 
trained in Germany also contributed to the new attitudes 
toward knowledge, through the connotations of the concept 
of Wissenschaft. Metzger explains:
The very notion of wissenschaft 
had overtones of meaning utterly 
missing in its English counterpart, 
science. The German term signified 
a dedicated, sanctified pursuit.
It signified not merely the goal 
of rational understanding, but the 
goal of self-£ulfiIlment; not merely 
the study of the "exact sciences," 
but of everything taught by the 
university? not the study of things 
for their immediate utilities, but 
the morally imperative study of 
things for themselves and for their 
ultimate meanings.37
The notion of wissenschaft had some impact on the new 
American conception of research; the necessity of thorough­
ness, disciplined inquiry, and positive dedication in the 
pursuit of reliable knowledge. Associated with these new 
attitudes toward knowledge was a high degree of enthusiasm
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for the research function of the professor* Once the 
commitment to the aggressive pursuit of knowledge was 
made, there could be no rational limits to research; no 
subject nor hypothesis could be taboo, in short, following 
the German argument, the pursuit of knowledge demanded 
academic freedom in the form of freedom of inquiry and 
expression.
As the horizons of knowledge were extended under 
university auspices, specialization of interest and 
competence became a practical necessity for the indi­
vidual. As the limits of competence narrowed, expertise 
increased, and with it, the professional status of the 
scholar-scientist. As this trend advanced the trustee 
and the administrator became less and less capable, in 
the eyes of academicians, of judging the professional 
competence and stature of an individual professor. The 
teacher-researcher now staked another claim for academic 
freedom in the guise of increased faculty authority over 
the judgment of the performance of colleagues. He wanted 
to be Insulated from the insecurity of being evaluated 
and harassed by irrelevant standards and incompetent 
judges. He hoped, by invoking academic freedom, to 
guarantee his liberty to pursue knowledge wherever that 
search led.
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Finally, the rise of the university also 
coincided with the rapid growth of the secular social 
sciences. This development was not without significance 
for the course of academic freedom. Prior to the Darwinian 
controversy and the emergence of the university, the study 
of social, economic, and political affairs belonged to 
moral philosophy. With the Darwinian attack on religious 
authority and the new outlook on knowledge sponsored by 
the university research function, it became feasible to 
study societal institutions in the systematic, secular, 
and often empirical, manner of the established sciences. 
However, the new social scientist was most vulnerable to 
intimidation in his research activities because he could 
not easily avoid questioning sacred mores and folklore.
He was trampling on the sacred with his secular science 
and outlook. He, more than his colleagues, needed some 
reliable guarantees of free inquiry and expression. It 
is worth noting that among the early leaders in the 
founding of the American Association of university
Professors was a disproportionately high representation
38of social scientists. The American Economic Association 
was particularly involved in the promotion of academic 
freedom and the AAUP.^®
On the whole, then, the rise of the university,
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with its emphasis on research and graduate training, the 
emergency of new, positive attitudes toward intellectual- 
scientific activity, the professionalization and special­
ization of academic roles, and the rise of the social 
sciences within the university, encouraged the specifi­
cation of the idea and the rationale of academic freedom.
Toward an operational Concept of Academic Freedom.
The founding of the AAUP in 1915, as an associ­
ation devoted primarily to the promulgation of academic 
freedom, signaled an important degree of institutionalization 
of the concept. The next chapter is devoted to an analysis 
of this organization as a sponsor of academic freedom.
Aside from the activity of the AAUP there continued to 
be discussion of the concept of academic freedom to 
clarify its meaning.
In the twentieth century two statements in 
particular represent important contributions to the 
continuing clarification of the concept, one is Arthur 
Lovejoy's definitive essay written in the 1930's and the 
other is by Robert Maclver in the 1950's. Neither statement 
represents an official conception of AAUP or any other 
organization.
In examining Lovejoy's and Maclver's discussion 
of the subject of academic freedom the following questions
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will serve as guidelines of analysis:
(1) What is the nature of academic freedom 
(What is one free to do or to have?) How does its nature 
and status compare to other "freedoms1 in society?
(2) who is entitled to academic freedom and 
under what conditions? Are students specifically included? 
is academic freedom only intramural, i.e., does it apply 
only within the routine activity of the academy?
(3) What is the basis or rationale of academic
freedom? Why is it valued? Who and what are its bene­
ficiaries?
(4) What and who are the main threats to aca­
demic freedom? How may academic freedom be protected or
extended? Who has the responsibility to defend academic 
freedom?
The late Arthur 0. Lovejoy, long-time professor
of philosophy at Johns Hopkins university, maintained a
scholarly interest in the subject of academic freedom
40throughout his professional career. He was the author
of a definitive essay, "Academic Freedom," in the Encyclo-
41pedia of the Social Sciences.
In this essay, written in 1930, Professor Lovejoy
advances the following definition of academic freedom:
Academic freedom is the freedom 
of the teacher or research worker
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in higher institutions of 
learning to investigate and 
discuss the problems of his 
science and to express his 
conclusions, whether through 
publication or in the in­
struction of students, without 
interference from political or 
ecclesiastical authority, or 
from the administrative of­
ficials of the institution in 
which he is employed, unless 
his methods are found by quali­
fied bodies of his own profession 
to be clearly incompetent or 
contrary to professional ethics.4
Academic freedom includes freedom of opinion,
speech, and publication, and is, thus, akin to ordinary
civil liberties "usually accorded to other citizens of
A Omodern liberal states," writes Lovejoy. The main 
difference between academic freedom and the similar 
freedoms of other citizens is that "the teacher is in 
his economic status a salaried employee," and, Lovejoy 
continues, "the freedom claimed for him implies a denial 
of the right of those who provide or administer the funds 
from which he is paid, to control the content of his 
teaching.1,44
This freedom is attached to the social role of 
the scholar in the academy and pertains to both the 
teaching and the research function performed in that 
setting. It is to be noted that Lovejoy makes no 
reference to academic freedom as pertaining to the role
1
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of student or to the function of learning. The closest 
he comes to this is in specifying freedom of research, 
but it is not the freedom to conduct research in the 
generic sense (to inquire, investigate, learn). It is 
the freedom of the "research worker," who is presumably 
a professional employee of the academy. There is little 
doubt, however, that Lovejoy has the benefit of the 
student and the learning process in mind in his state­
ment. Such a conclusion seems warranted when one 
examines his justification for academic freedom.
The freedom of the scholar is, in Lovejoy's 
view, "socially necessary," that is, of essential benefit 
to the life of. civilized society. He contends that the 
function of teaching and research in higher institutions 
of learning is among those indispensable functions 
"which cannot be performed if the specific manner of 
their performance is dictated by those who pay for 
them."^5 Furthermore, there are three aspects of the 
role of the academic scholar which necessitate academic 
freedom. These are: (1) technical expertise, (2)
disinterestedness, and (3) advancement of science and
46new ideas. As a technical eaqpert the scholar undergoes 
extensive and costly training prior to being set apart 
"to investigate problems which it is not practicable 
for all men to investigate thoroughly and at first hand
47for themselves." The scholar thus becomes an expert 
adviser and informant for society in his area of compe­
tence. The disinterestedness of the scholar is somewhat 
analogous to that of the judge. Such objectivity, neces­
sary in the pursuit of knowledge, can prevail only if the 
scholar is free from intimidation and subordination. The 
advancement of science and new ideas, the most important 
function of the scholar, often entails challenging or 
undermining dominant beliefs and generally accepted 
"knowledge." Inquiry, including presentation of findings, 
must occur without external restraints.
At another point in the same essay Lovejoy 
speaks more specifically to the question of the student's 
concern with academic freedom. Students are entitled, 
he states, "to learn the contemporary situation in each
science, the range and diversity of opinion among special-
48ists in it. . ." This condition can occur only to the 
extent that teachers are free in the sense of the definition 
quoted earlier. In other words this "right" of the student 
to learn is contingent upon the freedom of the scholar to 
make available his findings. This is not to say that the 
student possesses academic freedom as Lovejoy has defined 
it.
The only other freedom or right which inheres
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in the role of the student derives from the responsibility 
of the scholar to present fairly the range of opinion and 
interpretation in his field of inquiry. It is the obli­
gation of the teacher (and, conversely, the right of the 
student) to encourage and train the student to reach his 
own conclusions through critical reflection and investi­
gation. This right of the student might be construed to 
be academic freedom of a sort. Nonetheless, one roust 
conclude that Lovejoy did not conceive of academic 
freedom, as he defined it, to apply to the student. On 
the one hand, the student's right to learn is a result 
of the freedom of teaching. And, on the other hand, the 
right of the student to receive from the teacher a fair 
presentation of professional opinion is a result of the 
obligation of the teacher to practice academic freedom.
Granted, then, that academic freedom resides in 
the role of the scholar in the academy, is it only an' 
intramural freedom he enjoys or does it also apply to 
the extramural expressions and activities of the scholar? 
Lovejoy seems to be somewhat equivocal on this point. He 
states that dismissals pursuant to the exercise of po­
litical or personal freedom outside the university in a 
way, or for purposes, objectionable to the administrative 
authorities of a university are "contrary in spirit" to 
academic freedom. Such punitive action is, he declares,
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" . . . primarily a special case of the abuse of the
economic relation of employer and employee for the
49denial of ordinary civil liberties." This statement 
notwithstanding, the reader is left not knowing whether, 
after all, academic freedom is extramural in application 
or perhaps only extramural "in spirit."
Throughout Lovejoy's brief essay academic freedom 
is given an instrumental justification. The freedom of 
the scholar presumably is not an intrinsic value. Its 
worth is in its contribution to the quest for knowledge, 
which in turn is seen to be of extrinsic value to society. 
Academic freedom is, he writes, a prerequisite condition 
to "the proper prosecution . . .  of scientific inquiry and 
the communication of the results of it to the public and 
to students . . . »50 Thus, the students, directly, and 
society as a whole, perhaps less directly, are the bene­
ficiaries to whom the fruits of academic freedom accrue.
In his definition of academic freedom Lovejoy 
was careful-to specify potential sources of threats to 
the freedom of the scholar. Academic freedom is a freedom 
from interference from "political or ecclesiastical 
authority." He seems to have in mind, on the one hand, 
the system of public higher education, which is often 
subject to "political" control, if not interference.
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On the other hand, sectarian colleges are in many cases 
vulnerable to "ecclesiastical interference," e.g., 
official or informal norms in matters of religious creed.
In each case it is a form of "external" interference or 
restraint. By implication any manifestation of outside 
influence upon the academic affairs of the scholar 
represents a menace to free inquiry and free teaching.
Lovejoy also cites as potential threats to 
academic freedom the administrative officials of the 
institution. Traditionally in the united States, power 
to "hire and fire" has been quite generally in the hands 
of administrators. Academic freedom is intended, in part, 
to remind administrative officials that the academic 
employer-employee relation is not analogous in all 
respects to such a relation in the business world. The 
employee-scholar remains free from doctrinal specification 
of his expressions and activities, or any other type of 
interference. As Lovejoy phrases it, "„ . . those who 
buy a certain service may not (in the most important 
particular) prescribe the nature of the service to be 
rendered."51
What are the means by which academic freedom can 
be protected and extended? And, whose responsibility is 
it to defend this freedom? Governing boards, administrative
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officials, and faculty personnel alike are responsible 
for the maintenance of conditions of academic freedom. 
Governing boards, for their part, "should decline all 
endowments for the inculcation of opinions specified by 
the donor."52 Most attempts by external sectarian, po­
litical, economic, or other groups to interfere with 
academic freedom are channeled through, or brought to 
bear upon, the administrative officers of an institution. 
Thus, administrators are in a position, as well as obliged, 
to resist such arbitrary pressures before they are brought 
to bear on the faculty member. That is, the administration 
usually can, and certainly, must, insulate the faculty 
from external intimidation and influence. The faculty, 
for its part, should have general control of "admission 
of the teaching office." included in this responsibility 
is the naming of faculty personnel and formulation of 
policy related to that process.
These measures are essential for the maintenance
of academic freedom. "But the chief practical requisite
for academic freedom," Lovejoy asserts, "consists in
guaranteed security of tenure in professional positions 
53. . ." He goes on to say that such tenure must be 
qualified, i.e., so that a tenured professor can be 
removed for "grave cause," but for that reason only, as 
specified in his definition of academic freedom quoted
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above. The point is, of course, that if strict rules of 
academic tenure are in force, the tenured scholar is the 
least vulnerable to any kind of interference. Tenure, 
then, is seen to be the chief instrument for the accomplish­
ment of academic freedom.
It may be helpful to summarize professor Lovejoy's 
conception of academic freedom. It is the freedom to 
investigate, to discuss, to teach, to publish, it belongs
to the scholar-employee ---  the teacher or researcher -—
working in the environment of the academy. The extent to 
which it applies to the extramural affairs of the scholar 
is unclear, but extramural utterances are exercises of 
ordinary civil liberties and are in keeping with the 
“spirit" of academic freedom. Students are not specif­
ically included in the scope of academic freedom, but 
they are nevertheless entitled to be taught by teachers 
who are free to teach and who exercise their academic 
freedom. The rationale for academic freedom is extrinsic 
in that such freedom is an invaluable prerequisite for 
the pursuit and attainment of knowledge in all fields 
of scholarly inquiry. The benefits of academic freedom 
accrue to society as a whole and especially to students 
taught under such conditions. Finally, the threats to 
academic freedom may come from within the academy (e.g., 
administrative interference) or from beyond its bounds
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from various political, economic, or sectarian forces.
Whatever the source, the governing board, administrative
officers, and faculty share the responsibility to resist
encroachment upon the freedom of the scholar. The roost
effective single measure in protecting freedom of inquiry,
teaching and publication is the system of academic tenure
whereby the scholar is guaranteed a secure position in
the academy for so long as he is not guilty of proved
incompetence or moral delinquency.
Professor Robert Morrison Maclver, of Columbia
University, in 1955, published a volume devoted entirely
54to the subject of academic freedom. This work, sponsored 
by Columbia university through the American Academic 
Freedom Project, was in no small manner stimulated as a 
response to the so-called McCarthy period of the fifties, 
when the integrity of the university and the freedom of 
the scholar came under attack. In the preface to the 
book Maclver states: "The aggravated assaults on aca­
demic freedom and the general disesteem of intellectual
enterprise characteristic of our country at this time
55furnish the occasion for this work."
Maclver deals comprehensively with several 
aspects of the subject of academic freedom, including 
elements of the social and cultural context in which that 
freedom is operative. His Introductory essay is on the
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meaning of the concept of academic freedom is of most 
relevance here.
Maclver proposes the following definition of 
the concept:
The broad meaning of academic 
freedom is plain enough. It is 
the freedom of the scholar within 
the institution devoted to scholar­
ship, the 'academy.'
* * *
Academic freedom is . . .  a right 
claimed by the accredited educator, 
as teacher and investigator, to 
interpret his findings and to 
communicate his conclusions without 
being subject to any interference, 
molestation, or penalization because 
these conclusions are unacceptable 
to some constituted authority within 
or beyond the institution. Here is 
the core of the doctrine of academic 
freedom. It is the freedom of the_ 
student within his field of study.
From the above statement there seems to be no
doubt about the scope of the activities of the scholar
embraced by Maclver's concept of academic freedom. That
freedom applies to the ordinary functional activities of
teaching and investigation (or research) carried on in
the university, including especially the interpretation
and communication of findings or conclusions.
Academic freedom is a species of the general
C Q"freedom of the mind." However, whereas the notion of
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the freedom of the mind is quite abstract, the concept 
of academic freedom has reference to a specific context.
Academic freedom is conceived by Maclver to be an insti-
59tutional freedom. That is, the freedom of the scholar
applies to his institutional functions, to his work
within the academic environment. The scholar also, of
course, as an individual citizen is entitled to the
other aspects (not specified by Maclver) of the general
freedom of the mind outside the setting of the academy.
In its strict usage, the concept of academic
freedom, writes Maclver, "is taken to have reference only
to the teacher and the collectivity of teachers, the
faculty."^® Thus, it is a freedom attached to those
scholarly and scientific roles of the faculty, and does
not include the role of student. Maclver apparently
does not mean that students are to be denied intellectual
freedom, nor that there is no shared ground of interest
between student and teacher. But, academic freedom is a
61professional freedom. He explains: "it is the freedom
claimed as a right by the members of a guild. Just as
the doctor or the lawyer needs a special area of freedom
if he is to carry out his duties and serve aright his
6 2clients, so does the educator."
Being a professional freedom, that is, a freedom
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that is claimed by virtue of a certain kind of social
role performed by the scholar, academic freedom is not
absolute. The exercise of academic freedom is limited
to the area of competence of the scholar, to his chosen
field of study. Academic freedom is then a specialized
claim, or at least is specialized in application. Maclver
states that the faculty member should not "arrogate to
himself an authority beyond the range of his competence,"
nor should he, therefore, "regard the rostrum of his
class as a platform from which to broadcast his opinions
63on issues irrelevant to the courses he is teaching."
The chemist, for instance, is not entitled to indulge in 
geopolitical pronouncements in his biochemistry class.
Being institutional, academic freedom is es­
sentially intramural. According to Maclver, the 
academician is obligated to use discretion in his 
extramural affairs, outside the academy, the scholar- 
scientist should make it clear that he speaks as an 
individual citizen rather than as an institutional 
spokesman. Furthermore, he should "avoid any public
behavior that would tend to bring discredit on his 
64institution." Because of this latter proviso, it would 
seem that the scholar-scientist is less free than other 
citizens. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, for Maclver,
60
academic freedom applies exclusively intra muros.
Maciver advances an entirely instrumental rationale
for academic freedom. The full significance of academic
freedom, he asserts, lies in the fact that it is a
65functional freedom. Academic freedom is the sine qua 
non for the performance of the primary functions of the 
university and its faculty. Those primary functions are 
the advancement of knowledge (through research investigation) 
and the communication of knowledge (through publication, 
discussion and teaching). Speaking of the functions as 
one, Maciver states
From this function the claim to 
academic freedom derives. This 
freedom is not to be thought of as 
a privilege, not as a concession, 
nor as something that any authority 
inside or outside the institution 
may properly grant or deny, qualify 
or regulate, according to its 
interest or its discretion. It is 
something instead that is inherently 
bound up with the performance of the 
university's task, something as 
necessary for that performance as 
pen and paper, as classrooms and 
students, as laboratories and 
libraries.66
By the same token the role performance of the scholar- 
scientist functionally requires an environment of academic 
freedom.
Those who benefit by the maintenance of academic 
freedom in higher education are those who, directly or
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indirectly, benefit from the publicly accessible knowledge 
gained through open scholarly and scientific inquiry. 
Maciver indicates the inclusiveness of the range of 
beneficiaries in this statement: "The service of the
educator is not a service to his students alone or to 
his institution or to his profession. It is a service 
to his country, a service to civilization, a service to 
mankind."67 consequently, at least in abstract sense, 
all men have an objective interest in the security of 
conditions of academic freedom.
In spite of the fact that all men may reap the 
advantages of academic freedom, in actual practice that 
freedom is often abrogated, violated, or otherwise 
threatened. From what sources do these threats emanate? 
How may they be allayed? And whose responsibility is it 
to defend and to extend academic freedom? Much of 
Maciver's attention throughout the volume is focused 
on these questions. Here and there, in the introductory 
essay under review, he specifies some major perils to 
academic freedom without addressing himself to the topic 
in any systematic fashion.
Threats to academic freedom may originate from 
outside the academy or from within. Extramural threats 
may, of course, be quite varied in source and intent.
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There are, first of all, various ideological groups and 
special interests “agitating to make them /i.e., the uni­
versities/ agencies for the propagation of particular 
68causes," groups which do not appreciate the proper 
functions of the university, other threats of inter­
ference or intimidation may emanate from alumni, donors, 
politicians, the press, or simply "an excited portion 
of the public."
Likewise, very serious perils to academic freedom 
may arise from within the structure of the academy. Obvi­
ously, conditions of appointment or promotion which, by 
design or practice, give preference, irrespective of 
professional qualifications, to those whose views are 
more congenial to administrative authorities in contro­
versial issues, represent hazards to the integrity of the
6 9institution and to academic freedom. The faculty itself 
can commit encroachments upon freedom of inquiry in a 
variety of ways. Failure to defend the academic freedom 
of one's colleagues diminishes the practice of that 
freedom. In yielding to authoritarianism "from above," 
the principle of academic freedom is deteriorated further. 
And, as indicated earlier, overstepping the bounds of 
one's sphere of competence or misusing the rostbum of 
the classroom is an infraction of the scope of academic
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freedom. Personal qualities of bias, dogmatism, and 
authoritarianism of the individual scholar are also 
menaces to objectivity and free inquiry.
There is, however, another Intramural obstacle 
to academic freedom which is less likely to be noticed, 
according to Maciver. This less blatant, less overt, 
danger to free inquiry has to do with the proliferation 
of subsidiary functions of the university to the point 
that the primary function, the pursuit of knowledge, is 
submerged. Maciver explains the inherent danger in such 
a process in the following passage:
Take, for example, the idea that 
it is the business of the uni­
versity to prepare the young for 
more effective participation in 
the life of the community, to equip 
them better to meet the conditions 
or the demands of their society, or, 
simply, to have a more successful 
career. The university does serve 
the purposes thus indicated, but in 
its own way. if it made any such 
objective its primary function, its 
distinctive quality would be blurred 
and its distinctive contribution 
dissipated. . . . Here indeed is 
the rub. If the university sets out 
as its objective the preparation of 
its students for living —  then for 
What kind of living??®
If a university, for instance, in a racially 
segregated society, accepted such a function, its mission 
would be to inculcate the values and norms of segregation,
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with stultifying consequences for scientific inquiry con-
71cerning the question of racial inequality. Even in cases 
where the social values and norms to be inculcated do not 
necessitate a rejection of scientific evidence, the danger 
still exists to a degree in that the university becomes an 
agency for indoctrination. Maciver concludes, "The uni­
versity cannot without distortion become an agency designed
72for indoctrination, no matter how great or good the cause.
In short, it cannot be the foremost function of the uni­
versity to perform any other service for society than 
the open pursuit of knowledge. To do otherwise is not 
only a detriment to free inquiry in the academy, but 
subverts the integrity of higher education, making it the 
mouthpiece for the particular whims of society or special 
interests within it.
Because, on the one hand-; everyone benefits 
from academic freedom, and on the other hand, freedom is 
indispensable to the pursuit of knowledge, which is an 
intrinsic, universal value, the responsibility for the 
protection and advancement of academic freedom is 
incumbent on every individual. However, given the fact 
that threats to free inquiry do occur, responsibility 
for its defense has to be rather specifically allocated.
A large measure of this responsibility is properly 
located within the structure of the academy. Governing
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boards, administrative officials, and faculty share in 
this obligation. In the earlier discussion of intramural 
threats to freedom several practices were detailed, which, 
from the present perspective can be viewed as violations 
of responsibility. Without specifying them again, it may 
simply be noted that it is the responsibility of governing 
boards and administrative officials to shield the faculty 
from extramural clamors and demands, as well as to 
administer the operation of the academy in such a manner 
that the open pursuit of knowledge is the foremost role 
requirement of the faculty and that individual performance 
is rewarded or penalized exclusively in terms appropriate 
thereto. The role of the faculty in academic responsibility 
concerns mainly the performance of its functions in an 
objective fashion, refusing to serve doctrinaire ends 
imposed from any source, and protecting the right of 
colleagues to free inquiry.
To summarize Maciver1 s conception of academic 
freedom the following points should be noted. Academic 
freedom is institutional, it embraces the institutional 
activities of the scholar-scientist in the prescribed 
performance of his role. As such it is an intramural 
right and does not apply to non-institutional affairs of 
the faculty. Academic freedom is professional. That 
is, it applies to the teacher-researcher in the academy,
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rather than to students. Being a professional right, it 
applies to the academician's area of competence or 
specialization and involves responsibility toward one's 
professional colleagues. Academic freedom is functional.
It is an indispensable requirement for the full pursuit 
of knowledge, which, of itself, constitutes the raison 
d 1etre of the university as an institution and the 
scholar-scientist as a role. Knowledge is an intrinsic 
value; freedom in the pursuit of knowledge is a functional 
value. All those who benefit from knowledge are heirs of 
the results of academic freedom. The academy itself is 
the vanguard of the defense of academic freedom against 
external intimidation and Internal abasement.
IV. DIFFERENTIATION OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM FROM RELATED IDEAS
Now that the concept of academic freedom has been 
developed with some degree of specificity, it is possible 
to distinguish it from certain ideas with which it has 
often been confused. The major ideas frequently and 
mistakenly identified with academic freedom are intellectual 
freedom and freedom of expression, subjective freedom, and 
academic tenure.
Intellectual Freedom and Freedom of Expression.
Intellectual freedom or freedom of thought is a
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somewhat nebulous idea in spite of its currency in Western 
intellectual traditions. Technically, of course, any 
person is free to “think" what he will, to believe any 
idea in the privacy of his mind. However, intellectual 
freedom usually implies something more than this, the 
freedom to publicly express and maintain dissenting ideas 
and values. An atmosphere of intellectual freedom 
presumably includes also the lack of intimidation or 
penalty for expressing nonconformist opinions. In the 
united States this sort of "freedom" has been only partly 
instrumented in the form of a civil right of free speech. 
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and 
related civil rights of citizens simply assures the 
dissenter, within broad limits, that there will be no 
legal recriminations against his dissent. Civil rights 
do not protect the individual nonconformist from informal, 
extra-legal penalties and harassments, such as economic 
boycott, that may arise from the sanctions of conformist 
public opinion.
In a sense, intellectual freedom is a very broad 
claim that encompasses the narrower concept of academic 
freedom. Whereas academic freedom is reserved for a 
particular context, the scholar-scientist, teacher- 
researcher in the academy, intellectual freedom applies 
to all people, disregarding even citizenship status. To
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the extent that the civil right of free speech overlaps 
and protects intellectual freedom it applies to all 
citizens in their role as citizens, a protection of the 
individual from the government. Even if academic freedom 
is conceived as part and parcel of the inclusive notion 
of intellectual freedom, it must be kept distinct because 
of its quite different frame of reference or application 
and basis of sanction.
Subjective Freedom.
One of the problems of assessing the extent of 
academic freedom in particular institutions of higher 
learning resides in the fact that a subjective feeling 
of freedom may prevail without any "real" or objective 
freedom. A hypothetical illustration will exemplify the 
point. In a college in which the entire faculty and 
administration share an ardent commitment to racist 
beliefs, subjective freedom in expressing viewpoints on 
the "race question" is complete. If no one challenges 
the orthodox consensus, then everyone has the secure 
feeling of academic freedom. The point is that academic 
freedom is devoid of meaning in an atmosphere of total 
consensus. Academic freedom, including the right to 
dissent, takes on meaning only in a situation of dissensus 
and competition of ideas. Subjective "freedom" in orthodox
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consensus may be a false sense of liberty, but Is certainly 
not academic freedom. One can never say that academic 
freedom exists or prevails in a particular situation until 
orthodoxy has actually been tested or challenged.
Academic Tenure.
The concept of academic tenure also must be dis­
tinguished from academic freedom. Tenure is basically a 
form of "job security." Although the meaning and conditions 
for achieving tenure are far from uniform among insti­
tutions, usually a person who has tenure is secure in his 
position indefinitely until retirement unless guilty of 
such serious academic "felonies" as malfeasance, utter 
incompetence, or moral turpitude. Tenure is usually 
granted an Individual after a "period of satisfactory 
service," sometimes specified, sometimes not. The merits 
and demerits of the tenure system have long been debated
from the points of view of institutions, scholars, and the 
73profession. in practice the system of academic tenure 
often operates as a safeguard of academic freedom. A 
tenured professor may reasonably feel less insecurity 
than a non-tenured one in exercising academic freedom.
Tenure acts to reduce inhibitions in expressing dissent. 
Thus, there is a close operational relation between 
tenure and freedom. However, it is basically a means-end
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relation, tenure being the instrument of academic freedom. 
Further, it must be remembered that academic freedom 
applies to the non-tenured as well as to the tenured.
Thus, the two concepts are not identical and should be 
kept separate analytically.
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CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OP UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS: 
ADVOCATE OP ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The American Association of university Professors 
is a voluntary association of college and university facul­
ty members concerned with the rights and obligations of the 
profession and the interests of higher education in the 
united States. The present chapter provides an analysis 
of the structure and functioning of the Association as 
pertains to academic freedom. After reviewing some general  i
icharacteristics of the Association and its membership, 
the evolution and implementation of its policies on aca­
demic freedom are examined.
I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE ASSOCIATION
The Membership
Membership gualifications. Currently, member­
ship in the Association is open to "teachers and research 
scholars on the faculties of approved colleges and uni­
versities. Active (voting) membership is open to a 
person ". . . if he has at least a one-year appointment 
to a position of at least half-time teaching and/or
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research, with the rank of instructor or its equivalent
2or higher . . in an approved institution. Department 
heads and librarians are also eligible for membership. 
However, "if an Active or Junior member becomes a college 
or university administrative officer with less than half 
a normal teaching or research program, he must be trans-
3ferred to Associate membership. 11
Membership dues vary according to class of 
membership and, for Active members, according to salary. 
Membership lapses for non-payment of dues after one year. 
However, "once admitted, a member may change his occu­
pation or transfer to an institution not on the Association's 
approved list without affecting his eligibility for con­
tinuance of membership."^ Currently, about 92 per cent 
of all members of the AAUP are in the Active category . 5
Eligibility requirements for Association member­
ship have been liberalized over the years, originally 
membership was open only to the academic elite, to the 
professors "of recognized scholarship or scientific 
productivity" and with at least ten years of faculty 
experience . 6  Sporadically, over the last five decades 
the bars to membership have been lowered to the present 
requirements.
Membership trends. From its charter membership
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in 1915 of less than nine hundred the Association rolls 
doubled within a few months. At year's end in 1930, the 
Association, which had lowered its elitist membership 
standards and allowed graduate students to be Junior 
members, numbered over 10,000. (See Table I.) Growth 
during the Depression years of the thirties was relatively 
slow, increasing by only about 55 per cent to 1940.
Growth was again slow during World War Two. At the end 
of 1945 membership was still under 18,000. From then 
until the end of 1950 the gain was rapid, more than 
doubling to 40,626.
Overall, the decade 1950 to 1960 was a period 
of stagnation in membership growth. In 1959 the Associ­
ation had fewer members (39,000) than in 1950. The drop 
of six thousand from 1954 to 1955 is probably largely
7explained by a 50 per cent increase in dues. The decline
of two thousand from 1958 to 1959 is accounted for by a
purge from the rolls of lapsed memberships which had
8been carried for two years. From that point to the
present the membership has increased at a rapid pace.
From the end of 1959 to the end of 1965 the membership
practically doubled to about 77,000. This increase has
„ 9occurred in spite of a dues increase in 1962.
Figure 4 shows membership trends by three-year 
intervals from 1944 through 1965. The first six years
TABLE I
SIZE OP AAUP MEMBERSHIP, 1915-65*
Year Number Year Number
1915 847 1941 16,329
1916 1,931 1942 15,920
1917 2,244 1943 16,015
1918 2,274 1944 16,910
1919 2,378 1945 17,970
1920 3,632 1946 21,238
1921 4,046 1947 28,016
1922 4,568 1948 33,638
1923 5,206 1949 37,524
1924 5,520 1950 40,626
1925 5,828 1951 42,263
1926 6,077 1952 43,404
1927 6,468 1953 43,525
1928 6,896 1954 43,615
1929 7,986 1955 37,567
1930 10,115 1956 36,415
1931 11,588 1957 37,363
1932 12,069 1958 41,264
1933 11,765 1959 39,020
1934 11,500 1960 42,273
1935 12,713 1961 49,022
1936 13,377 1962 54,387
1937 13,930 1963 61,316
1938 14,595 1964 66,645a
1939 15,330 1965 76,900a
1940 15,872
aSource: Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72.
♦Source: Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 110.
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Figure 4. AAUP membership trends, from 1944 to 1965.
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of the period showed rapid growth. From 1950 to 1953, 
one notes the distinct leveling off, followed by a de­
crease in the next three years (dues increased fifty per 
cent in 1955). Only slight gains were recorded until the 
sharp upswing began in 1959, which continued until 1965 
with no indication that it would abate (as of 1965).
Membership trends as measured by number of
institutions with a local AAUP chapter indicate similar
patterns (see Table II). Beginning in 1916 with only 31
chapters (or "branches" as they were then called), by
1930 there were 155. The percentage increase in chapters
between 1930 and 1940 was much greater than the rise in
total membership, having doubled to 301 in the ten years.
One hundred new chapters were added by 1950, and 200 more
by 1960. The increase since 1960 has been especially
fast, going from 600 to 936 in the five years ending in 
101965.
Membership base. There seem to be available no 
accurate statistics for the AAUP membership base. How­
ever, the U. S. office of Education has provided (since 
1957) biennial total figures for full-time instructional 
staff for residential instruction in degree-credit courses. 
These data, for selected years, are presented in Table III. 
While this category does not coincide exactly with the
TABLE II
TOTAL NUMBER OP AAUP CHAPTERS, 
BY YEAR, 1916-65*
Year Number Year Number
1916 31 1941 315
1917 41 1942 325
1918 52 1943 324
1919 52 1944 323
1920 56 1945 319
1921 65 1946 329
1922 85 1947 _335
1923 98 1948 356
1924 103 1949 371
1925 113 1950 402
1926 119 1951 428
1927 128 1952 447
1928 138 1953 451
1929 141 1954 471
1930 155 1955 482
1931 175 1956 474
1932 218 1957 499
1933 227 1958 535
1934 235 1959 573
1935 248 1960 600
1936 253 1961 636
1937 267 1962 700
1938 272 1963 757
1939 284 1964 835
1940 301 1965 936a
aSource: Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72.
♦Source: Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 117.
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TABLE III
AAUP MEMBERSHIP COMPARED WITH FULL-TIME FACULTY FOR RESIDENT INSTRUCTION 
IN DEGREE-CREDIT COURSES IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
UNITED STATES, 1949-50 TO 1964-65*
Full-time staff, Instructor 
Academic or above
AAUP Membership as of 
January 1
AAUP Membership per 
cent of full-time
Year Number3 Per cent increase Number* 5
Per cent 
increase
staff
1949-50 115,000° w —— w 37,524 32.6
1951-52 1 1 1 ,0 0 0 ° -3.5 42,263 1 2 . 6 38.1
1953-54 126,000° 13.5 43,525 3.0 34.5
1955-56 136,000° 8 . 0 37,567 -13.7 27.6
1957-58 154,602 13.2 37,363 -0.5 24.2
1959-60 163,656 5.9 39,020 4.4 23.8
1961-62 178,632 9.2 49,022 25.6 27.4
1963-64 204,561 14.5 61,316 25.1 30.0
1964-65 2 2 1 ,0 0 0 ° 8 . 1 66,645 8.7 30.2
1965-66 243,000e 19. lf 74,962 2 2 .2 f 30.9
aSource: U, S. Office of Education, Digest of Educational Statistics
(OE-10024-65, Bulletin 1965, No. 4), p. 8 6 . ^Source: AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51,
No. 2 (May 1965), p. 110, and Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 72. ^Estimated 
by the author from other statistics. ^Estimate by the office of Education. 
eEstimated by the author. fPer cent increase from 1963-64.
♦Source: Multiple sources cited separately above.
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total eligible membership of the AAUP, it fits as nearly 
as any on which data are available.
As shown in Table III, recently the AAUP member­
ship has averaged under 30 per cent of this national base. 
From a low of 23.8 per cent in 1959-60, the AAUP percentage 
has climbed steadily to about 30 per cent in 1964-65. If 
this trend may be projected to 1965-66, the Association 
membership is probably about 31 per cent of its potential 
as measured from this base. Therefore, not only is the 
AAUP growing at a rapid pace, but also considerably faster 
than its base during the last five years.
Figure 5 shows another way of comparing member­
ship growth to total faculty trends. if 1957-58 is used 
as the base year, one cap compare percentage increases 
from that point through subsequent years for the two 
groups. As shown in Figure 5, the only biennium since 
1957-58 in which the percentage of total faculty increase
ihas been larger than that for the AAUP was the first, 
i.e., from 1957-58 to 1959-60. Since 1959 the percentage 
increases for the AAUP have been considerably greater 
than those for its base, the total faculty. The increase 
over the entire period was 100.6 per cent for the AAUP, 
compared to 57.4 per cent for the total faculty. The 
percentages used in Figure 5 were computed from figures 
in Table III.
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Membership distribution*
a. Geographical location. Table IV offers com­
parative data on the distribution of the Active membership 
of the AAUP and total faculty by geographical regions {as 
defined by the u. S. Census) for 1956-57, the only year 
for which these data are available for both populations.
By these data the AAUP is relatively stronger in the states 
of the Midwest and the Middle Atlantic, and relatively 
weaker in New England, the South, the Far West, and es­
pecially the Southwest (see Table IV).
Using the same regional classification one may 
note the regional discrepancies in recent increases in 
AAUP membership (see Table V). The regions showing the 
greatest percentage increase between 1957 and 1963 were 
the Pacific, the Southwest, and the South Atlantic states, 
where the Association had been relatively weak in numbers, 
and the Middle Atlantic states where it had already been 
comparatively strong. Each of the foregoing sections 
experienced gains of about eighty per cent during the six 
year period in question. All other regions had gains of 
less than the 64 per cent for the Association as a whole.
b* Type of institution. The distribution of 
Association members by type of institution seems to be at 
variance with the distribution of the profession generally.
TABLE IV
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OP AAUP MEMBERSHIP 
COMPARED TO TOTAL COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITIES 
FACULTIES: UNITED STATES, 1956-57*
Numbers Percentages
Regiona Total
Faculty
AAUP
Members"
Total
Faculty
AAUP
Members
New England 24,731 2611 8.3 7.7
Middle Atlantic 57,508 6986 19.3 2 0 . 6
East North Central 58,642 8016 19.6 23.6
West North Central 29,526 3717 9.9 1 6 . 9
South Atlantic 37,948 3835 12.7 11.3
East South Central 17,011 1581 5.7 4.7
West South Central 24,505 2 0 1 0 8 . 2 5.9
Mountain 11,709 1545 3.9 4.6
pacific 36,872 3652 12.4 1 0 . 8
Total 298,452 33953 1 0 6 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
aU. S. Census definition
^Includes only Active members in accredited institutions. 
♦Source: AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 113.
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TABLE V
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCREASES 
IN AAUP MEMBERSHIP, 1957-63*
Regiona
1957
Membership*5
1963
Membership*-1
Per cent 
Increase
New England 2611 3880 48.6
Middle Atlantic 6986 12,771 82.8
East North Central 8016 11,663 45.5
West North central 3717 5283 42.1
South Atlantic 3835 6927 80.6
East South Central 1581 2368 49.8
West South Central 2 0 1 0 3589 78.6
Mountain 1545 2442 58.1
pacific 3652 6760 85.1
Total 33,953 55,683 64.0
aU. S. Census definition
^Includes only Active members in accredited institutions. 
♦Source: AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 113.
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According to an analysis performed by the Association 
staff for the academic year, 1962-63, private insti­
tutions are overrepresented in the AAUP membership, while 
public institutions are underrepresented. 1 1  For the 
approximately five hundred institutions studied, about 
two thirds of all faculty were at public Institutions, 
whereas only 55 per cent of the AAUP membership was 
serving at those institutions. The same analysis looked 
at the distribution among colleges, on the one hand, and 
universities and technical institutions, on the other.
Here also one notes a discrepancy between the AAUP 
distribution and that for the total faculties, college 
faculties tend to be overrepresented slightly on the AAUP 
rosters. About one third of the total faculty was found 
at colleges, whereas about 40 per cent of the AAUP member­
ship was at such institutions.
Co Field of specialization. The distribution 
of AAUP members compared to total u. S. faculty is 
summarized in Table VI. Compared to the distribution of 
total faculty, the "arts and sciences" are overrepresented 
on the AAUP rolls, while the professions and miscellaneous 
fields are similarly underrepresented, within the arts and 
sciences the humanities are the roost heavily represented 
category for both the AAUP and for total faculty. The
TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OF AAUP MEMBERSHIP BY FIEIDS 
OF SPECIALIZATION, 1956 AND 1963, COMPARED TO 
DISTRIBUTION DF TOTAL FACULTIES, U. S. COLLEGES 
AND UNIVERSITIES, 1963*
Field
Per cent of 
1956 AAUP 
Membership
Per cent of 
1963 AAUP 
Membership
Per cent 
of total 
faculty
Arts and Sciences 70.0 70.1 60.8
Humanities 29.6 29.5 23.7
Social Sciences3 21.4 2 1 . 0 15.3
Natural Sciences 
and Mathematics 19.0 19.6 2 2 . 0
Professions, etc. 30.0 29.9 39.2
Educat ion and 
Physical 
Education 9.6 9.1 12.4
Business 4.1 3.9 5.0
Engineering 3.7 3.1 6.9
Health Pro­
fessions 2.4 4.3 4.7
Others: Agri­
culture, Home 
Economics, Law, 
Library, etc. 1 0 . 2 9.5 1 0 . 0
Totals 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
Totals 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
aIncludes also geography, history, and psychology.
♦Source: AAUP Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 112.
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most overrepresented category in the AAUP membership as 
compared to total faculty, however, is the "social 
sciences," which is construed to include also geography, 
history, and psychology.
Two other patterns are evident and noteworthy in 
Table VI. First, the distribution of the AAUP membership 
was almost unchanged from 1957 to 1963. Second, slightly 
over fifty per cent of the Association's membership comes 
from the humanities and the social sciences together.
These categories are considerably overrepresented compared 
to the total faculty distribution. The natural sciences 
and mathematics together comprise less than twenty per 
cent of the membership and are underrepresented when 
compared to the totals.
The report of the AAUP self-study in 1965, in 
analyzing these data, presented the following interpre­
tation:
Some of the basic nature and charac­
teristics of the Association are 
indicated clearly in these dis­
tributions. While its membership 
includes persons from all the subject 
matter areas, its basic strength is 
in the arts and sciences rather than 
in the professions, and in the 
humanities and social sciences in 
particular. Its membership is 
strongest in areas concerned more 
with basic theoretical matters than 
with applied learning and technology, 
and within the basic areas themselves,
91
the membership is somewhat stronger 
in those fields where matters of 
value and opinion are relatively 
of more concern than matters of 
fact and experimental evidence.12
The Structure of the Association
Officers and Council. There are only three
elective offices of the Association on the national level,
13the presidency and two vice presidencies. The in­
cumbents of these positions serve for two-year terms.
Two other executive offices, the General secretary and 
the Treasurer, are appointive. The incumbents of these 
five positions are ex officiis members of the council, as 
are the three latest living (former) presidents of the 
Association. There are thirty other members of the 
Council, three from each of ten geographical districts 
of the nation, one third elected by the Association 
membership each year for staggered three-year terms.
Out of thirty-eight total number of the Council, there­
fore, eight serve ex officiis, while the remaining thirty 
are elected specifically to Council membership. The 
structural composition of the Council has changed very 
little during the Association's history.
The Council is the chief policy-making and ex-
14ecutive body of the Association. The Council is charged 
by the constitution with performing certain basic functions
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and is authorized to act £or the Association. Among its 
functions are: (1) Levying dues, (2) managing the
property and financial affairs of the Association, (3) 
interpreting the constitution, (4) appointing and de­
termining the salaries of the General Secretary, the 
Treasurer, and the members of the professional staff, (5) 
convening the Annual Meeting and special meetings of the 
general membership, (6 ) authorizing Association com­
mittees, and (7) assuming responsibility for the 
publications of the Association, including records of 
its own meetings.
According to current practice the Council meets
twice a year, although special meetings may be called by
15the President. Between Council meetings certain re­
sponsibilities may be assigned to the Executive Committee, 
which consists of the President, the First Vice President, 
and at least four other Council members appointed by the 
President. In such cases the Executive Committee is 
authorized to act for the Council in conducting the 
business of the Association.
Association Headquarters and Staff. While ulti­
mate authority over the affairs of the Association is 
vested in the Council, most of the ongoing work is 
performed by the Association headquarters and its staff.
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The central offices, which house the files and staff of
the Association, are located in Washington, D. C.
The size of the professional staff has been ve^y
small until quite recently. In 1955, there were only
three members of the professional staff, including the
16General Secretary. As of January 1966, there were
- 17eleven. All these persons have come to their positions 
with academic experience. Their main functions are: (1)
to service the Council, the committee, and the other units 
of the Association, (2) to publish and distribute the 
publications of the Association, (3) to maintain communi­
cation with other associations, government agencies, etc., 
whose actions are related to the interests of the AAUP, 
and (4) to supervise the work of the non-professional 
staff (currently about thirty employees) in the per­
formance of the day-to-day tasks of the headquarters 
office. By virtue of his "professional" status a member 
of the professional staff is expected to make a creative 
contribution in serving the needs of the Association, its
units and members. He frequently exercises judgment,
18interprets policy, and offers informed advice.
Committee structure. Much of the Association's 
policy deliberation and formulation occurs in its national 
committees. These are standing committees authorized and
i
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appointed by the Council to deal with specific subjects
of policy. The policy proposals resulting from committee
activity are subject to approval by the Council. The
AAUP began in 1915 with sixteen committees on various
subjects ranging from academic freedom to faculty im- 
19provement. Each committee was designated alphabetically 
as Committee "A," "B," "T,'* or "Z," and so on, along with 
its subject label or title. The practice of using alpha­
betical designations has become a customary shorthahd
20reference to the committees.
The most important committee, and the only one
with a record of continuous activity since 1915, is
Committee A, the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
21Tenure. Because of the relevance of the work of this 
committee to the subject of this study. Committee A is 
discussed separately later in the chapter. Of the other 
committees active in the recent history of the Association, 
the major ones are Committee B (Professional Ethics), 
Committee T (College and university Government), Com­
mittee D (Accreditation), Committee Z (Economic Status 
of the Profession), and Committee R(Relations of Higher 
Education to Federal and State Government). Each of 
these committees, composed of members scattered over the 
nation, meets from time to time, deliberates on appropriate
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policies, furnishes guidance to staff members, and sug­
gests policy resolutions for the Annual Meeting and for 
22the Council.
Academic freedom entails correlative academic
responsibility. From its founding the Association has
given recognition to the professional duties and standards
binding upon faculty members. For this reason the AAUP
established Committee B, on Professional Ethics. The
record of this committee's activity, however, indicates
relatively less vigor in promoting and enforcing standards
of academic responsibility than Committee A has mustered
for academic freedom. From 1940 to 1957 the committee
23was idle, if not defunct. in 1957 the committee was 
reactivated and charged with the responsibility of formu­
lating codes of professional ethics and a statement of 
principles as well as plans for enforcement machinery.
As of January 1966, in spite of several drafts, no state-* 
ment on the matter has become Association policy. The 
AAUP anticipates having an explicit policy statement in 
the near future. 2 4
The activity of Committee T on College and Uni­
versity Government is an indication of the Association's 
long-term concern with the role of the faculty in the 
government of colleges and universities. Since its
r
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establishment in 1916, this committee has performed two 
main functions. It has (1) studied the extent and taethodfe 
of faculty participation in college and university govern­
ment, and (2 ) devised a set of principles applicable to 
faculty participation. In recent years a third function 
has been assumed, namely, investigation and mediation of
25cases of reported violations of its sanctioned principles. 
The committee has come to play an increasingly active and 
important role in recent years.
The Association also has an obvious Interest in 
accreditation, which is the concern of Committee D. To 
be eligible to gain Active membership in the AAUP a person 
must serve on the faculty of an "approved" institution, 
which is construed at present to mean an institution 
accredited by its regional accrediting association. Thus, 
the quality of the membership of the Association is partly 
dependent on the criteria of the accrediting organizations. 
Furthermore, as stated in the AAUP self-study report,
. . .  one of the chief purposes of 
the Association, as laid down in its 
Constitution at the beginning, has 
been the promotion of the interests 
of higher education and research, and 
the establishment of accreditation 
procedures has proved to be an effective 
way of improving the quality of our 
institutions. The obligation of 
keeping watch upon these accrediting 
bodies is therefore implicit in the 
Association's statement of its
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purposes. Within recent years .
. . /another/ motive for such inter­
est has been expressed, viz., the 
desire to use the accrediting process 
for assisting in the maintenance of 
academic freedom and tenure and in 
the improvement of faculty-administration 
relations in general.26
Therefore, when Committee D was authorized in 
1956, the Council prescribed that the Committee be con­
cerned " . . .  with the methods and organizations for 
accrediting colleges, universities, and professional 
schools; with the relation of faculty members to the ac­
crediting process; and with the effectuation of the Associ-
27ation's objectives through accreditation."
The Association has always had a committee con­
cerned with the economic status of the profession, Committee 
Z. The work of this committee has been aided, since 1959,
by the service of one of the members of the Washington
28staff, who is a professional economist. One of the main 
functions of this committee is to collect and publish in 
the Bulletin annually detailed information on salary levels 
at U. S. colleges and universities. This report has grown 
steadily in its acceptability and interest since it was 
initiated in 1958-59. In 1965 some 800 institutions 
authorized publication of their salary information for
2Q1964-65. committee z is also concerned about taxation, 
fringe benefits, the financing of higher education, and
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the possibilities of adapting collective bargaining pro-
30cedures to the academic marketplace.
The functions of Committee R on Relations of 
Higher Education to Federal and State Government receive 
thdir impetus from the trends of growing government support 
and control of many facets of higher education. Among the 
myriad problems and issues that have concerned this com­
mittee are legislation and executive policies which relate 
to academic freedom, the economic status of the profession, 
academic ethics in regard to use of federal grants and 
contracts for research, the international exchange of
scholars and scholarly materials, copyright regulations,
31and many more. Judicial action, especially in direct 
or indirect relation to academic freedom also receives 
the attention of Committee R. Much of the committee's 
activity is of a surveillance nature. However, the com­
mittee shows indications of more positive efforts, such 
as initiating its own proposals which support the inter­
ests of both the Association and higher education 
generally, and pressing these in appropriate government 
channels.32
There are other committees that have been active 
from time to time. The Council recently established Com­
mittee S on Faculty Responsibility for the Academic Freedom
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of Students.33 The first function assigned to it was the 
formulation of some guiding principles in the area. It 
promises to he an important committee but it is as yet 
too soon to analyze its work.
Annual Meeting. Throughout the history of the 
AAUP there has been a yearly meeting of the Association 
membership at which all members are welcome, but only 
Active members may vote.3^ The agenda of the Annual 
Meeting is almost entirely taken up with Association 
business. The Annual Meeting is authorized by the consti­
tution "to express its views on professional matters."
Much of its business is concerned with action on recom­
mendations of the Council. However, usually a number of 
resolutions are acted upon at the meeting which are not 
derived from previous council action.
Ordinarily less than one per cent of the Associ­
ation's Active members attend the meeting, with the result
35that it is hardly a representative body. in view of 
the possible impulsiveness and non-representative character 
of the meeting, the constitution provides two checks upon 
its power. First, at the request of one fifth of the 
delegates present (elected representatives of chapters 
and other constituent units), a "proportional vote" may 
be called, in which the vote of each delegate is weighted
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36according to the size of his constitutency. This pro­
vision tends to make a vote more nearly representative 
of the Association (although the provision has been used 
very seldom). A second check is erxplained in the recent 
self-study of the Association:
A second check upon the power of 
the Annual Meeting is the requirement 
that proposals initiated there re­
ceive either the concurrence of 
the Council, or the concurrence of 
a subsequent Annual Meeting.. Most 
proposed actions come to the Annual 
Meeting upon the initiative or at 
least concurrence of the Council; 
if the Annual Meeting accepts these 
proposals, they are considered to 
be the "action of the Association."
If the Meeting rejects the proposals, 
they are dead, at least for the time 
being. If the Meeting itself 
initiates some action, it becomes 
the "action of the Association" only 
if the Council subsequently concurs 
in it, or if the ensuing Annual 37 
Meeting agrees with its predecessor.
Thus, the Association's policy-making machinery
is bicameral. The Council and the Annual Meeting share
responsibility for formulating and expressing Association
policy. Each body maintains some provision to check the
action of the other. Most policy decisions are initiated
by the Council or its authorized committees and, in
receiving the concurrence of the Annual Meeting, become
the "action of the Association."
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Chapters. A chapter is recognized by the Associ­
ation when the college or university at which it is located
38includes at least seven Active members of the Association. 
Each chapter has its own elected officers and delegates 
to meetings of the Association. According to the report 
of the self-study of the AAUP/ the chapter/ as a unit of 
the Association, performs three major functions: (1) pro­
motion of acceptance of the AAUP principles and policies' 
by the faculty and administration of the institution in 
which it exists; (2) communication of local information 
and opinion to the Washington office; and (3) recruitment 
of new members.
Most chapters hold regular meetings and assess 
modest dues for chapter functions. Trends in the number 
of chapters are given in Table n .  The Association now 
has chapters in two thirds of the regionally accredited, 
four-year colleges and universities and in about one
39fourth of the accredited junior and community colleges.
State and Regional Conferences. As stated in 
the 1965 report of the Association self-study, the organi­
zation of chapters into larger associations on a state or 
regional basis was an unplanned development in the history 
of the AAUP.4^ The first formally-organized association 
of chapters occurred in the 1920's, in the form of the
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41Iowa State Conference. According to the same report,
". . . beginning in the early 1950’s the organization of 
such conferences began to assume the characteristics of 
a movement; eighteen were established between 1952 and 
1959.1,42 By a constitutional amendment in 1957, the
conferences were given formal recognition as units of
■ 43the Association's structure. a s of 1965, some forty
states had such conferences. Most of the conferences
are geographically defined by state boundaries, but there
are also metropolitan and interstate conferences which
44meet on a regular basis.
Most of the state conferences established since 
the Second World War seem to have risen out of concern 
about laws detrimental to academic freedom (e.g., 
disclaimer oaths and speaker bans) enacted by state 
legislatures allegedly in the quest for national 
security. As stated in the self-study report,
. . . Neither the isolated chapter 
nor the national association seemed 
adequately equipped to meet and fore­
stall such attacks upon higher edu­
cation; hence the growing sense of a 
need for groupings larger than the 
chapter that could effectively 
present the academic case to local 
legislators and other state officials.45
Thus, state or regional conferences seem to be
uniquely suited for maintaining surveillance of legislative
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development. Other functions include: (1) promulgation
of new chapters and recruitment efforts; (2) intermediary 
communication between chapters and the Washington office 
on some matters of regional concern; and (3) maintaining 
liaison with regional accrediting associations on matters 
of policy and procedure.4^
II. EVOLUTION OF POLICY ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The American Association of university Professors 
was born into an atmosphere of apprehensiveness about 
academic freedom. Throughout its history, the Association 
has given top priority among its several concerns to the 
promotion and defense of academic freedom. The basic 
outlines of its stance toward norms and practices of 
freedom have changed little since the founding of the 
Association. The general evolution of its philosophy, 
programs, strategy and tactics pertaining to academic 
freedom deserves review.
The general circumstances of the academic world 
out of which the AAUP was conceived and organized, in­
cluding the discontent and restiveness felt by academicians 
toward the effects of rapid change and expansion in higher 
education, are well described elsewhere.47 Attention 
here is restricted to the essential developments and 
policies of the Association relevant to academic freedom.
I
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Just as academic freedom antedated the formation 
of the AAUP* so also did attempts to codify the concept.
In 1913, three professional societies, the American 
Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, 
and the American Political Science Association, collabo­
rated in a committee effort to produce a set of principles
48of academic freedom. After a year's deliberation, the 
members concluded that the thorny issues and questions 
involved in their endeavor required protracted and 
intensive thought and discussion. This committee turned 
out to be the immediate predecessor and parent of the
49AAUP's first committee on academic freedom and tenure.
The 1915 Statement
In December 1915, the Association's Committee 
A offered in its report a statement of principles which 
laid the foundation for the Association's policy on 
academic freedom for years to come.^0 in this report 
academic freedom was linked to the needs of academic 
research, adequate instruction, and the development of 
expertise for public service. Above all, academic 
freedom was cast as an indispensable attribute to a 
university. Further, academic freedom incorporated 
the notion of ultimate faculty responsibility to 
"posterity" in the pursuit of knowledge, rather than
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to the trustees who were one's employers. Academic freedom 
was bounded by the need for objectivity and competence; 
that is, conclusions should be ". . . gained by a scholar's 
method and held in a scholar's spirit." On the other 
hand, the limitations of competence and objectivity did 
not apply, according to the statement, to extramural 
utterances. Outside the university, faculty members had 
the same rights as any other citizens for expression and 
action, limited only by the need for decorum. These 
propositions formed the skeleton of the Association's 
philosophy of academic freedom.
Aside from these generalities the report also 
contained practical proposals for their implementation, 
the purposes of which were (1) to limit the trustees' 
prerogative to fire teachers, and (2) to provide security 
and dignity to academic positions. The idea of due 
process was embodied in the proposal of trials under 
faculty auspices:
Every university or college teacher 
(at the rank of associate professor 
or above) should be entitled, before 
dismissal or demotion, to have the 
charges against him stated in writing 
in specific terms and to have a fair 
trial on those charges before a 
special or permanent judicial com­
mittee chosen by the faculty senate 
or council, or by the faculty at 
large.
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At such trial the teacher accused 
should have full opportunity to 
present evidence, and if the charge 
is one of professional incorapetency, 
a formal report upon his work 
should he first made in writing by 
the teachers of his own department 
and of cognate departments in the 
university, and if the teacher 
concerned so desires, by a committee 
of his fellow specialists from other 
institutions appointed by some 
cpmpetent authority. 51
These procedures of due process were intended especially
to safeguard freedom of expression of faculty members
against the potential wrath of trustees.
Tenure was to provide similar safeguards and
some measure of dignity to faculty positions, "In every
institution there should be an unequivocal understanding
as to the term of each appointment," which should be morally,
52if not legally, binding. As Metzger states, "Academic 
freedom was the end: due process, tenure, and establish­
ment of professional competence were regarded as necessary
,.53 means."
The 1925 Statement
The Association of American Colleges, an organi­
zation of college presidents also founded in 1915, had 
its own committee on academic freedom and tenure. This
committee looked upon the AAUP code as the height of
54presumption as indicated in its 1917 annual report.
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Within a very short while, however, the AAC was to change 
completely its view of the AAUP statement*, Its 1922 
committee report was quite laudatory of the AAUP for its
"significant and highly important" work in codifying aca-
55demic freedom. The AAC proceeded to accept virtually 
the entire AAUP rationale and outline of procedures. The 
AAC reversal made possible a jointly endorsed statement 
of principles of freedom and tenure for academic insti­
tutions in 1925. This statement, which resulted from
considerable negotiation of detailed differences, became
56the policy of each organization.
in substance the 1925 AAUP-AAC statement differed 
little from the 1915 AAUP code. It had the disadvantage 
of being cast in the form of mandatory regulations, 
apparently calling for explicit adoption by colleges and 
universities in order to become absorbed into their by­
laws. Such instances of formal college adoption were very 
rare, presidents and trustees were often willing to
abide by the spirit of the code, but balked at the
57regulatory machinery. Moreover, the AAUP and the AAC 
began to realize in the 1930's that "what was needed was 
a statement of policy that invited approval, not a set 
of rules that required adoption." After sustained 
cooperation and negotiation between the two associations
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a new statement was published as the policy of each group 
in 1940.
The 1940 Statement
The joint AAUP-AAC statement of 1940 continues
CQ tas present policy. This statement went further than 
its predecessor in protecting the freedom and security 
of faculty members of the lower ranks. The maximum 
length of the probationary period was set at seven years.
If a teacher were retained after this period he was entitled 
to permanent tenure. At least one year's notice of impending 
dismissal was to be given all teachers, including those on 
probation. Finally, this important proviso was added;
"During the probationary period a teacher should have 
the academic freedom that all other members of the faculty 
have." The statement is presented in its entirety in 
Appendix C.
The AAUP Philosophy of Academic Freedom
The Association's philosophy of academic freedom 
has exhibited some internal evolution over the decades.
The charter membership of the AAUP, which sponsored the 
1915 code, was hardly a representative body of the aca­
demic profession. Aside from the fact that deans and 
presidents were explicitly denied membership in those 
days, the rolls of the AAUP included only the academic
6 Xelite, the luminaries of the profession. Lesser lights 
among the faculty ranks were not represented (see the 
discussion of membership qualifications earlier in this 
chapter). The 1915 statement itself seems to have been 
born of a somewhat elitist inspiration. The most striking 
and explicit example of this tendency was the stipulation 
of associate professor rank to entitle a faculty member 
to due process in dismissal proceedings. Furthermore, 
there was an underlying tone in the statement to the 
effect that academic freedom was an earned right by virtue 
of the contributions to scholarship and science of these 
notables. The academic nobility was speaking, as it 
were, from the standpoint of reputation and accomplishment 
and was seeking to enhance its own sense of dignity. The 
guild quality of the profession had been radically threat­
ened by the burgeoning size of higher education in the 
preceding decades and the elite sought to secure its
professional status in the face of growing numbers of
6 2co-workers in the lower ranks.0
The elitist bias gradually was mitigated as the 
membership base was broadened. By the time of the 1940 
statement the privileges of academic freedom were not 
reserved for the elite only, but were claimed for all 
regular faculty ranks. Furthermore, deans and other
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administrative officers were eligible for active member­
ship as long as they retained substantial teaching or 
research duties, and thus were not denied membership, ex 
officiis.
The rationale of academic freedom presented in 
the 1915 code were linked to changes taking place in the 
structure of higher education<> Those who drafted the 
statement took cognizance of the new research function 
of the university! "the modern university is becoming 
. . a the home of scientific research."63 Freedom, the 
statement continued, "is the breath in the nostrils of 
all scientific activity.”64 If freedom was necessary 
for the uninhibited pursuit of research interests, it 
was equally important for teaching. In the early period 
of the nation's history it had been sufficient simply
". . . to train the growing generation and to diffuse
65the already accepted knowledge," However, with the 
expansion and differentiation of knowledge, the peda­
gogical function must be modified to take account of 
the tentativeness of research conclusions. According to 
the 1915 statement,
. . .  if the student has reason to 
believe that the instructor is not 
true to himself, the virtue of the 
instruction as an educative force is 
incalculably diminished. There must 
be in the mind of the teacher no
Ill
mental reservation. He must give 
the student the best of What he 
has and what he is.66
The authors of the 1915 code, then, justified 
academic freedom as the sine qua non of the new university 
functions. The university functions were in turn justified 
as serving the public interest. In the interest of 
posterity the university
. . o should be an Intellectual 
esqperiment station, where new ideas 
may germinate and where their fruit, 
though still distasteful to the 
community as a whole, may be allowed 
to ripen until finally, perchance, 
it may become a part of the accepted 
intellectual food of the nation or 
of the world.®'
An examination of the 1940 statement reveals no 
change in the rationale of academic freedom:
institutions of higher education are 
conducted for the common good and not 
to further the interest of either the 
individual teacher or the institution 
as a whole. The common good depends 
upon the free search for truth and its 
free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to 
these purposes and applied to both 
teaching and research. Freedom in 
research is fundamental to the 
advancement of truth. Academic 
freedom in its teaching aspect is 
fundamental for the protection of 
the rights of the teacher in 
teaching and of the student to 
freedom in learning. Freedom and 
economic security, hence tenure, are
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indispensable to the success of 
an institution in fulfilling its 
obligations to its student and 
to society.®®
The Structure and Functioning of Committee A
The committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
(Committee A) stands at the apex of the Association's 
committee framework. Historically the reputation of the 
AAUP has been built upon the work and accomplishments of 
Committee A. Even with the Association's recent broadening 
of concerns and activities, the 1965 report of the self- 
study stated that from 40 to 50 per cent of the time and 
energies of the professional staff is consumed by the
fiQwork of this committee.
Of the fourteen members of Committee A, two of
them, the President and the General Secretary of the
Association, are members ex officiis. The remaining
twelve are appointed by the President for staggered three- 
70year terms.
The most general and fundamental functions of 
Committee A are (1) the formulation of principles of 
academic freedom and tenure and (2) the effectuation and 
implementation of these principles. Since 1940 Committee 
A has given relatively little attention to formulating 
principles and relatively more attention to interpreting 
and applying these principles. Every occasion on which
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the committee is called upon to apply the principles of
the 1940 statement entails interpretation. The committee
also has sought to interpret the 1940 statement by
amplifying its principles. A case in point is the 1958
"Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal
Proceedings," which was intended to supplement the idea
71of due process in the 1940 document. Nevertheless, the 
bulk of the committee's activity is concerned with "case 
work," arising from specific complaints of alleged vio­
lations of the 1940 principles.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY 
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The responsibility for implementation of the
Association's principles of academic freedom and tenure
also rests primarily with Committee A. The discussion
of procedures which follows refers to the implementation
72of the 1940 code.
Committee A Procedures
Committee A authorizes the General Secretary to 
receive on its behalf complaints of violations of academic 
freedom and tenure by college and university authorities.
If the General Secretary believes that the complaint 
merits attention by the Association, he is authorized 
to make a preliminary inquiry and " . . .  where appropriate,
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communicate with the authorities of the institution
73concerned to secure factual information and comments."
If possible, the General Secretary is then authorized to 
seek an adjustment between the parties involved; in other 
words, to resolve the complaint. If, at that point, an 
adjustment seems impossible and the General Secretary 
decides that the case (the incident is now a "case" 
rather than a "complaint") warrants further attention by 
the Association, he is authorized to establish an ad hoc 
committee to investigate and render a written report on 
the incident.
The task of the ad hoc committee is 
to ascertain the facts involved in 
the incident under investigation and 
to determine whether the 1940 'State­
ment of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure' as interpreted 
by the Association has been violated, 
and whether unsatisfactory conditions 
of academic freedom and tenure prevailin the institution.^
The ad hoc investigating committee is authorized 
to visit the institution in question to interview the 
parties involved and to secure information and views 
pertaining to the case, in such visits the committee is 
charged by the Association rules:
. . . the Committee should make clear 
that as an investigating body it acts 
not in partisanship, but as a professional 
body charged with ascertaining the facts 
as objectively as possible, on this
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basis, the cooperation of others 
may be sought without hesitation 
and will usually be forthcoming.
The committee should Investigate 
fully the violation alleged to 
have occurred, and should inquire 
into conditions of academic 
freedom and tenure in the insti­
tution which form the background 
of the particular case, or which 
may have given rise to related 
incidents, and into relevant 
subsequent developments.75
In dismissal cases, "the committee should de­
termine whether the decision to dismiss was fairly reached
and is rationally supported in the light of the Associ-
76ation's principles, both procedural and substantive." 
Depending upon the committee's conclusions,
. . . The committee may set forth 
recommendations for or against 
publication of the report and for 
or against Association censure of 
the administration concerned; but 
the decision of these matters will 
rest with Committee A and, as to 
censure, with the Council and 
Annual Meeting of the Association.
Hence, the recommendation as to 
censure will not be published as 
part of the report. The report 
should be transmitted in confidence 
to the General Secretary.77
The committee's report is transmitted to the 
members of Committee A for review and editorial sug­
gestions. The report, as amended, is then sent to the 
persons involved in the report, including administrative 
officers, . .with the request that they supply corrections
I
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for any errors of fact that may appear In it and make
such comments as they may desire upon the conclusions 
78reached." The report may subsequently be rewritten 
and submitted to the members of Committee A. If Com­
mittee A approves the revised report, it is published 
in the Bulletin over the names of the ad hoc committee 
members as chief authors of the report and the names of 
Committee A members as authorizing publication of the 
report.
The authority for imposing censure upon the 
administrative officers of the institution in question 
rests with the Council and the Annual Meeting of the 
AAUP. If censure is voted by these bodies, then the n^me 
of the institution is published in subsequent regular 
issues of the Bulletin under the list of "Censured 
Administrations." Censure may be removed in the same 
manner by which it is imposed. During the period of 
censure the General Secretary is authorized to correspond, 
and to invite consultation, with the censured adminis­
tration for the purpose of ameliorating the conditions 
which resulted in censure. When the Association 
(specifically Committee A) is satisfied that the grounds 
for imposing censure have been eliminated, then censure
may be removed by vote of the Council and the Annual 
79Meeting.
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The Use of Sanctions
The ultimate sanction employed hy the Association 
in implementing its principles of academic freedom is the 
imposition of censure on an institutional administration, 
and the publication in the regular issues of the Bulletin 
of the names of colleges and universities whose adminis­
trative officers are so censured. While this is perhaps 
the weightiest sanction employed, certainly it is not the 
only one.
Within the framework of Committee A procedures 
outlined above, three other sanctions are evident. The 
first is the announcement to an institution's adminis­
tration that the Association has received a complaint of 
an alleged infraction and is seeking to establish the 
facts of the case and offers its good offices in 
resolving the incident. A second sanction, which comes 
into play if the first one fails, is the Association's 
initiation of an on-campus investigation of the case. A 
third sanction is the published report (in the Bulletin) 
of the ad hoc investigating committee's findings. These 
three sanctions are listed in the order of their probable 
effectiveness, the latter being the most effective of 
the three, and yet somewhat less potent than censure 
itself. It would seem that the potency of each sanction
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arises from its position among the procedural stages of 
Committee A, which are cumulative in nature. Thus, the 
power of the first sanction is dependent on the realization 
by a "guilty" administrative officer that failure to 
ameliorate the situation would lead to subsequent and 
weightier sanctions.
It appears that the published report of an in­
vestigation is a particularly important sanction. Noting 
this, the self-study report of 1965 states:
. . . publication of the facts 
always precedes censure, and publi­
cation even without censure is a 
powerful sanction, particularly in 
the academic world, where prestige 
counts for so much. There are 
probably no administrators who 
relish having the facts of a 
questionable episode revealed to 
the outside world under the 
auspices of an AAUP report, even 
though censure is not imposed. .
. . the publication of a story of 
administrative ineptitude is often 
the only sanction necessary to 
bring about changes in the rules 
and regulations of the institution 
concerned and to induce others to 
put their own procedures in order.80
Thus, regardless of whether censure is the
eventual result, the lesser sanctions derive their power
from their position on the cumulative chain that leads
(or can lead) to censure, censure, it may be noted, is
the only sanction by which the Association seeks in any
way to discourage members from seeking appointments at
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given institutions. According to present practice, the 
Association includes the following statement over the 
published list of censured administrations:
Members of the Association have 
often considered it to be their 
duty, in order to indicate their 
support of the principles violated, 
to refrain from accepting appointment 
to an institution so long as it 
remains on the censure list. Since 
circumstances differ widely from 
case to case, the Association does 
not consider it advisable to assert 
that such an unqualified obligation 
exists for its members; it does 
urge that, before accepting 
appointments, they seek information 
on present conditions of academic 
freedom and tenure from the Associ­
ation's Washington Office and 
prospective departmental colleagues.
The Association leaves it to the 
discretion of the individual, 
possessed of the facts, to make the 
proper decision.81
Alternate Means
Aside from the activity of Committee A, the 
Association has other somewhat less direct means of pro­
moting its principles of academic freedom. Two of these 
are particularly important in the view of the author; the 
influence of the AAUP on the accrediting process (the 
concern of Committee D) and the promotion of faculty 
participation in the governing of colleges and universities 
(Committee T).
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The importance of the accrediting process is 
perhaps self-evident. The regional accrediting associ­
ations have more powerful sanctions at their disposal 
than the AAUP, particularly the removal of accredited 
status from an institution. To the extent that the AAUP 
is successful in having its principles of academic freedom 
and tenure incorporated as standards into the criteria 
for accreditation by the regional associations, the 
realization of the Association's ideals of freedom will 
be enhanced. The Association is evidently well aware of
these potentialities, as indicated by the activity of
82Committee D, established in 1956.
Likewise, the promulgation of ideals of faculty 
participation is supportive of the practice of principles 
of freedom. As with accreditation, to the extent that 
there is representative faculty participation in academic 
government, the probability of faculty misunderstanding 
and disaffection would be reduced. Therefore, to the 
degree that Committee T is able to effectuate its ideals, 
the purposes of Committee A are advanced and its work 
lessened.
The difficult question of the effectiveness of 
the AAUP policies and procedures relative to academic 
freedom is reserved for the discussion of concrete cases 
in Chapter Five. it has been the purpose of this chapter
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to outline the main elements of structure and function 
of the AAUP Which are relevant to its promotion of aca­
demic freedom, it is to be noted that the AAUP< through 
its policy statements on principles of academic freedom 
and tenure, has contributed to the further codification 
and specification of the concept of academic freedom.
As noted, however, the AAUP's interest in the concept 
of academic freedom is more than merely academic. The 
formation of the AAUP perhaps signalled the end of the 
guild era of faculty-administration relationships and of 
the informal etiquette that guided their behavior.
With the advent of the AAUP, one notes the 
bureaucratization of the norms, roles, and interaction 
within academic social systems. The three academic 
freedom codes are formal, explicit statements of norms 
both substantive and procedural (including the values 
which underly them), which apply to the quasi-bureaucratic 
interaction of faculty and administration. In spite of 
the formalization of these norms, however, their main 
force is moral, rather than legal. The efficacy of its 
sanctions against violators depends upon the response of 
displeasure within the academic community, inasmuch as 
the Association cannot cause direct harm to a recalcitrant 
administration. Attention will be redirected to these 
matters in Chapter Five, in chapter Four the author
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attempts to analyze academic organization with reference 
to problems of academic freedom.
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CHAPTER IV
ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION 
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Academic freedom is not merely an idea or an 
abstract concept. As indicated in Chapter I, academic 
freedom is also a complex of norms, which, as any other 
set of norms, is (or can serve as) a basis for the behavior 
of people. In Chapter II it was suggested that the concept 
of academic freedom was influenced in its American develop­
ment by the kind of historical context within which it 
evolved, if academic freedom were merely an abstraction, 
the "historical context" examined in that chapter would 
have no relevance. Moreover, much of the program of the 
AAUP in regard to academic freedom, examined in Chapter 
III, takes cognizance of the "behavioral" context in 
which norms of academic freedom must operate. The AAUP 
does not simply formulate a detailed concept of academic 
freedom. Rather, as noted in Chapter III, the Association 
is concerned also with the implementation of its principles 
and policies. All of these considerations point to the 
value of analyzing the relationship of norms of academic 
freedom to academic organization. For the academic
128
129
organization of colleges and universities is the framework 
within which these norms have meaning and within which 
they influence the behavior of the incumbents of academic 
roles. This chapter, therefore, is concerned with the 
bearing of various facets of academic organization on 
the practice of academic freedom.
In conventional terms academic organization in 
the united States includes the following components: a
governing board, a hierarchy of administrative officials, 
a faculty, a corps of non-academic employees, a body of 
students, a roster of alumni, and possibly other elements, 
depending on the peculiarities of local situations, of 
these component units, only the first three, trustees, 
administration and faculty, normally share permanent, 
de jure, authority over the academic affairs (programs, 
policies, appointments, etc.) of a college of university.*' 
Occasionally other component units and external groups 
and forces exert influence on some special aspect of 
academic affairs, but these influences are not derived 
from the authority structure of the institution and tend 
to be exceptional. For this reason the ensuing discussion 
of academic organization is limited to the roles and 
interrelations among trustees, administrators and faculty.
There is a further justification for thus 
limiting the conception of academic organization employed
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here, Which takes into account the overall concern of 
this study with academic freedom* Of the several structur­
al components cited above, only the faculty, administration 
and trustees have any de jure authority to determine 
policies and to control conditions affecting academic 
freedom.^ The limitations employed, therefore, are 
consonant with the purpose of the chapter, the examination 
of the impact of academic organization on academic freedom.
The first section of this chapter presents some 
models of organization which aid in the analysis of aca­
demic organization from a sociological perspective. The 
second section explores the hypothesis that academic 
freedom is a function of academic organization. The 
discussion of academic organization, in turn, serves as 
the background for the analysis of "academic freedom 
cases" in Chapter V.
I. ANALYSIS OF ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
Colleges and universities in the United States 
are examples of large-scale complex organization. As is 
true of complex organization in general, they are charac­
terized by both hierarchical and functional differentiation 
in their internal structure. Conventionally, a governing 
board of lay trustees is granted by charter ultimate 
authbtity over institutional affairs. Both administrative
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offices and faculty positions are responsible to the 
board. A considerable degree of "managerial" responsi­
bility is usually allocated to administrative offices, 
however. Traditionally, administrators have been con­
sidered to be "agents1 of the governing board, and until 
rather recently were selected by the trustees.4 The 
faculty, like the "administration," is characterized 
by a substantial degree of functional and hierarchical 
differentiation. The place of the faculty in the au­
thority structure has been uncertain, at best, commonly 
the faculty role in institutional governance has been 
minimal compared to the roles of administration and 
trustees and traditionally has been confined to limited 
"academic" decisions such as degree requirements and 
curriculum. This traditional pattern of allocation of 
authority has been, to some extent, challenged in recent 
decades as a result of increased concern about academic 
freedom.
in the analysis of the relation of academic 
organization to academic freedom which follows, academic 
organization is examined within a sociological framework. 
In the first section some models of formal and informal 
organization are applied to academic organization, in 
the second section, selected concepts of reference group
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organization are examined as they apply to academic 
organization.
Formal and Informal Organization
5 6 7Following Mayo, Barnard, and others, it may
be said that academic organization has both formal and 
informal aspects. The formal organization of a college 
or university is founded upon official definitions of 
positions or roles within the institution and of the 
norms for interaction among the various roles. This 
pattern of organization is essentially prescribed and 
therefore is de jure, in nature, rather than d£ facto.
The formal organization, for instance, will include role 
prescriptions for the president, the dean(s), the registrar, 
the department chairmen, and so on. Procedural norms for 
role interaction will also be a part of the prescribed 
structure. Therefore, the formal organization is de 
jure, prescribed, and official.
Mayo, Barnard, and others have asserted that 
within any formal organization, there will also be 
informal relationships, which are unaccounted for by 
any diagram of formal organization. According to 
Barnard's usage, informal organization refers to .
. . the aggregate of the personal contacts and inter-gactions and the associated groupings of people. . ."
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In other words, in the college or university, as else­
where in large-scale organizations, there are unofficial 
relationships, which are not prescribed by the formal 
structure. This type of organization may arise from the 
interaction among individual personalities as opposed to 
interaction among role incumbents. For example, Department 
Chairman A may consult Department Chairman B on a given 
matter, not because of B's official role or official 
relationship to A, but because of the quality of the 
personal relationship between them. Informal organization, 
thus, tends to be de facto, unprescribed, and unofficial.
In distinguishing informal from formal organi­
zation there is the temptation to regard the organizational 
behavior of the participants as either formal or informal. 
In the author's view, such a dichotomous conception is 
not warranted. The formal-informal distinction applies, 
not to behavior or interaction but, to the sets of norms, 
values, and roles by which behavior is more or less 
governed. That is, "behavior" is all of one piece and 
is not divisible according to this analytical scheme.
The formal-informal distinction applies, in other words, 
to what may be called the normative level, rather than 
the level of action or behavior.
Both Mayo and Barnard seem to have fallen to
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this temptation. An attempt is made to represent their
conceptions schematically in Figure 6. The author's
conception is also presented there. Each diagram in the
figure has two intersecting dimensions, creating four
cells. Horizontally, the diagram is bisected by the
formal-informal distinction, on the vertical is the
distinction between the normative and behavioral levels.
Barnard's formal-informal dichotomy applies only to the
behavioral level. He speaks only of informal (and formal)
groups and associations. He does not discuss norms,
9values, and roles in the same terms.
Mayo also makes the formal-informal distinction 
on the behavioral level, unlike Barnard, however, Mayo 
talks about a formal structure of norms.3'0 Nevertheless, 
the informal-normative cell is empty because Mayo, like 
Barnard, does not recognize a normative structure for 
informal association. Both writers tend to discount the 
structured quality of informal interaction. Barnard, for 
instance, writess
. . . informal organization is 
indefinite and rather structureless, 
and has no definite subdivision. It 
may be regarded as a shapeless mass 
of quite varied densities . . .■*•*■
The author's conception, also presented in Figure
1, departs from the earlier schemes in two respects. First,
BARNARD
FORMAL
INFORMAL
X
X
MAYO
NORMATIVE BEHAVIORAL
X X
FORMAL
INFORMAL
X
DRYSDALE
FORMAL 
(Official)^
INFORMAL
(Unofficial)
BEHAVIORALNORMATIVE
Figure 6« Three models of formal and informal organization; 
Barnard, Mayo, Drysdale.
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the formal (official)-informal (unofficial) distinction 
applies to the normative level, representing a true 
dichotomy. On the one hand there are the official norms, 
role definitions, values and goals which comprise the 
formal organization. On the other hand, there are extra- 
or un-official roles, norms, values, and goals Which are 
the foundation for patterns of informal association. 
Second, on the behavorial level, the formal-informal 
dichotomy is erased, to take cognizance of the remarks 
made above, to indicate the indivisibility of behavior 
or interaction in these terms. To deny that behavior can 
be regarded as either "formal" or "informal," which is
i
the meaning of this scheme, does not imply that the 
formal-informal dichotomy is irrelevant for understanding 
organizational behavior. A given act may be guided 
primarily by either one or the other type of norms.
It is the author's contention, however, that rarely, if 
ever, is a giVen act guided exclusively by either formal 
or informal norms. Particular actions are guided by 
both formal and informal norms, goals, and values. The 
questions involved here are thorny ones for the sociolo­
gist. How does the observer determine whether, and to 
what extent, a given act is guided by informal (or 
formal) norms, especially in view of the fact that the
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"influence11 of norms, whether formal or informal, may be 
unconscious as well as conscious? Tracing the normative 
bases of actions is a formidable research task. Con­
ceptualizing behavior in this unified manner does not 
resolve such difficulties, but does at least take cognizance 
of them.
in applying the formal-informal distinction, 
there is also the temptation to say that one or the other 
is more "real," that while formal organization is pre­
scriptive, informal organization is actual or real. Such 
a statement is misleading, however* Both formal and 
informal organization are sets of norms, and as such are 
prescriptive. Each is "real" in the sense that each is 
capable of serving as the basis for human interaction.
Thus, both behavior and the norms guiding it, whether 
formal or informal, may be regarded as "real." "Real" 
organization can be formal, informal, or an amalgam of 
the two.
Reference organization; "Cosmopolitans" and "Locals"
The concept of "reference group," developed in 
recent years by sociologists and social psychologists is
also applicable to the analysis of academic organization.
12The term has been given a variety of meanings. Here, 
the concept will refer to a group Which serves as a
138
source of values and norms for an individual Whether he 
is a member of that group or not. Reference organization 
will mean alternative sets of values and norms within the 
same social system (e.g., a university). Reference 
organization seldom coincides with official organization 
and therefore represents a type of informal organization.
Following Robert Merton, a distinction may be
13made between '’cosmopolitans" and "locals.” Applied to 
academic organization, "locals" are those among the 
faculty and administration whose reference group is the 
institution at Which they serve. Their primary loyalty 
is to the values and goals of their college or university. 
Their interests are parochial and particularistic. The 
local situation is their "world," the framework within 
Which they see their lives unfolding. They "identify" 
with the local framework to the virtual exclusion of 
interests beyond the institution and locality.
"Cosmopolitans," on the other hand, are those 
whose reference groups are found beyond institution and 
locality. Because there are so many possibilities for 
external reference groups, cosmopolitans are less likely 
than locals to be homogeneous. Their primary loyalties 
may be to the values and norms of a professional or learned 
society, science, education in general, and so on. While
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in order to operate in the local environment one must at 
least minimally heed local norms and values, the cosmo­
politan's "world" is beyond the confines of locality.
His perspective is likely to be more universalistic than 
particularistic. Local affairs in so far as they are 
unique and remote from "cosmopolitan" concerns are not 
likely to compel his attention and interest. He is "in" 
the local situation but not "of" it.
Applied to a hypothetical university, one might 
expect the cosmopolitans to be represented heavily among 
the faculty and locals similarly overrepresented among 
administrative officers. If for no other reasons than 
the requirements of their roles, administrators are 
expected to be committed to the local values and norms 
and the bulk of their work is concerned with local affairs. 
The demands of faculty roles are generally less likely to 
invoke local loyalty and involve relatively less attention 
to local concerns, on the contrary, faculty roles are 
considered widely to be "liberating" and ecumenical by 
nature.
Assuredly, however, locals are to be found among 
faculty ranks and cosmopolitans among administrators.
The "local" professor may be an aspirant for an adminis­
trative post. He may anticipate remaining at his school 
for the duration of his career. He may have relatively
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little communication with fellow scholars and researchers 
in his field in the "outside" world of professional 
activity. The "cosmopolitan” administrator, on the other 
hand, may have retained a strong loyalty to his own 
discipline and an active interest in the work done by 
"external" colleagues in his field. He may view his 
administrative work as temporary, at least in respect 
to his current institution. His retention of an identity 
with any outside reference group will inhibit his becoming 
a "local."
Because lopals and cosmopolitans act on the 
basis of quite different values and norms, the possi­
bility for conflict between them is ever present. The 
two are likely to have different conceptions of the 
proper goals of the institution and its programs and the 
means of achieving goals, including definitions of roles 
of faculty and administrators. Locals, the "home-guard" 
as it were, are more likely to put institutional interests 
as they perceive them above considerations of more abstract 
values, ideas, and goals, conversely, cosmopolitans, who 
might be labeled "careerists," are more likely to promote 
goals and values derived from their "external" reference 
groups.
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II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS A 
FUNCTION OF ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION
In Chapter One it was stated that academic organi­
zation is an intervening variable between the AAUP and 
the practice of academic freedom. It is the purpose of 
this section to examine this idea in the light of the 
preceding discussion of the formal and informal (es­
pecially reference) organization of faculty-administration 
relationships.
The Relevance of Formal organization
As with complex organization in general, colleges 
and universities usually have explicitly defined structural 
units or components differentiated in terms of both function 
and hierarchy. Also, functions and procedures of these 
units for action and Interaction are usually specified 
in some detail, inasmuch as these structures and functions 
are the bases for much of the action of faculty and adminis­
trators, the nature of the formal organization is relevant 
to the kinds of policy and practice (including academic 
freedom) characteristic of a college or university.
Central to the hypothesis that formal organi­
zation is relevant to the practice of academic freedom is 
the additional hypothesis that certain types of academic 
structure and function are favorable while others are
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unfavorable, to the practice of academic freedom. That 
is, specific structures and functions may affect the 
practice of academic freedom either positively or 
negatively. Hypothetical cases will illustrate the 
point in question.
The extreme case of negative influence would 
probably be a college or university wherein all policy­
making authority rested in the office of president. Such 
a system would be compatible with autocratic management 
of an institution. If such were the case there would be 
no structural guarantees of functional autonomy within 
the institution.
Looking at institutional governance in terms of 
formal organization, functional autonomy for the faculty 
seems to be the key to the practice of academic freedom. 
By functional autonomy is meant the institutionalized 
means whereby faculty roles and units are granted policy 
control over specific faculty, or academic, functions. 
Those structural features which allow for autonomy will 
tend to promote the chances for academic freedom for the 
faculty.
Functional autonomy is closely approximated by 
what the AAUP terms "faculty participation" in college 
and university government. An examination of the Associ­
ation's principles of faculty participation provides an
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illustration of structural and functional means of pro­
moting faculty autonomy, and hence, presumably academic 
freedom. Among the principles which the AAUP has pro­
moted over the years are the following:
1. There ought to be a close under­
standing between the faculty and 
the board of trustees and to 
this end agencies other than the 
president are required for joint 
conference between the two 
bodies.
2. The general faculty should 
participate with the trustees
in the nomination of a president, 
and the faculty of a school or 
division should have a voice in 
selecting the dean who presides 
over that school.
3. Administrative officers should 
have the advice of representative 
faculty committees in matters of 
educational policy, and specifically 
in matters touching appointments, 
promotions, and dismissals, and
in making budgets.
4. The faculty of the university at 
large or its authorized repre­
sentatives, and the faculty of 
each college in the university, 
should have ultimate legislative 
power over educational policies 
within the jurisdiction of that 
faculty, and should control its 
own organization and its committee.
5. The departments of instruction, 
however organized, should be con­
sultative bodies and should exercise 
what is in effect a collective 
authority over the teaching and 
research under their jurisdiction.1,4
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The first principle cited simply provides for 
communication (through unspecified means) between faculty 
and governing board. Presumably this communication would 
be in some sense direct rather than mediated through normal 
"administrative" channels, one function of this communi­
cation would be to make the trustees aware of faculty 
ideas and opinion on specific institutional issues. 
Additionally, direct communication would tend to foster 
mutual understanding and appreciation of the functions 
performed by each body.
The second principle makes provision for the 
faculty to share authority with the board in selecting 
administrative officers. The means and extent of this 
authority are not specified. However, it is clear that 
this measure increases the autonomy of the faculty. More­
over, to the extent that the faculty has an important 
voice in such selections, the chances for selecting 
officers sympathetic to faculty autonomy in general are 
enhanced.
The third principle seeks to assure faculty 
influence, but not autonomy, in policy formulation 
pertaining to faculty personnel and academic budgeting.
It seems to leave primary responsibility for these with 
administrative officers.
The fourth principle, however, claims full
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autonomy for each faculty unit (college, school, etc.) 
in legislating educational policy within its juris­
diction. There are no qualifications or limits over this 
functional autonomy. This measure in itself may constitute 
a form of academic freedom inasmuch as policy issues 
related to academic freedom may be decided by the 
faculty or its units.
Finally, the fifth principle provides for faculty 
autonomy at the departmental level. On the one hand, the 
department is autonomous from external and higher au­
thority in certain types of decisions regarding teaching 
and research by its members. On the other hand, the 
terms "consultative bodies" and "collective authority"
Seem to be safeguards against "undemocratic" department 
"heads."
It may be noted that all five of the AAUP princi­
ples cited above would seem to have the effect of minimizing 
the hierarchical character of academic organization and 
at the same time emphasizing functional differentiation 
as well as autonomy. Each of the principles (the first 
one perhaps only quite indirectly) aims at increasing the 
degree of institutionalized faculty authority in academic 
decisions.
Faculty authority and academic freedom,thus, 
are closely interrelated. In a sense academic freedom is
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faculty authority over functions of teaching and research, 
broadly defined, if the faculty has specific forms of 
functional autonomy, then its academic freedom can be 
denied by no one. in practice, the problem is that the 
faculty does not in fact possess such authority and 
therefore its freedom is, at best, uncertain, and, at 
worst, non-existent.
Furthermore, it may be noted that the AAUP 
principles discussed above represent norms for academic 
functions and interaction. They define the roles of 
offices and units within the college or university. The 
values behind these norms are not explicitly stated. If 
faculty authority is not an end in itself, then perhaps 
one could say that the chief underlying value or 
rationale of these norms is academic freedom. This 
interpretation is substantiated by the AAUP's overarching 
concern with academic freedom. Furthermore, the net 
effect of these norms is to promote academic freedom.
The Relevance of Reference Organization
Aside from the importance of the formal or 
official organization of the college or university, the 
reference organization will have an effect on the practice 
of academic freedom. The composition of the faculty, 
administration, and governing board, in terms of the
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values to which they adhere, will affect the probability 
of maintaining norms of academic freedom in practice.
The reference organization may also affect the kind of 
official organization implemented in the institution.
Employing the reference group categories of 
"cosmopolitans" and "locals" discussed earlier, some 
hypotheses may be set forth to illustrate the potential 
importance of reference organization for academic freedom.
1. "localism" increases with age, rank, and 
length of service at a particular college or university.
This hypothesis simply relates localism to individual 
characteristics. The three independent variables cited 
are, of course, related. As one's length of service at 
an institution increases so does his age and usually his 
rank. The most significant variable is probably "length 
of service." Locals are probably less likely to be 
mobile, i.e., to leave the institution for another 
appointment. If this is true, it helps to explain the 
oligarchic tendencies in faculty government and adminis­
trative recruitment. If locals predominate at the 
higher levels of age, rank, and tenure, their chances 
for hierarchical advancement are enhanced.
2. Holding rank constant, localism decreases
as professional reputation outside an institution increases.
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This hypothesis asserts that within each rank locals have 
less professional standing and acquaintance outside the 
institution at which they serve than do cosmopolitans.
If this proposition is true, it is compatible with the 
fact that "cosmopolitans" by definition identify with 
external reference groups, foremost among which are the 
learned societies, their mefobers and professional 
activity. Also if locals are engaged in cultivating 
their "local" careers, their commitment to professional 
activity is likely to decline.
3. Locals are overrepresented among adminis­
trators and trustees; cosmopolitans are overrepresented 
among faculty. According to this hypothesis, adminis­
trators are more likely to be locals than are the faculty, 
whereas faculty are more likely to be cosmopolitans.
As suggested earlier, the reasons for this may lie in 
the nature of faculty vork and administrative function.
The requirements of administrative office may reinforce 
"localistic" tendencies, whereas most faculty functions 
are less likely to do so. Particularly the research 
function of the faculty is likely to support tendencies 
toward cosmopolitanism.
4. Locals are overrepresented among recruits 
for administrative offices. This hypothesis maintains
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that there is selectivity in the recruitment of adminis­
trative officers from faculty ranks reinforcing localism 
among administrators. Locals are more likely than 
cosmopolitans to be drawn into administrative work.
Perhaps one reason for this is to be found in the first 
hypothesis; that is, locals, predominating at the higher 
levels of age, rank, and tenure, are considered to be 
"eligible" for administrative positions, one important 
qiialification to the fourth hypothesis must be noted.
The probability of cosmopolitans being named to certain 
types of administrative posts, such as departmental 
chairmanships with limited tenure, will be enchanced if 
the selection is made by the faculty constituency rather 
than by the "higher administration."
5. Locals are more homogeneous (in values) than 
cosmopolitans. This hypothesis postulates in effect that 
locals are more likely to possess "value consensus" than 
are cosmopolitans. Loca3s share an overriding commitment 
to the local institution, its heritage, values and goals, 
as well as mutual personal loyalties. Moreover, this 
tendency would be reinforced by the fact that locals are 
more likely to know one another and interact over a 
sustained period of time (derived from the first hypothesis). 
On the other hand, cosmopolitans, while sharing primary
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commitments to external groups and values, do not share 
identical reference points. In view of the diversity 
of potential reference groups outside the local situation 
cosmopolitans may be characterized by relative hetero­
geneity of values. Their mutual acquaintance and 
interaction are inhibited by their relatively shorter 
periods of service at the institution. In short, cosmo­
politans are less likely than locals to represent a 
collectivity (unless, of course, they unite to form an 
AAUP chapter).
6. Locals favor organizational change in the 
institution less than do cosmopolitans. This hypothesis, 
concerning orientation to organizational change, rests
on the commitment of locals to their institution. Because 
of their loyalty to institutional traditions and values, 
locals are more likely than cosmopolitans to support the 
status quo in the face of proposed change. Whether this 
statement is true might well depend on the nature of any 
proposed change. The kinds of change that locals would 
most likely oppose would be those that are either based 
on cosmopolitan values or those that would be detrimental 
to personal loyalties or institutional traditions.
7. Locals support norms of academic freedom 
and other values promoted by the AAUP less than do
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cosmopolitans. This hypothesis is the most germane to 
the topic of this section, the relevance of reference 
organization to academic freedom. If it is true that 
locals are less likely than cosmopolitans to support 
norms of academic freedom, why is this so? in the view 
of the author, locals are more likely than cosmopolitans 
to feel their loyalties and interests threatened by 
academic freedom. Academic freedom and the values upon 
which it is based are abstractions and, as such, are no 
respectors of persons, loyalties or local traditions. 
Localism is particularistic; academic freedom is uni- 
versalistic. Furthermore, academic freedom is by nature 
cosmopolitan in the sense that it is "external" to any 
particular local institution.
It may be objected, however, that the seventh 
hypothesis is not compatible with the fifth one. If 
cosmopolitans are relatively heterogeneous in the 
"external" values to which they adhere, why would they 
unite in support of norms of academic freedom? It may 
be the case that cosmopolitans feel more insecure without 
institutionalized norms of academic freedom. For ex­
ample, cosmopolitans are more likely than locals to be 
outspoken on issues considered by the administration to 
be "controversial" and to antagonize the local "establish­
ment." Thus, the cosmopolitans are more likely to need,
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and to perceive the need for, official protection in the 
form of norms of academic freedom, unity in support of 
these norms does not necessarily mean that cosmopolitans 
will unite in collective action to achieve their goals, 
however.
As it is with academic freedom, so it is with 
other norms and values supported by the AAUP. Principles 
of academic responsibility, faculty participation in 
university government, and so forth are compatible with, 
and supportive of, academic freedom. If this is true, 
then an additional, derivative hypothesis should be 
trues cosmopolitans are overrepresented among the AAUP 
membership on both the national and the local chapter 
levels. There is little doubt that cosmopolitans 
predominate in the AAUP. However, there are probably 
many members who do not wholly subscribe to the values 
and norms of the Association. There are those who take 
an active interest in the local chapter and participate 
in its activities while paying little heed to national 
programs and principles, a s a consequence, local 
chapters may differ widely in their interest in and 
support of national values and norms. Just as locals may 
dominate college or university government, they may also 
dominate a local AAUP chapter and minimize its force in
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promoting academic freedom and related values.
In the light of the preceding discussion of 
formal and reference organization, the concept of academic 
freedom may be looked upon as an organizational concept.
As stated at the outset of Chapter one, academic freedom, 
from the perspective of academic organization, is a set 
of norms which governs the action of the faculty, adminis­
trators, and trustees. The essential norms which comprise 
academic freedom are the following:
(1) A faculty member, in his role as an aca­
demic specialist, should be free to criticize and to 
challenge accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related 
to his field of competence. This norm applies to the 
normal functional activities of teaching, research, and 
publication, as well as to other channels of expression.
For the social sciences and the humanities this norm 
entails freedom to criticize prevalent beliefs and 
practices of one's community and society insofar as
these are the subject of one's competence.
(2) A faculty member, in his role as a "citizen" 
of the institution at which he serves, should be free to 
criticize the official policies and practices of his 
institution, including the actions of administrative 
officers and trustees.
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(3) A faculty member, in his role as a member 
of the academic profession, should be free to defend his 
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations 
of, their academic freedom.
These norms are role prerogatives of faculty
15members. Each norm is attached to a special faculty 
role: specialist, institutional citizen, and professional
colleague. To speak of freedom is to speak of authority.
To state that the faculty is free to exercise the above- 
mentioned prerogatives is to say that it has the authority 
to do so. Academic freedom, therefore, entails functional 
autonomy for the faculty in the performance of faculty 
roles.
Correspondingly, if the norms of academic freedom 
are institutionalized as faculty prerogatives or rights, 
these norms constitute duties or responsibilities from 
the perspective of administrative and trustee roles. 
Administrators cannot authoritatively abrogate the norms 
of academic freedom, on the contrary, it may be asserted 
that it is the duty of administrators to safeguard aca­
demic freedom even from external threats.
Academic freedom, thus, is linked inherently 
to faculty authority. Viewed in this manner, faculty 
participation in college and university government is a
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key mechanism for the enhancement of academic freedom.
In general, to the extent that faculty participation 
in institutional governance is minimized, to that extent 
is academic freedom diminished. Therefore, when academic 
freedom is viewed sociologically, from the perspectives 
of both formal and reference organization, faculty 
participation is the crux of the problem of academic 
freedom.
156
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
•^Thomas Edward Blackwell, College Law; A Guide 
for Administrators (Washington, D.C.: American Council
on Education, 1961), pp. 40-42, 48-50; Robert M. Maclver, 
Academic Freedom in Otar Time (New York; Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1955), pp. 67-103.
2This is not to ignore the fact that state 
legislatures and government agencies, for instance, can, 
and sometimes do, exercise legal influence which may 
affect the practice of academic freedom. From the 
conceptual standpoint, however, such influences are 
"external" to academic organization.
3Mac±ver, op. cit., pp. 71-72; Blackwell, op. 
cit:q , p. 41.
^Especially the president, who in turn selected 
other officers with the approval of the board. Cf.
Blackwell, ojo. cit., p. 41.
5Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an industrial 
Civilization (Cambridge; Harvard university Press, 1933). 
Also F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, Management 
and the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1946).
^Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive 
(Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1938).
^Richard T. Lapiere, A Theory of Social Control 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954) , pp. 290-300; Peter M.
Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: university
of Chicago Press, 1955), Ch. I; George C. Homans,. The 
Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), Chs. 14,
15.
8Barnard, op. cit., p. 115.
9lbid., pp. 81-122.
10Cf. Roethlisberger and Dickson, o£. cit., pp.
525-548.
^Barnard, op. cit., p. 115.
12cf. especially Robert K. Merton, Social Theory 
and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 19577^
157
pp. 225-386? Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social 
psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp.
93-314; Ralph H. Turner, "Role-Taking, Role Standpoint, 
and Reference-Group Behavior," American Journal of 
Sociology, LXI, 4 (January 1956), pp. 316-328? Tamotsu 
Shibutani, "Reference Groups as Perspectives," American 
Journal of Sociology, IX (May 1955), pp. 562-659.
l^Merton, op. cit., pp. 387-420.
^American Association of university Professors, 
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 165.
lSihe values which underlie these normative 
freedoms were discussed in Chapters II and III.
CHAPTER V
ACADEMIC FREEDOM CHALLENGED:
SOME POST-WAR CASES
Each of the last three chapters has dealt with 
a single variable. Chapter IX treated the development 
of the concept of academic freedom in the united States 
in historical terms. Chapter III presented an analysis 
of the structure and functioning of the AAUP as an 
advocate of academic freedom. Chapter IV provided a 
largely hypothetical analysis of academic freedom. It 
is the purpose of this chapter to examine the interplay 
of the three variables in concrete situations.
The conceptual relationships among the three 
variables were outlined in Chapter I. It was noted there 
that academic freedom is a dependent variable in relation 
to the AAUP and to academic organization. Academic 
organization was viewed as an intervening variable 
between the other two. That is, the AAUP in promoting 
principles of academic freedom must seek to have its 
principles assimilated into the patterns of college and 
university structure as official policy, in Chapter IV 
academic freedom was examined from the perspective of 
organization as a set of norms which govern the actions
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of faculty, administrators, and trustees. The question 
that arises at this point is the focus of the present 
chapter: what happens when these norms are not present,
or break down, in particular situations? what happens 
when an individual faculty member feels victimized by 
the fact that these norms are not operative in the 
institution at which he serves? It is possible to 
examine the interplay of the three variables in 
situations in which the AAUP intervenes.
The situations chosen to illustrate the concrete 
interplay of the AAUP, academic freedom, and academic 
organization are cases of AAUP censure of administrative 
officials of particular colleges and universities for 
violations of the Association's principles of academic 
freedom. Only those cases which have occurred since 
World War II and which have been resolved by 1965 are 
included in this analysis. These are, in effect, cases 
in which the AAUP decided that given institutions had 
defective patterns of organization in that adminis­
trative and/or trustee actions were not governed by 
norms of academic freedom.
Following the general descriptive information 
on the cases presented in the section below, the cases 
are analyzed in terms of the issues involved, the 
intervention of the AAUP, and the resolution of the cases.
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I. THE POST-WAR CASES 
OP AAUP CENSURE: DESCRIPTION
During the period from January 1945 through 
December 1965, the American Association of University 
Professors, following the procedures described in Chapter 
III, imposed its censure on the administrative officers
3(and/or trustees) of thirty-seven U. S. colleges and 
universities for violations of the Association's 1940 
statement of principles of academic freedom and tenure.
By the end of this period twenty-one of the thirty-seven 
cases had been "closed," i.e., removed from censure, and 
sixteen cases remained "open," i.e., still listed by the 
Association on its list of "Censured Administrations."
For the reasons stated in Chapter I, only the 
closed cases are analyzed in this chapter. It may be 
shown that the closed cases do not differ materially in 
several respects from the open cases. From the data 
presented in the tables in this section, it may be noted 
that the closed cases and the open cases show similar 
patterns of regional distribution, frequency by type of 
institution, and duration of censured status.
Table VII presents the names and locations of 
institutions whose censure has been imposed and removed 
between 1945 and 1965, as well as specification of 
regional location and type of institution.1" Also given
TABLE VII
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
Institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of 
Institution
year
Imposed
Censure
Removed
No- Years 
Censured
Univ. of Missouri 
Columbia, Missouri
Midwest Public 
State Univ.
1946 1952 6
Univ. of Texas 
Austin, Texas
Southwest Public 
State Univ.
1946 1953 7
Evansville College 
Evansville, Indiana
Midwest Private 
Church related
1950 1956 6
Univ. of California 
Berkeley, California
West Public 
State Univ.
1956 1958 2
North Dakota State 
Univ., Fargo,
North Dakota
Midwest Public 
State Univ.
1956 1964 8
Ohio State Univ. 
Columbus, Ohio
Midwest Public 
State Univ.
1956 1959 3
Univ. of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma
Southwest Public 
State Univ.
1956 1957 1
Rutgers
New Brunswick,
New Jersey
East Public 
State Univ.
1956 1958 2 
(continued)
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TABLE VII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
Institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of 
Institution
Year Censure 
Imposed Removed
No. Years 
Censured
Saint Louis Univ. St. Louis, Missouri Midwest
Private 
Church related
1956 1957 1
Temple Univ.
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
East Private
university
1956 1961 5
Catawba College 
Salisbury,
North Carolina
South Private 
Church related
1957 1964 7
Univ. of Nevada 
Reno, Nevada
West Public 
State Univ.
1957 1959 2
Auburn Uhiv. 
Auburn, Alabama
South Public 
State Uhiv.
1958 1964 6
Dickinson College 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
East Private
College
1958 1963 5
Livingston College 
Salisbury,
North Carolina
South Private 
Church related
1958 1960 2
(continued)
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TABLE VII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSED AAUP CASES
1945-65
Institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of Year 
Institution Imposed
Censure
Removed
No. Years 
Censured
Univ. of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan
Midwest Public 
State Univ.
1958 1959 1
Southwestern Louisiana 
Institute 
Lafayette, Louisiana
South Public 
State Uhiv.
1958 1960 2
New York Univ.
New York, New York
East Private
university
1959 1961 2
Princeton Theological 
Seminary 
Princeton, New Jersey
East Private 
Church related
1960 1961 1
Allen Uhiv.
Columbia, South Carolina
South Private 
Church related
1961 1962 1
Arkansas A., M., and N.
College 
Pine Bluff, Arkansas
South Public 
State College
1964 1965 1
Average Duration of Censure 3.4
163
164
in this table are the years in which censure was imposed 
and removed and the total number of years censured.
Table VIII provides the same types of data for the open 
cases, except that along with the year censure was 
imposed, the number of elapsed years to 1965 is given.
As noted in Tables VII and VIII respectively, the 
duration of censure for the closed cases is 3.4 years, 
and for the open cases 3.2 years (through 1965). Only 
three of the sixteen open cases had been censured (as of 
the end of 1965) longer than five years, whereas six of 
the twenty-one closed cases were censured for at least 
six years. Therefore, there is no apparent reason on 
the basis of these data to assume that the open cases 
are inherently more difficult to resolve than were the 
closed cases.
Table IX gives data on the geographical 
distribution of the censure cases, of the thirty-seven 
total cases, fourteen, or about forty per cent, occurred 
in the South. The South had more total cases than any 
other region. Considering the regional distribution 
of colleges and universities, the South is probably 
heavily overrepresented among the censure cases. The 
Midwest and the East were represented by nine and eight 
cases respectively, whereas the Southwest had four cases 
and the West had only two. Comparing the open and the
TABLE VIII
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of 
Institution
Year censure 
Imposed
No. Years 
Censured, 
to 1965
Jefferson Medical College 
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
East Private
College
1956 9
Texas Technological Southwest 
College 
Lubbock, Texas
Public 
State College
1958 7
Fisk university 
Nashville, Tennessee
South Private
College
1959 6
Lowell Technological 
Institute 
Lowell, Massachusetts
East Public 
State College
1960 5
Benedict College 
Columbia, South Carolina
South Private 
Church related
1961 4
Alabama State College 
Montgomery, Alabama
South Public 
State College
1962 3
(continued)
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TABLE VIII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
Institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of 
Institution
Year Censure 
Imposed
No. Years 
Censured, 
to 1965
South Dakota State 
College 
Brookings, South Dakota
Midwest Public 
State College
1962 3
Alcorn A. and M. College 
Port Gibson, Mississippi
South Public 
State College
1963 2
Arkansas State Teachers 
College 
Conway, Arkansas
South Public 
State College
1963 2
Grove City College 
Grove City, Pennsylvania
East Private 
Church related
1963 2
Univ. of Illinois 
Urbana, Illinois
Midwest Public 
State Univ.
1963 2
Sam Houston State southwest 
College 
Huntsville, Texas
Public 
Stat^ College
1963 2
(continued)
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TABLE VIII (continued)
IDENTIFICATION AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AAUP CASES
1945-1964
Institution, Name 
and Location
Region Type of 
institution
Year Censure 
Imposed
No. Years 
Censured, 
to 1965
Univ. of Arkansas 
Fayetteville, Arkansas
South Public 
State Uhiv.
1964 1
Mercy College 
Detroit, Michigan
Midwest Private 
Church related
1964 1
College of the ozarks 
Clarksville, Arkansas
South Private 
Church related
1964 1
Univ. of South Florida 
Tampa, Florida
South Public 
State Univ.
1964 1
Average number of years on censure through 1965 3.2
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TABLE IX
DISTRIBUTION OF OPEN AND CLOSED CENSURE 
CASES BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION
Region No. of 
Closed cases
No. of 
Open Cases
Total
Cases
East 5 3 8
Midwest 6 3 9
South 6 8 14
Southwest 2 2 4
West 2 0 2
Totals 21 16 37
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closed cases the distributions and totals are similar 
with two exceptions. First, while the West had two 
closed cases, it has no open cases. Second, eight of 
the South's fourteen cases are still open. However, 
little significance can be attached to the fact that 
roost of the South's cases are still open inasmuch as 
most of them are recent in occurrence, in three of the 
eight open cases censure has been in effect for only 
one year, in two others for only two years.
in Table X the occurrence of open and closed 
cases by type of institutional control is given. The 
basic categories are public and private. The public 
institutions are classified as either state universities 
or state colleges. The latter category includes techni­
cal institutes and teachers colleges. The private insti­
tutions are divided into those that are church-related 
or controlled and those that are not.
As Indicated in Table X, of the thirty-seven 
cases, twenty-two, or about sixty per cent, involve 
public colleges and universities. Fourteen of these are 
state universities and the other eight are state colleges 
of various types. Of the fifteen private institutions, 
ten are church-related; five are not. A comparison of 
the open to the closed cases reveals a proportionate 
distribution between the public and private categories.
TABLE X
DISTRIBUTION OF OPEN AND CLOSED CENSURE CASES 
BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION
Type of No. of 
Institution Closed Cases
NO. of 
Open Cases TotalCases
Public
State university 11 3 14
State College 1 7 8
Total 12 10 22
Private
Church Related 6 4 10
Non-Church Related 3 2 5
Total 9 6 15
Total Cases 21 16 37
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Of the closed cases, twelve are public and nine are 
private institutions, of the open cases, ten are public 
and six are private institutions. Among the private 
colleges and universities the distribution between 
church-related and non-church-related institutions is 
exactly proportionate, exhibiting the overall two to one 
ratio. Among the nine closed cases, six are church- 
related; three are not. Among the open cases, four are 
church-related; two are not.
Within the public category, however, there is 
a considerable disparity between the open and the closed 
cases, of the fourteen state university cases, eleven 
are closed; only three are open. Of the eight state 
college cases, only one is closed, whereas seven are 
still open. The discrepancy is increased when it is 
noted that two of the three open state university cases 
have been censured for only one year as of 1965, whereas 
none of the seven open state college cases is that recent. 
It is not easy to account for the difference. However, 
it may be noted from a comparison of Tables VII and 
VIII that those universities of greatest academic 
reputation are overrepresented among the closed as 
compared to the open cases. For instance, among the 
closed cases are the university of California, university
172
of Michigan, university of Texas, and Ohio State Uhi- 
versity, as well as Rutgers, Missouri, and other lesser- 
ranking universities. The hypothesis may be advanced 
that these relatively high-prestige institutions are 
characterized by greater institutional autonomy and are 
thus lacking some of the external bureaucratic handicaps 
of the state colleges in general. Thus, they may be 
more capable of rapid adjustments leading to resolutions 
of the cases. Additionally, they may be more concerned 
than the state colleges with their national esteem, which 
stands to suffer under censure.
On the whole, then, it may be concluded that the 
open cases do not differ substantially from the closed 
cases on the criteria examined. At this point there is 
no reason to conclude that the open cases are inherently 
more resistant to resolution. On the contrary, one might 
predict that the open cases will fall into similar patterns 
as the closed cases and with time submit to resolution 
(though not automatically to be sure).
Finally, looking at the time distribution of 
all thirty-seven cases, one finds they are quite evenly 
distributed according to the dates on which censure was 
imposed (see Tables VII and VIII). For the period under 
study there were only three cases of censure prior to 
1956, two in 1946 and one in 1950. in 1956, eight
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institutions were meted censure by the Association, and 
six more were sanctioned in 1958. Fewer schools were 
censured in 1957 and later years. Any attempted expla­
nation must be largely hypothetical. A few reasons may 
be advanced as partial explanations. First, the Associ­
ation from time to time has been concerned about the size 
of its censure list. Some spokesmen have believed that 
to carry too long a list of censured administrations
2would diminish the effectiveness and meaning of censure. 
For the first few years of the period under study, the 
Association was carrying on its “blacklist” several 
cases of censure invoked prior to 1946. The last of 
these cases was not resolved until 1959. This con­
sideration may have inhibited potential AAUP censure 
actions at least until the early 1950's. A second 
reason for lack of censure actions until 1956 may 
have been organizational lethargy during the mid-fifties. 
During this period there was a backlog of cases under
3Investigation which were slow to culminate in censure. 
Also, as noted in Chapter III, this was a period When 
dues were increased fifty per cent and membership in 
the Association actually declined. The years roughly 
coincided with the "McCarthy era," in which the AAUP 
was slow to react to the issues and the tensions of the 
period. Therefore, the sudden rash of censures in 1956
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to 1958 partially reflects the backlog of Committee A 
work which had accumulated. Since 1958 the time dis­
tribution of censures has been more evenly spaced.
II. THE PATTERNS OF CONFLICT: THE ISSUES
The analysis in this and later sections of the 
chapter pertains exclusively to the closed AAUP censure 
cases listed in Table VII. As mentioned earlier these 
are cases in which censure was imposed between 1945 and 
1964 and removed between 1946 and 1965. The data relied 
upon in this chapter are matters of public record. Only 
the reports and information published in the AAUP Bulletin 
during the twenty-year period are employed in this analysis.
No attempt is made in the following discussion 
to provide a detailed or systematic analysis of the 
twenty-one cases. The data presented in the published 
reports do not seem to be amenable to such a presentation. 
Because the cases exhibit diverse characteristics the 
reports vary in comprehensiveness and lack any standardized 
framework for presenting and interpreting information.
In spite of this consideration the reports offer clear 
accounts of the issues involved in each case in terms 
of the sequence of events and of the bearing of Associ­
ation policy on the circumstances of each case. Therefore, 
the published reports are well-suited for illustrative
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purposes pertaining to the Interplay of academic freedom, 
academic organization, and the American Association of 
University Professors,
The issues involved in the twenty-one closed 
cases seem to be of four types: academic freedom, aca­
demic tenure, academic due process, and academic organi­
zation. Some of the cases involved all four issues; yet 
it seems valuable to keep the issues distinct wherever 
possible. The issues themselves are often interrelated 
such that violations of tenure usually involve violations 
of due process, for instance. Nevertheless, the cases 
are examined here in terms of the separate issues 
illustrated by them.
Issues of Academic Freedom
Seventeen of the twenty-one cases include 
various types of academic freedom issues. If academic 
freedom is conceived as being comprised primarily of 
the three norms elaborated in Chapter IV, the seventeen 
cases exhibit violations of, or failures to abide by, 
each of these norms, including the freedom of the 
specialist to express his views, of the institutional 
citizen to criticize his administrative officers and 
their policies and actions, and of the colleague to 
defend his peers. Additionally, some of the cases
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represent denial o£ civil liberties apart from academic 
freedom.
The post-war period under study encompasses the 
years of the so-called McCarthy era, which was charac­
terized by public concern for “national security," led 
largely by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the late forties 
and early fifties. Part of the attention of the many 
security investigations, seeking to reveal "security 
risks," especially members, former members, and sympa­
thizers with the Communist Party, was focused on 
individual professors and institutions of higher learning. 
It is interesting to note that eight of the seventeen 
cases which specifically entailed academic freedom 
issues can be classified as “national security" cases.
in the fall of 1955 the Association's Council 
appointed a special committee to report on the develop­
ments of national security cases in several institutions. 
The committee was explicitly charged ". . .to review 
the effects upon academic freedom and tenure of the 
national effort to achieve military security and to 
combat Soviet Communism . . .1,4 The committee produced 
a report that included consideration of eighteen cases, 
eight of which eventually resulted in censure (seven 
of these eight cases are now closed). Two of the cases
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included on-carapus investigations authorized by the 
committee, according to the usual procedures of 
treating such cases, in all the other cases which the 
committee reviewed, it relied on facts of public 
knowledge and the contents of published documents only. 
This was a departure from the normal procedures de­
scribed in Chapter III. Apart from the special com­
mittee 's report in 1956, there were later and separate 
reports of two additional national security cases, one
of which resulted in censure and is now closed, making
5a total of eight closed national security cases.
It may be noted that 1955-56 was a relatively 
late date to exhibit concern about such cases in view 
of the fact that, for all practical purposes, the McCarthy 
era was over by that time. The report of the special 
committee acknowledges pressure from the AAUP membership 
for the Association to take a strong public stand even 
at so late a date: "The insistence that it do so is
widespread among its members . . . "  The report of 
the cases is divided into two sections, the first 
entitled, "The Impact of Public Actions Directed 
Against Communism," and the second, "The Effects of 
the Refusal to Testify." under the first heading are 
included cases at the university of California and the
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University of Oklahoma, under the second are included 
New York university, Rutgers, Temple, Ohio State, and 
the university of Michigan.
The university of California case is probably 
the most widely known of all the cases and may be used 
to illustrate some of the issues of conflict which have
7led to censure. One of the key issues in this case
involved the imposition of a so-called "disclaimer oath"
to faculty members and administrators as a condition of
continued employment. The oath was actually prescribed
in 1949 by the university's Board of Regents ", . . to
forestall legislation to establish security controls
over the University, which seemed imminent by reason of
0previous investigations and reports." The oath which
it imposed included a statement disclaiming membership
in the Communist Party as well as in any other " . . .
gcommitment that is in conflict with my obligations."
The president of the University as well as 
the faculty senates within the system went on record as 
being strongly opposed to the oath requirement. After 
several months of negotiation and heated controversy, 
thirty-two faculty members persisted in refusing to sign 
the oath. The Board subsequently dismissed the faculty 
members, more than half of whom bad tenure. Additional
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faculty members resigned in protest of the dismissals.
The conflict then shifted to the state courts when 
twenty of the dismissed faculty members brought suit 
to compel their reinstatement.
In 1952, the State Supreme Court decided in favor 
of the dismissed faculty members on the ground that the 
Board did not have the authority to impose such an oath.^ 
However, in the interim the state legislature had enacted 
a statute requiring a similar oath of all state employees, 
including, of course, those in higher education. Upon 
court test, this oath was upheld as valid. Some of the 
dismissed faculty members then took the oath and were 
reinstated. However, the university administration refused 
to pay the salaries of the dismissed members during their 
non-employment on the ground that the Board action had 
been illegal. On each campus of the university an 
administrative official was charged with responsibility 
for security surveillance in keeping with the insti­
tution's policy of not employing members of the Communist 
11Party.
In the eyes of the AAUP and the special com­
mittee the Board, in prescribing the disclaimer oath, 
was contravening the academic freedom of the faculty in 
bowing to external pressures in the form of anticipated
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12legislative sanctions. The administrative officials 
also later bowed to the same pressures including those 
from Board in maintaining surveillance, as it were, on 
the political affiliations and activities of the faculty. 
For these infractions the University was censured by the 
AAUP. The report especially noted the adverse effects 
of the oath and the surrounding controversy on faculty 
morale.
The case at the university of Oklahoma revolved
around the consequences of the imposition of an oath
13similar to the one at California. A state-sponsored 
investigation of an assistant professor of zoology 
raised "doubts" in the minds of the Regents as to the 
man's political sympathies. (He testified in a hearing 
that at one time, long before assuming his present 
position, he had "sympathized" with the Communist 
Party.) He was dismissed by the Board. AAUP censure 
was the result.
In the section of the committee report en­
titled "The Effects of the Refusal to Testify," the 
cases examined are largely "First and Fifth Amendment" 
cases. At Rutgers two faculty members, one with 
tenure, were dismissed because they invoked the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in
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refusing to testify before the House Un-American acti-
14vities Committee. Under similar conditions a tenured 
professor of philosophy at Temple university was dismissed. 
Likewise, at Ohio State a tenured associate professor of 
physics was dismissed the same day on which he invoked
the First and Fifth Amendments in refusing to testify
16before HUAC. His refusal to testify was construed by
the Board as “gross insubordination” to the administration.
The AAUP report noted that the dismissal action rested
partially on ". . . deductions from a supposed state of
17public opinion in relation to his act . . . ” Ohio
State also had a disclaimer oath and a "speaker ban.”
At New York university two tenured associate
18professors were dismissed for similar reasons. one
had been convicted of contempt of Congress for failing
to produce records of the Joint Anti-Facist Refugee
Committee on demand of HUAC. The other man had invoked
the First and Fifth Amendments in answering questions
posed by the.Senate internal Security subcommittee.
Similarly three faculty members at the University of
Michigan, one with tenure, received punitive action
19upon invoking the two amendments. on the same day 
they testified before the HUAC they were suspended from 
teaching duties pending inquiry initiated by the adminis­
tration. Eventually two of them were dismissed and the
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third was censured by the Board of Regents, in taking
these measures the Board stated that Its actions were
not based on the refusals to testify by invoking the
amendments, but on the alleged Communist affiliations
of the men. The dismissals at Rutgers, Temple, Ohio
State, and New York University were based on the
invocation of the amendments and in most of those cases
the trustees acknowledged that they were confident that
the dismissed faculty members had no affiliations, past
20or present, with the Communist Party.
The other Pifth Amendment case, that of
Dickinson college in Pennsylvania, was examined in a 
21later report. However, issues in this case were 
similar to those cited above. An assistant professor 
of economics (not having tenure) was dismissed for 
having invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer 
questions upon interrogation by the HUAC.
There is some question, in the author's opinion, 
as to whether these Fifth Amendment dismissals actually 
constitute academic freedom cases, invocation of the 
First or Fifth Amendments is the constitutionally 
guaranteed civil liberty of an individual. Dismissals 
pursuant to exercise of these rights, and solely for 
this reason, comprise a form of denial of civil liberties.
183
not of academic freedom, only If freedom of extramural 
expression is construed as part and parcel of academic 
freedom can such dismissals be cast as violations of 
academic freedom. Freedom of extramural utterance, 
however, is the constitutional right of any citizen, 
professor or not, and is therefore something distinct 
from academic freedom, which by definition pertains to 
those in the ‘'academy," and to their academic functions 
and roles. Assuredly, the Fifth Amendment cases outlined 
above involved issues of due process, tenure, and organi­
zation. They did not involve, in the opinion of the 
author, distinct issues of academic freedom.
The issue of extramural utterance was also the
primary one which culminated in the AAUP censure of
22Evansville College in 1946. An assistant professor 
of religion and philosophy was dismissed largely for 
his extramural political activity in support of Henry 
Wallace for President. His political nonconformity 
became the focus of public controversy in the college 
and, more especially, in the city of Evansville. Here 
again, a faculty member was deprived of his position 
because he exercised his civil liberties, it does not 
seem to represent a clear-cut issue of academic freedom.
Academic freedom in the strict sense seems to
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have been involved more clearly in the Auburn University 
case. An assistant professor of economics was dismissed 
for writing a "letter to the editor" of the campus news­
paper in which he challenged (in a rather judicious tone) 
the segregationist views expressed in a previous editorial 
in that paper. The specific topic of both the editorial 
and the faculty member*s letter pertained to a subject 
within the competence of a social scientist. The Board, 
however, construed his letter as the basis for summary 
dismissal, in that it dealt with the controversial race 
issue, especially since tenure was not involved. The 
AAUP, of course, did not agree. The man was performing 
an appropriate function as a faculty member and as an 
individual. Therefore, his academic freedom was clearly 
violated by the dismissal.
Academic freedom issues of various types were 
also involved in most of the other cases. However, these 
issues were usually secondary to issues of tenure, due 
process, and organization, which are examined in the 
following sections.
issues of Academic Tenure
The 1940 statement of AAUP principles deals not 
only with academic freedom, but also with standards of 
tenure and due process. Sixteen of the twenty-one closed
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censure cases Included infractions of the Association's
standards of tenure.
The 1940 statement (see Appendix C) states that
"Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time
instructor or a higher rank, the probationary period
24should not exceed seven years . . . "  Service at other 
institutions prior to a given appointment should be 
included in the seven years,
. . . subject to the proviso that 
when, after a term of probationary 
service of more than three years 
in one or more institutions, a 
teacher is called to another 
institution it may be agreed in 
writing that his new appointment 
is for a probationary period of 
not more than four years, even 
though thereby the person's total 
probationary period in the academic 
profession is extended beyond the 
normal maximum of seven years.*5
Tenure is permanent or continuous until re­
tirement age and may be terminated only because of bona 
fide financial exigencies or proof of adequate cause 
(such as incompetence or moral turpitude). Some of the 
institutions represented among the sixteen tenure cases 
had no explicit tenure policies; others had policies 
which differed from the AAUP standards. In some cases 
the tenure policies of the particular institution were 
abrogated; in others the infractions pertained only to
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the AAUP standards.
It Is to be noted that infractions of tenure 
do not occur in isolation from other issues. As noted 
above, most of the academic freedom cases included 
infringements of tenure. Many of the tenure cases 
apparently resulted from personal conflicts and dis­
harmonies in which the "victims'' were accused of 
disloyalty or insubordination to the administration or 
other forms of obstreperousness or uncooperativeness. 
These cases are to some extent typified by the case
which led to the censure of Saint Louis university in 
261956. A professor of medicine who was also Director 
of the Department of Internal Medicine (both positions 
tenured by esqolicit agreement of university officials) 
was dismissed largely because of friction between him 
and certain administrators and trustees, and more 
especially between him and the Sisters of Saint Mary, 
who staffed a hospital which was used by his department. 
The conflict between the latter over the use of the 
hospital seems to have been the root issue which led 
the trustees to believe that the professor was dis­
pensable. In view of the AAUP, Saint Louis university 
was censureable because the professor's tenure was 
violated without adequate cause. (For instance, the
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the university had failed to live up to certain explicit 
commitments made to the man upon his appointment and also 
had failed to attempt to ameliorate the conflict between 
the professor and the Sisters.) Other cases are variations 
on the same theme.
Issues of Academic Due Process
All twenty-one of the closed cases involved one 
or more issues of due process as set forth in the 1940 
statement. The notion of due process pertains to the 
proper procedures to be followed in instances of dismissal 
or non-reappointment. The basis AAUP-sanctioned princi­
ples of due process are contained in the following 
paragraph from the 1940 statement:
Termination for cause of a con­
tinuous appointment, or the 
dismissal for cause of a teacher 
previous to the expiration of a 
term appointment, should, if 
possible, be considered by both 
a faculty committee and the 
governing board of the insti­
tution. in all cases where the 
facts are in dispute, the accused 
teacher should be informed before 
the hearing in writing of the 
charges against him and should 
have the opportunity to be heard 
in his own defense by all bodies 
that pass judgment upon his case.
He should be permitted to have 
with him an adviser of his own 
choosing who may act as counsel.
There should be a full stenographic
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record of the hearing available 
to the parties concerned. In 
the hearing of charges of 
incompetence the testimony 
should include that of teachers 
and other scholars, either from 
his own or from other insti­
tutions. Teachers on continuous 
appointment who are dismissed for 
reasons not involving moral 
turpitude should receive their 
salaries for at least a year 
from the date of notification 
of dismissal whether or not 
they are continued in their 
duties at the institution. 7
It is to be observed that due process, like
academic freedom, is the prerogative of the non-tenured
as well as the tenured positions, while an institution
may choose not to reappoint a non-tenured faculty member
without an explanation or hearing, it may not interrupt
or terminate a non-tenured appointment during the period
of the appointment except in accordance with the above
procedures, since 1940 the Association has also
elaborated its principles of due process to apply to
28notice of reappointment or non-reappointment. While 
the essence of due process is a fair hearing, academic 
due process may be conceived more broadly to include all 
procedural standards applying to appointments and their 
termination by ad hoc administrative action.
Occasionally due process violations occur in 
isolation from other issues. The censure of Livingstone
29College in North Carolina Is a case in point. in 
applying for a position at Livingstone, which is af­
filiated with a Protestant denomination, an applicant 
explicitly noted his religious identification as 
Unitarian. He was offered an acceptable contract to 
teach at Livingstone the following academic year. He 
signed and returned the contract, received confirmation 
of it from Livingstone, and resigned his position at 
Blackburn College where he was teaching at the time. 
Early in June he received notice that his contract had 
been cancelled by the Livingstone Board of Trustees 
because he was a Unitarian, a faith that was unac­
ceptable at Livingstone. The revocation of the signed 
contract before the period of appointment began was a 
violation of due process, rather than of tenure (to 
which he had no claim) or of academic freedom.
Such cases as the one at Livingstone are rare 
in comparison to those cases in which issues of due 
process are accompanied by issues of academic freedom 
and tenure. The great majority of the closed censure 
cases under consideration included all three types of 
issues.
Another case in which due process constituted 
the primary, though perhaps not the exclusive, issue was
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the dismissal of a professor of history and sociology
30at Southwestern Louisiana Institute in 1955. The 
professor had served for one year and his contract had 
been renewed for 1955-56. He was not entitled to tenure 
although he had taught at several other institutions in 
previous years. For one reason or another (the basis 
of the charges was never made quite clear) the adminis­
tration decided to revoke his contract for the coming 
year toward the end of the summer. He was not granted 
a hearing nor any other feature of due process either 
by the administration or the State Board of Education 
to whom the institution was responsible. Aside from the 
fact that there may have been some latent issues of 
academic freedom, the denial of due process was the 
overriding consideration leading to the AAUP censure 
of Southwestern in 1958.
In all the other cases (aside from Southwestern 
and Livingstone) the infractions of due process were 
accompanied by other misdemeanors and felonies. Some 
of the due process violations were relatively minor 
(for instance, a hearing may have been granted but 
opportunity for counsel may have been denied) while 
others were gross in disregard of due process standards. 
The details of these other infractions do not seem to
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deserve special attention apart from consideration of 
other issues.
Issues of Academic Organization
Principles of academic organization was not 
treated explicitly by the 1940 statement. Nevertheless, 
it may be shown that issues of academic freedom, tenure, 
and due process, whether considered singly or in con­
junction, entail issues of academic organization.
Academic freedom, tenure, and due process consist 
of rules which can govern the actions of people. They 
are amenable to exposition in the form of policy. Prom 
the perspective of academic organization these rules are 
organizational norms and, thus, aspects of the organization 
of a college or university. Defective policies, or dis­
regard of policies, of academic freedom, tenure, or due 
process thus constitute instances of faulty organization 
or failure to abide by institutional norms. Thus, even 
the case of Livingstone College, which involved a simple 
violation of due process, is an instance of defective 
organization. Moreover, by definition, all twenty-one 
cases under examination involve organizational issues.
These considerations notwithstanding, there are several 
types of substantive issues of organization involved in 
the several cases, which are now to be examined.
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The organizational issues are of two fundamental 
types: those that pertain mostly to formal or official
organization, and those that pertain to reference organi­
zation. Of the former type there are several instances 
among the censure cases. The university of Nevada case 
in particular is a notable instance of disregard for
31faculty authority in the government of a university.
This case concerned the dismissal of a tenured professor 
of biology who was also chairman of that department on 
charges of insubordination and disloyalty to the 
president of the university, in the judgment of the 
AAUP, the case exhibited flagrant violations of academic 
freedom, tenure, and due process. In the view of the 
author, an examination of the organization of authority 
within this university sheds light on the issues of the 
case.
The chief antagonist in the Nevada case was 
the president of the university, Dr. Stout. His 
predecessor had believed that " . . .  the general 
faculty should be responsible for formulating the
32educational policy of the University as a whole." 
Consonant with this view he had initiated certain 
changes in the authority structure, as reflected in
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this statement in the university catalog:
. . .  the University Faculty has 
legislative jurisdiction, in all 
matters of government, discipline, 
and educational policy not delegated 
by it to the separate faculties, and 
has the right of review of all 
actions of the several colleges 
which relate to the educational 
welfare of the University as a 
whole.33
This rather extensive authority was vested mostly 
in the general university faculty, but a hierarchical 
committee system was devised by the faculty to deal with 
specialized concerns. Dr. Stout assumed the office of 
president in the fall of 1952, and quite soon began, "on 
his own authority," to revamp the authority system and to 
diminish the role of the faculty in policy-making. He 
referred to the faculty committees as a system which 
tried "to pool ignorance and come up with knowledge."3^ 
From that point faculty committees were formed at the 
pleasure of the president and other administrators and 
used in an advisory capacity in the event that the adminis­
trators wanted advice? otherwise, the committee functions 
were perfunctory.
The administrative organization of the uni­
versity was thus revised by president Stout to emphasize 
a "chain of command" and to eliminate faculty authority 
in university government. According to Dr. Stout, an
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administrator's function is to "administer," while a
faculty member's function is to "teach" and to conduct
research in his field without concerning himself with
35administration. In harmony with the approach Dr.
Stout initiated a change in admissions requirements 
(lowering the previous standards) without consulting 
the general faculty.
Among other effects, Dr. Stout's modifications 
in the organization precluded the right of the faculty 
to offer constructive criticism of administrative 
policy and practice, which is an aspect of academic 
freedom. 1 1 1 6  aforementioned professor of biology was 
"guilty" of opposing the new organizational policies 
and of criticizing practices under the administration of 
Dr. Stout. For these activities the professor was 
charged with disloyalty and insubordination.36 He was 
granted a hearing of sorts, though not in keeping with 
a full measure of due process, in which Dr. Stout confronted 
the biology chairman with these wordss.
. . .Dr. Richardson, this is 
serious, because on this campus 
there is not going to be any 
departmental friction. There is 
going to be no case of any 
departmental belittling or 
criticizing others, in other 
words, there is not going to be 
friction. In case there is any 
individual who feels he has to stir
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It up, then he Is going to leave 
the faculty. In case there are 
two people who can't get along, 
both of them will go • . . You 
were hired to teach biology*
This year you were given the 
appointment to serve as department 
head. That does not make you a 
critic or a supervisor of the 
entire program of higher edu­
cation . . .Have I made myself 
clear? . . .37
Dr. Richardson was dismissed, but subsequently
was reinstated after the Supreme Court of the state of
Nevada overturned the action on the ground that there
38was no ground for the dismissal.
It may be observed that while there were definite 
issues of academic freedom, tenure, and due process in 
the Nevada case, the organizational issues encompassed 
all of them and represented the underlying source of 
these other issues. The changes wrought by President 
Stout destroyed not only faculty authority but also 
morale and quite naturally evoked criticism and opposition, 
in which the biology professor was not the sole partici­
pant. The president's conception of academic organization 
left no place for faculty criticism, much less faculty 
participation. Organization, in this case defective 
to be sure, was the root cause of denial of academic 
freedom and led to violations of tenure and due process.
Whereas the Nevada case Involved grave trans­
gressions of faculty authority by the president, the
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University of Texas case exhibited similar and equally
39serious transgressions by the governing board. The 
Texas case, which occurred during world War II and 
resulted in AAUP censure in 1946, is among the most 
complex and widely known cases in the annals of aca­
demic freedom. The case cannot be treated here in 
detail. Like the Nevada case this one included vio­
lations of academic freedom, tenure, and due process. 
Contrary to the advice of Dr. Homer P. Rainey, the
president, the governing board dismissed several faculty
40members summarily without benefit of due process.
This action was publicly condemned by both the president 
and duly constituted bodies of the faculty. In Noveniber 
1944, President Rainey was also dismissed summarily 
from office, and also from his tenured professorship 
in education because of the discord between him and 
the Board.41 Several more faculty members resigned in 
protest. Also, three Board members protested the 
president's dismissal by resigning. Faculty morale 
suffered with each new encroachment by the Board.
At the root of the violations of freedom, 
tenure, and due process seems to have been the Board's 
view of university organization and of the internal 
structure of authority. With regard bo the relationship 
of the Regents to the president and faculty, the Board
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members seem to have held this view, as described in 
the AAUP report of the case:
. . . they (the majority of the 
members of the Board of Regents) 
regard this relationship to be 
that of a private employer to his 
employees, a relationship in which 
the Regents are not debarred by 
any moral restrictions beyond 
their own individual sense of 
expediency from imposing their 
personal views and prejudices 
upon the teaching of the 
university and from employing 
the power of dismissal to gratify 
their private antipathies and 
resentments. They have made it 
clear that they regard the uni­
versity of Texas asa proprietary 
institution.42
Later in the same report is this statement con­
cerning the external pressures to which the Board yielded 
in making the dismissals:
The evidence in the university of 
Texas situation indicates that what 
is happening in Texas with reference 
to the university is a reappearance 
of an old phenomenon, namely, an 
effort on the part of certain 
special Interest groups to control 
education,4^
Thus, instead of conceiving of its role as 
insulating the university from external pressures and 
attacks from special interests, the Board collaborated 
with forces inimical to the freedom and integrity of
educational pursuits within the university. As in the
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Nevada case, the violations of the AAUP principles seem 
to have stemmed from defective academic organization.
The Texas and Nevada cases illustrate, through 
their deficiencies, the relevance of patterns of aca­
demic organization for issues of academic freedom, tenure, 
and due process. Unfortunately, these were not isolated
cases. Similar patterns are evident especially in the
44cases of North Dalcota State University, Allen uni-
45 46versity, and Princeton Theological Seminary. In
the latter case, for instance, the AAUP reported that
channels for faculty authority, such as a committee
system, were non-existent in the seminary. Continuing,
the report noted that
. . . the apparently arbitrary 
character of some presidential 
decision, made without consultation 
with the faculty, has . . .  resulted 
in a feeling of pessimism about the 
health of the institution. The
idea of a "Christian community" has
turned somewhat sour . . . 7
The second type of organizational issue pertains 
to reference organization. The relevance of reference 
organization to the issues of academic freedom, tenure, 
and due process can be discussed here only briefly in
view of the lack of data in the case reports. According
to the distinction made in the previous chapter between
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cosmopolitans and locals, the basic trends in the cases 
are rather clear.
The overwhelining majority of dismissals in the 
twenty-one cases were of cosmopolitans who were "guilty" 
in many cases of challenging localistic values, interests, 
and practices. This type of case was often reflected in 
charges of disloyalty or insubordination. The cosmo­
politan "victims" marched to a different drum beat, as 
it were, and suffered localistically justified reprisals. 
President Rainey of Texas, for instance, was dismissed 
from office by the Board because of discord in their 
relation. He thought it more important to defend cosmo­
politan principles of academic freedom, rather than to 
jeopardize the integrity of his faculty by courting 
the pleasure of the Board and seeking harmony between 
himself and the Regents. There are many variations on 
this theme among the censure cases. To designate victims 
such as President Rainey as cosmopolitans is not meant 
to imply that they were "disloyal" to their insti­
tutions by virtue of their cosmopolitanism, a s far as 
can be ascertained from the record, roost of the cosmo­
politans displayed commendable loyalty and firm 
appreciation of their institutions, very often, it 
was simply a case of cosmopolitan versus local conceptions
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of the proper organization and function of the school, 
in this light a cosmopolitan could hardly be expected 
to approve uncritically each and every action of his 
administrators and trustees, who may have been operating 
on different values entirely.
in sum, patterns of academic organization 
comprise not only the framework within which issues of 
academic freedom, tenure, and due process arise, but 
also the substantive source of these issues. This is 
particularly true of the structure of authority (in­
cluding the role of the faculty) in a formal sense 
and the values to which the members of the academy 
adhere, which form the basis for reference organization.
III. PATTERNS OF AAUP 
INTERVENTION: CENSURE IMPOSED
The American Association of university Pro­
fessors places primary responsibility for the Associ­
ation's intervention in the cases under study with 
Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure. The 
prescribed procedures which guide the actions 
sanctioned by Committee A have been reviewed in 
Chapter III. The actual patterns of AAUP intervention 
in the twenty-one cases departed little, on the whole, 
from these prescriptions and thus require only brief 
attention in the present context.
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The patterns of AAUP intervention to the 
point of censure may be outlined as follows:
1. informal conciliation
2. Appointment of an investigating 
committee
3. on-campus investigation
4. Preparation and publication 
of findings
5. imposition of censure^8
In all instances among the twenty-one cases the 
Association attempted to resolve or reconcile the reported 
conflict in order to prevent its becoming a "case" at 
all. Usually, such action took the form of communi­
cation between the Washington office with administrative 
officials or trustees, informing of a complaint, requesting 
clarification of the situation, and (sometimes a separate 
step) offering the good offices of the Association in a 
conciliatory fashion. In this preliminary stage the
Association would briefly state the relevance of AAUP
49principles to the situation. in some cases, these early 
conciliatory offers were rebuffed by college officials to 
the effect that "It is none of your business." In other 
cases, conciliatory offers were accepted in part, but 
were unsuccessful in the end.
Upon the failure of informal conciliation, the
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AAUP proceeded to the formal stage of appointing and 
briefing an investigating committee. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter this step was not taken in some 
of the "national security" cases which were handled by 
an ad hoc committee (which relied on published facts 
rather than on-campus investigations). By this point 
the Association/ through the activity of its staff, 
had usually gathered many facts and had clarified some 
of the issues of the case. The information gained in 
this manner was used to brief the ad hoc investigating 
committees appointed by the General Secretary. As far 
as the composition of the investigating committee is 
concerned, the ideal sought, but not always achieved, 
was
. . .  to have represented on the 
committee someone with previous 
experience, someone from the region, 
someone from the discipline of the 
complaining teacher, someone with 
legal training.50
The on-campus investigations usually required 
at least two full days in which the members of the 
committee sought to interview most of the parties 
involved in the case. The committees usually planned 
as much as possible for the investigation and made 
arrangements prior to arrival to facilitate the 
investigation. The investigating committee in all
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instances sought to make clear, as the Washington office 
has done in advance, that the committee has an exclusively 
fact-finding function and seeks all available information 
on all sides of the issues.^
Following the campus visit the members of the 
investigating committee collaborated in writing a 
report for the Association including a summary of the 
facts of the case, an interpretation of the bearing of 
AAUP principles to the issues of the case, and recom­
mendations for Committee A action. According to the 
prescribed rules these reports were submitted to the 
chief parties in the case for correction of any errors 
of fact. With Committee A approval, which often followed 
rewriting of the report, it was approved for publication 
in an issue of the AAUP Bulletin.
The final step entails the imposition of 
censure by the procedures described in Chapter III. 
However, imposition of censure does not terminate AAUP 
intervention in any of the censure cases. These later 
steps pertain to removal of the case from censured 
status.
IV. PATTERNS OF RESOLUTION:
CENSURE REMOVED
Intervention of the American Association of 
University Professors extends until censure is removed
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from an institution. Each fall the General Secretary 
writes to the administration of each institution 
currently on the censure list urging resolution of the 
case in accordance with the principles of the 1940 
statement. If appropriate, the Association offers to 
have a conference between its representatives and the 
administrative officers of an institution in the interests 
of a settlement, in order for censure to be removed and 
for a case to be closed. Committee A has to be satisfied 
that the conditions which led to censure have been 
alleviated.
According to the 1965 Association self-survey 
report " . . .  it seems that censured administrations may 
be required to meet one or more of three sorts of 
conditions*"5^
They may be required to give 
evidence of reform (by changing 
their rules and regulations and 
replacing liable personnel); they 
may be required to give evidence 
of repentance (by admitting to 
past mistakes and promising not to 
stray again); they may be required 
to give evidence of redress (by 
making amends to the individual 
for injuries suffered at their 
hands.*3
Of the three conditions reform has received
54the most emphasis as a requirement for censure removal. 
Reform usually entails organizational changes in harmony
205
with Association principles. These reformative changes
tend to ensure the future security of Association
principles whereas repentance and redress are linked
to the particular case, until the 1950's redress was
never insisted upon by the Association/ and repentance
from the offending administrations was seldom forth- 
55coming.
There is, finally, the question of the effective-
a‘ ness of the AAUP's whole program of advocacy of academic 
freedom. These questions cannot be evaluated fully in 
the present context. As an agency of codification of 
principles of academic freedom, tenure, and due process, 
the AATJP has been accorded high esteem in the academic 
profession. The principles which have been promulgated 
by the Association since 1915 have been assimilated into 
the entire profession. Some thirty-five learned 
societies and educational associations have endorsed 
the 1940 statement.56 As an agency of implementation 
of these principles the record of the AAUP is also 
remarkable. The channels by which it seeks to implement 
its standards are moral rather than legal. The Associ­
ation is generally recognized as having minimized the 
■ ex parte character of its intervention. Its fairness
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has been exemplified in its presentation of case reports. 
If fault is found on the part of a complainant the 
misdemeanor is reported along with the encroachments 
of offending administrators. In spite of the fact that 
it has no legal force the Association has been able to 
secure the cooperation of errant institutions in 
resolving the censure cases expeditiously. Finally, 
the Association's record is enhanced by the fact that 
is has been able to effect organizational reform in the 
censure cases, in the view of the author such reform 
is crucial to the future of academic freedom, tenure, 
and due process.
207
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE
■^These are the total cases in which censure was 
imposed between 1945 and 1964 and removed between 1946 
and 1965. AAUP censure is imposed in April of each year 
according to current practice. The minimum duration of 
censure is one year.
2American Association of university Professors, 
"Report of the Self-Survey Committee of the AAUP," AAUP 
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), p. 154.
3 Ibid.
4Report of a Special Committee of AAUP, "Aca­
demic Freedom and Tenure and the Quest for National 
Security," Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1956), pp. 
49-107.
^The closed case was that of Dickinson College. 
The other case, which never resulted in censure, was the 
University of Southern California.
^Report of the Special Committee, o£. cit., p.
52.
^Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1956), pp. 
64-66; 100-107.
8Ibid., p. 64.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 65.
H l b i d ., p. 66.
12ibid.
■*-3Ibid., pp. 69-70.
14Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
l5Ibid., pp. 79-80.
l^Ibid., pp. 81-83.
208
17Ibid., p. 83.
18Ibid., pp. 75-77.
-1-9 Ibid♦ , pp. 89-92.
20The Michigan and New York University cases 
wer subsequently investigated by AAUP committees 
before censure was imposed.
^ Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 1958), 
pp. 137-150.
22Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1949), pp.
74-111.
23Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 1958), pp.
158-169.
24See Appendix C.
25see Appendix C.
26Bulletin. Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1956), pp.
108-129.
27See Appendix C.
28Cf. Louis Joughin, "Academic Due Process," 
Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1964), pp. 19-35.
29Bulletin. Vol. 44, No. 2 (June 1958), pp.
188-191.
30Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 1956), 
pp. 718-733.
3^Ibid., pp. 530-562.
32Ibid., p. 538.
33Ibid.
34lbid.. p. 540.
35Ibid., p. 541.
36ibid., p. 551.
209
37Ibid., pp. 558-559.
38Ibid., p. 530.
39Bulletln, Vol. 30, NO. 4 (December 1944), pp. 
627-634; Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1945), pp. 462-465;
Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1946), pp. 374-385.
4QBulletin, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1944), 
pp. 627-628.
41Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1946),
p. 375.
42Ibid., pp. 629-630.
43Ibid., p. 633.
44Bulletin, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1956), pp.
130-160.
43Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 1 (March I960), pp.
87-104.
46Bulletin, Vol. 45, NO. 1 (March 1959), pp.
47-57.
47Ibid., p. 57.
48Cf. Joughin, op. clt., pp. 22-35; and Bulletin, 
Vol. 51, No. 2 (May 1965), pp. 212-221.
49"Report of the Special Committee on Procedures 
for the Disposition of Complaints Under the principles 
of Aaademic Freedom and Tenure," Bulletin, Vol. 51,
NO. 2 (May 1965), p. 212.
50Ibid., p. 216.
51Ibid.
52Ibid., p. 157.
53From a report on "Censure and Redress" prepared 
by a subcommittee of Committee A in 1961. Quoted in 
Ibid., p. 157.
210
54ibia.
55lbid.
56lbld., p. 105.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Prior to the formation of the American Associ­
ation of university Professors in 1915, relatively little 
scholarly attention had been devoted to the subject of 
academic freedom in the United States, in recent decades, 
however, a sizeable literature on the subject has accumu­
lated. Most of this literature is exhortative rather than 
scholarly in nature. Among scholarly works the main 
concerns have been either the philosophical rationale 
or the historical genesis and development of academic 
freedom. Particularly important historical work in 
recent years has been contributed by Hofstadter, Metzger, 
Maciver, and others. Noticeably missing from the growing 
academic freedom literature, however, is any systematic 
examination of the subject from a sociological per­
spective. The primary purpose of this study has been 
to develop a sociological conception of academic freedom 
from an analysis of the social context in which it 
operates. The main results of this analysis may now be 
summarized.
The social context of academic freedom consists,
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on the one hand, of the internal organization of colleges 
and universities, and on the other hand, of forces in 
the academic profession at large, foremost among which 
is the American Association of university professors 
as an advocate of academic freedom. Prior to the 
establishment of the AAUP there had been little collective 
advocacy of academic freedom within the profession. The 
earlier history of academic freedom is primarily, though 
not exclusively, the story of events and decisions in 
particular colleges and universities. Thus, the work 
of the historian is especially well suited for the 
analysis of the development of academic freedom prior 
to the present century. Beginning approximately with 
the founding of the AAUP, which greatly increased 
collective action in the academic profession as a 
whole, the sociologist is able to contribute to the 
scholarly discussion of the subject of academic freedom.
As a national association, the AAUP is not 
only external to the academic organization of the two 
thousand colleges and universities of the United states.
It also has no legal authority over the affairs of a 
particular institution. The force of its advocacy of 
principles of academic freedom is essentially moral, 
resting as it does on the value commitments of the
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profession as a whole as well as those of its constituents. 
'The force of the Association's policies is aided by the 
fact that its members, as faculty members of particular 
institutions, are carriers of its values and supporters 
of its norms with reference to local situations. The 
work of local members is advanced through the organ of 
the local AAUP "chapter" as the framework for discussion 
and collective action.
The force of the AAUP's promotion of academic 
freedom is furthered through the endorsement of its 
principles by other educational associations and learned 
societies. The Association of American Colleges, an 
organization of administrators, has jointly sponsored 
the 1925 and the 1940 statements of principles. More and 
more the principles of the AAUP are becoming those of 
the profession as a whole.
There are several means by which the Associ­
ation seeks to implement its principles of academic 
freedom. Chief among these is the censure of adminis­
trative officers and/or trustees of institutions for 
serious violations of principles of academic freedom and 
tenure. Its work in this connection is probably the 
most widely known aspect of AAUP activity within and 
beyond the profession.
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The salutary effects deriving from its censure 
activity are widely recognized but difficult to measure. 
These benefits stem partly from the judiciousness of 
Association procedures in censure cases. It has sought 
to minimize the ex parte character of its investigation 
and censure of institutions. Censure, and the procedures 
attendant to it, are not conceived as partisan intervention 
in behalf of injured members, but rather intervention 
on behalf of ideals which benefit the entire academic 
community in fulfilling its primary functions, the 
attainment and dissemination of knowledge. Thus, the 
moral force of AAUP censure is not attenuated by charges 
of partisanship.
The other aspect of the social context of aca­
demic freedom examined in this study is the internal 
structure of colleges and universities, specifically 
the roles of faculty, administrators, and trustees. In 
Chapter IV, in which this subject was treated, two types 
of academic organization were distinguished: one, the
formal or official organization of authority in insti­
tutional governance, and, the other, the reference 
organization based on the value commitments of the 
institutional citizenry.
The formal or official organization of a college
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or university prescribes the legitimate structure within 
which institutional decisions and policies are made. The 
manner and degree to which faculty authority is allowed 
and promoted in the official organization affects not 
only the morale but the academic freedom of the faculty.
If institutional authority is concentrated in adminis­
trative roles so that the faculty has no functional 
autonomy, then the faculty has no secure hold on any 
aspect of academic freedom. Such freedom as it may 
enjoy in these circumstances comes to it by default , 
as it were, of administrative prerogatives and at the 
pleasure of individual presidents and deans.
From the perspective of academic organization, 
academic freedom is comprised of norms which govern the 
action of academic citizens. The most essential normative 
components of academic freedom are the following:
(1) In his role as an academic specialist, 
a faculty member is free to criticize and to challenge 
accepted theories, beliefs, and practices related to 
his field of competence.
(2) in his role as a citizen of the insti­
tution in which he serves, a faculty member is free to 
criticize the official policies and practices of his 
institution, including the actions of administrative
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officers and trustees.
(3) in his role as a member of the academic 
profession, a faculty member is free to defend his 
colleagues against perceived threats to, or violations 
of, their academic freedom.
These norms may be considered prerogatives of 
faculty members, each norm being attached to a special 
faculty role: specialist, institutional citizen, and
professional colleague. These norms of freedom constitute 
measures of authority vested in the faculty. In order 
to thrive in practice these norms must be lodged in 
patterns of academic organization which encourage their 
exercise. Conceived in this manner academic freedom is 
part and parcel of the official authority structure of 
a college or university. Genuine and legitimated faculty 
participation in institutional governance is essential 
to the prospects for academic freedom.
The unofficial patterns of reference organi­
zation within colleges and universities also have import 
for the maintenance of norms of academic freedom in 
practice. In Chapter IV, academic organization was 
analyzed in terms of the reference group composition 
of the faculty and administration, especially according 
to the distinction between cosmopolitans and locals.
217
Whereas locals share a primary identification with the 
local institution and its official values and norms, 
cosmopolitans subscribe to values derived from a more 
universal culture (including the AAUP). The cleavage 
between cosmopolitans and locals is likely to be 
reflected in differential conceptions of university 
goals and functions. Cosmopolitans are far more likely 
than locals to support norms of academic freedom and 
the values upon which these norms are based, owing to 
the demands of administrative roles as they are usually 
structured, administrators are more likely to be 
localistic than cosmopolitan. Thus, without official 
channels for the exercise of faculty authority, academic 
freedom is likely to be diminished because of the adverse 
value commitments of some administrative personnel.
Academic freedom, thus, is intimately linked 
to its social context, including especially the patterns 
of internal academic organization and the activity of 
such external forces as the AAUP. The examination of 
AAUP censure cases in Chapter V demonstrated the relevance 
of patterns of academic structure to violations of 
principles of academic freedom. As a rule the infractions 
occurred in situations in which faculty authority was 
trammeled. Very often the violations were tied to
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administrative denial of the right of the faculty to 
criticize, much less to formulate, institutional 
policy. The majority of dismissals apparently were 
of cosmopolitans who had not “internalized11 the 
localistic values of their colleagues in administrative 
positions. The censure cases were resolved mainly by 
reforms in the policy and organization of the offending 
institutions relative to principles of academic good 
practices as formulated by the AAUP.
How can an observer, a sociologist for instance, ■ 
determine whether academic freedom prevails in a given 
college or university? The preceding discussion would 
suggest that he would look first to the official 
organization of the institution. Some colleges and 
universities have explicit policies which reflect 
institutionalized norms of academic freedom. In the 
absence of such explicit policies, the observer would 
then examine the authority structure of the institution 
to determine the extensiveness of faculty autonomy in 
certain kinds of policy-making. The assumption here 
is that a diminution of faculty authority is incompatible 
with academic freedom.
In the absence of official channels of faculty 
influence, how may the extent of academic freedom be
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assessed? In the author's judgment, if there are no 
formal, legitimate channels for faculty participation 
in institutional decision-making, the prospects for 
academic freedom are precarious at best. It is not 
feasible for an observer to interview faculty members 
with the intent of polling their opinions on the extent 
of academic freedom. As mentioned earlier in this 
study, faculty members may misperceive the extent of 
academic freedom in an objective sense, They may feel 
quite free to express personal views. This type of 
freedom is, however, subjective, in the absence of heter­
ogeneous opinions and values, in a local academic community 
characterized by value consensus on matters that would be 
controversial elsewhere, subjective feelings of freedom 
are misleading.
It is the author's conviction that without 
manifest patterns of faculty authority the only manner 
in which the presence or absence of academic freedom 
can be determined is by examining what happens when the 
norms of academic freedom are practiced by an individual. 
For instance, an observer may inquire into what transpires 
when a faculty member criticizes administrative policy 
(e.g., the lack of faculty participation). From the 
observer's point of view this is a form of testing. If
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reprisals follow, and assuming no fault on the part of 
the faculty member, then academic freedom in the aspect 
tested does not exist. Without such challenges to 
administrative authority, an observer cannot determine 
whether, or to what extent, academic freedom prevails.
This study has been undertaken in spite of 
these methodological obstacles with the conviction that 
academic freedom is a worthy subject for sociological 
inquiry, and that important subjects should not be 
avoided simply because they are difficult to research.
This study, with its announced limitations of scope, is 
but a starting point for sociological investigation of 
the subject. Its task has been primarily conceptual.
An attempt has been made to bring to bear on the subject 
a conceptual framework from sociology to enhance scholarly 
understanding of academic freedom. A number of hypo­
theses pertaining to both academic freedom and academic 
organization have been advanced which may lead to more 
fruitful research by the sociologist, who is at least 
as vulnerable as any other citizen of the academic 
community to attacks upon academic freedom.
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APPENDIX A
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 
1915 STATEMENT
I. General Declaration of Principles
The term "academic freedom" has traditionally 
had two applications —  to the freedom of the teacher 
and to that of the student, Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreihelt. 
It need scarpely be pointed out that the freedom which 
is the subject of this report is that of the teacher. 
Academic freedom in this sense comprises three elements: 
freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching 
within the university or college? and freedom of extra­
mural utterance and action. The first of these is 
almost everywhere so safeguarded that the dangers of 
its infringement are slight* It may therefore be 
disregarded in this report. The second and third phases 
of academic freedom are closely related, and are often 
not distinguished. The third, however, has an importance 
of its own, since of late it has perhaps more frequently 
been the occasion of difficulties and controversies than 
has the question of freedom of intra-academic teaching.
All five of the cases which have recently been investigated 
by committees of this Association have involved, at least 
as one factor, the right of university teachers to express 
their opinions freely outside the university or to engage 
in political activities in their capacity as citizens.
The general principles which have to do with freedom 
of teaching in both these senses seem to the committee 
to be in great part, though not wholly, the same, in 
this report, therefore, we shall consider the matter 
primarily with reference to freedom of teaching within 
the university, and shall assume that what is said 
thereon is also applicable to the freedom of speech of 
university teachers outside their institutions, subject 
to certain qualifications and supplementary considerations 
which will be pointed out in the course of the report.
An adequate discussion of academic freedom must 
necessarily consider three matters: (1) the scope and
231
23 2
basis of the power exercised by those bodies having 
ultimate legal authority in academic affairs; (2) 
the nature of the academic calling; (3) the function 
of the academic institution or university.
1. Basis of academic authority
American institutions of learning are usually 
controlled by boards of trustees as the ultimate reposi­
tories of power, upon them finally it devolves to 
determine the measure of academic freedom which is to 
be realized in the several institutions, it therefore 
becomes necessary to inquire into the nature of the 
trust reposed in these boards, and to ascertain to whom 
the trustees are to be considered accountable.
The simplest case is that of a proprietary 
school or college designed for the propagation of 
specific doctrines prescribed by those who have 
furnished its endowment. It is evident that in such 
cases the trustees are bound by the deed of gift, and, 
whatever be their own views, are obligated to carry 
out the terms of the trust. If a church or religious 
denomination establishes a college to be governed by 
a board of trustees, with the express understanding 
that the college will be used as an instrument of 
propaganda in the interests of the religious faith 
professed by the church or denomination creating it, 
the trustees have a right to demand that everything 
be subordinated to that end. if, again, as has 
happened in this country, a wealthy manufacturer 
establishes a special school in a University in order 
to teach, among other things, the advantages of a 
protective tariff, or if, as is also the case, an 
institution has been endowed for the purpose of 
propagating the doctrines of socialism, the situation 
is analogous. All of these are essentially proprietary 
institutions, in the moral sense. They do not, at 
least as regards one particular subject, accept the 
principles of freedom of inquiry, of opinion, and of 
teaching; and their purpose is not to advance 
knowledge by the unrestricted research and unfettered 
discussion of impartial investigators, but rather to 
subsidize the promotion of the opinions held by the 
persons, usually not of the scholar's calling, who 
provide the funds for their maintenance. Concerning
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the desirability of the existence of such institutions, 
the committee does not desire to express any opinion*
But it is manifestly important that they should not be 
permitted to sail under false colors. Genuine boldness 
and thoroughness of inquiry, and freedom of speech, are 
scarcely reconcilable with the prescribed inculcation 
of a particular opinion upon a controverted question.
Such institutions are rare, however, and are 
becoming ever more rare, we still have, indeed, 
colleges under denominational auspices; but very few 
of them impose upon their trustees responsibility for 
the spread of specific doctrines. They are more and 
more coming to occupy, with respect to the freedom 
enjoyed by the members of their teaching bodies, 
the position of untrammeled institutions of learning, 
and are differentiated only by the natural influence 
of their respective historic antecedents and tra­
ditions.
Leaving aside, then, the small number of insti­
tutions of the proprietary type, what is the nature of 
the trust reposed in the governing boards of the ordinary 
institutions of learning? Can colleges and universities 
that are not strictly bound by their founders to a 
propagandist duty ever be included in the class of 
institutions that we have just described as being in 
a moral sense proprietary? The answer is clear. If 
the former class of institutions constitute a private 
or proprietary trust, the latter constitute a public 
trust. The trustees are trustees for the public. In 
the case of our state universities this is self-evident.
In the case of most of our privately endowed institutions, 
the situation is really not different. They cannot be 
permitted to assume the proprietary attitude and privilege, 
if they are appealing to the general public for support. 
Trustees of such universities or colleges have no moral 
right to bind the reason or the conscience of any 
professor. All claim to such right is waived by the 
appeal to the general public for contributions and 
for moral support in the maintenance, not of a propa­
ganda, but of a non-partisan institution of learning.
It follows that any university which lays restrictions 
upon the intellectual freedom of its professors proclaims 
itself a proprietary institution, and should be so 
described whenever it makes a general appeal for funds; 
and the public should be advised that the institution 
has no claim whatever to general support or regard.
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This elementary distinction between a private 
and a public trust is not yet so universally accepted 
as it should be in our American institutions. While 
in many universities and colleges the situation has 
come to be entirely satisfactory, there are others in 
which the relation of trustees to professors is apparently 
still conceived to be analogous to that of a private 
employer to his employees; in which, therefore, 
trustees are not regarded as debarred by any moral 
restrictions, beyond their own sense of expediency, 
from imposing their personal opinions upon the 
teaching of the institution, or even from employing 
the power of dismissal to gratify their private 
antipathies or resentments. An eminent university 
president thus described the situation not many years 
since:
"In the institutions of higher edu­
cation the board of trustees is the 
body on whose discretion, good 
feeling, and experience the securing 
of academic freedom now depends.
There are boards which leave nothing 
to be desired in these respects; but 
there are also numerous bodies that 
have everything to learn with regard 
to academic freedom. These barbarous 
boards exercise an arbitrary power of 
dismissal. They exclude from the 
teachings of the university unpopular 
or dangerous subjects. In some states 
they even treat professors* positions 
as common political spoils; and all 
too frequently, both in state and 
endowed institutions, they fail to 
treat the members of the teaching 
staff with that high consideration 
to which their functions entitle 
them."*
It is, then, a prerequisite to a realization of 
the proper measure of academic freedom in American
*From "Academic Freedom," an address delivered 
before the New York Chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa Society 
at Cornell University, May 29, 1907, by Charles William 
Eliot, LL.D., President of Harvard university.
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institutions of learning, that all boards of trustees 
should understand - as many already do - the full 
implications of the distinction between private 
proprietorship and a public trust.
2. The nature of the academic calling
The above-mentioned conception of a university 
as an ordinary business venture, and of academic teaching 
as a purely private employment, manifests also a radical 
failure to apprehend the nature of the social function 
discharged by the professional scholar. While we should 
be reluctant to believe that any large number of educated 
persons suffer from such a misapprehension, it seems 
desirable at this time to restate clearly the chief 
reasons, lying in the nature of the university teaching 
profession, why it is to the public interest that the 
professorial office should be one both of dignity and of 
independence.
If education is the corner stone of the structure 
of society and if progress in scientific knowledge is 
essential to civilization, few things can be more 
important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar's 
profession, with a view to attracting into its ranks 
men of the highest ability, of sound learning, and of 
strong, and independent character. This is the more 
essential because the pecuniary emoluments of the 
profession are not, and doubtless never will be, 
equal to those open to the more successful members of 
other professions. It is not, in our opinion, desirable 
that men should be drawn into this profession by the 
magnitude of the economic rewards which it offers; but 
it is for this reason the more needful that men of high 
gifts and character should be drawn into it by the 
assurance of an honorable and secure position, and of 
freedom to perform honestly and according to their own 
consciences the distinctive and important function which 
the nature of the profession lays upon them.
That function is to deal at first hand, after 
prolonged and specialized technical training, with the 
sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of 
their own and of their fellow-specialists' investigations 
and reflection, both to students and to the general 
public, without fear or favor. The proper discharge
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of this function requires (among other things) that the 
university teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary 
motive or inducement to hold, or to express, any 
conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored product 
of his own study or that of fellow-speciallsts. indeed, 
the proper fulfillment of the work of the professorate 
requires that our universities shall be so free that no 
fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a 
suspicion that the utterances of university teachers 
are shaped or restricted by the judgment, not of 
professional scholars, but of inesqpert and possibly 
not wholly disinterested persons outside of their ranks. 
The lay public is under no compulsion to accept or to 
act upon the opinions of. the scientific experts whom, 
through the universities, it employs. But is is highly 
needful, in the interest of society at large, that what 
purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and 
dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be 
the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the 
opinions of the lay public, or of the individuals who 
endow or manage universities. To the degree that 
~ professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation 
of their opinions, are, or by the character of their 
tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than 
their own scientific conscience and a desire for the 
respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree the 
university teaching profession is corrupted; its 
proper influence upon public opinion is diminished 
and vitiated; and society at large fails to get from 
its scholars, in an unadulterated form, the peculiar 
and necessary service which it is the office of the 
professional scholar to furnish.
These considerations make still more clear 
the nature of the relationship between university 
trustees and members of university faculties. The 
Latter are the appointees, but not in any proper sense 
the employees, of the former. For, once appointed, 
the scholar has professional functions to perform in 
which the appointing authorities have neither competency 
nor moral right to intervene. The responsibility of 
the university teacher is primarily to the public 
itself, and to the judgment of his own profession; 
and while, with respect to certain external conditions 
of his vocation, he accepts a responsibility to the 
authorities of the institution in which he serves, 
in the essentials of his professional activity his
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duty is to the wider public to which the institution 
itself is morally amenable. So far as the university 
teacher's independence of thought and utterance is 
concerned - though not in other regards - the 
relationship of professor to trustees may be compared 
to that between judges of the Federal courts and the 
Executive who appoints them. Uhiversity teachers 
should be understood to be, with respect to the 
conclusions reached and expressed by them, no more 
subject to the control of the trustees, than are 
judges subject to the control of the President, 
with respect to their decisions; while of course, 
for the same reason, trustees are no more to be held 
responsible for, or to be presumed to agree with, 
the opinions or utterances of professors, than the 
President can be assumed to approve of all the legal 
reasonings of the courts. A university is a great 
and indispensable organ of the higher life of a 
civilized community, in the work of which the 
trustees hold an essential and highly honorable place, 
but in which the faculties hold an independent place, 
with quite equal responsibilities - and in relation 
to purely scientific and educational questions, the 
primary responsibility. Misconception or obscurity 
in this matter has undoubtedly been a source of 
occasional difficulty in the past, and even in several 
instances during the current year, however much, in 
the main, a long tradition of kindly and courteous 
intercourse between trustees and members of university 
faculties has kept the question in the background.
3. The function of 
the academic institution
The importance of academic freedom is most 
clearly perceived in the light of the purposes for 
which universities exist. There are three in number;
A. To promote inquiry and 
advance the sum of human 
knowledge.
B. To provide general instruction 
to the students.
C. To develop experts for various 
branches of the public service.
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Let us consider each of these, in the earlier 
stages of a nation's intellectual development, the chief 
concern of the educational institutions is to train the 
growing generation and to diffuse the already accepted 
knowledge, it is only slowly that there comes to be 
provided in the highest institutions of learning the 
opportunity for the gradual wresting from nature of 
her intimate secrets. The modern university is becoming 
more and more the home of scientific research. There 
are three fields of human inquiry in which the race is 
only at the beginnings natural science, social science, 
and philosophy and religion, dealing with the relations 
of man to outer nature, to his fellow men, and to the 
ultimate realities and values. In natural science all 
that we have learned but serves to make us realize 
more deeply how much more refrains to be discovered.
In social science in its largest sense, which is 
concerned with the relations of men in society and 
with the conditions of social order and well-being, 
we have learned only an adumbration of the laws which 
govern these vastly complex phenomena. Finally, in the 
spiritual life, and in the interpretation of the general 
meaning and ends of human existence and its relation to 
the universe, we are still far from~a comprehension of 
the final truths, and from a universal agreement among 
all sincere and earnest men. In all of these domains 
of knowledge, the first condition of progress is 
complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and 
public its results. Such freedom is the breath in 
the nostrils of all scientific activity.
The second function - which for a long time 
was the only function - of the American college or 
university is to provide instruction for students.
It is scarcely open to question that freedom of 
utterance is as important to the teacher as it is 
to the investigator. No man can be a successful 
teacher unless he enjoys the respect of his students, 
and their confidence in his intellectual integrity,.
It is clear, however, that this confidence will be 
impaired if there is suspicion on the part of the 
student that the teacher is not expressing himself 
fully or frankly, or that college and university 
teachers in general are a repressed and intimidated 
class who dare not speak with that candor and courage 
which youth always demands in those whom it is to 
esteem. The average student is a discerning observer,
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who soon takes the measure of his instructor. It is 
not only the character of the instruction but also 
the character of the instructor that counts; and if 
the student has reason to believe that the instructor 
is not true to himself, the virtue of the instruction 
as an educative force is incalculably diminished*
There must be in the mind of the teacher no mental 
reservation. He must give the student the best of 
what he has and what he is.
The third function of the modern university 
is to develop experts for the use of the community.
If there is one thing that distinguishes the more 
recent developments of democracy, it is the recognition 
by legislators of the inherent complexities of economic, 
social, and political life, and the difficulty of 
solving problems of technical adjustment without technical 
knowledge. The recognition of this fact has led to a 
continually greater demand for the aid of experts in 
these subjects, to advise both legislators and 
administrators. The training of such experts has, 
accordingly, in recent years, become an., important 
part of*the work of the universities; and in almost 
every one of our higher institutions of learning the 
professors of the economic, social, and political 
sciences have been drafted to an increasing extent 
into more or less unofficial participation in the 
public service. It is obvious that here again the 
scholar must be absolutely free not only to pursue 
his investigations but to declare the results of his 
researches, no matter where they may lead him or to 
what extent they may come into conflict with accepted 
opinion. To be of use to the legislator or the 
administrator, he must enjoy their complete 
confidence in the disinterestedness of his conclusions.
It is clear, then, that the university cannot 
perform its threefold function without accepting and 
enforcing to the fullest extent the principle of 
academic freedom. The responsibility of the university 
as a whole is to the community at large, and any 
restriction upon the freedom of the instructor is 
bound to react injuriously upon the efficiency and 
the morale of the institution, and therefore 
ultimately upon the interests of the community.
The attempted infringements of academic 
freedom at present are probably not only of less 
frequency than, but of a difference character from,
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those to be found in former times, in the early period 
of university development in America the chief menace 
to academic freedom was ecclesiastical, and the disciplines 
chiefly affected were philosophy and the natural sciences. 
In more recent times the danger zone has been shifted to 
the political and social sciences - though we still have 
sporadic examples of the former class of cases in some 
of our smaller institutions. But it is precisely in 
these provinces of knowledge in which academic freedom 
is now most likely to be threatened, that the need for 
it is at the same time most evident. No person of 
intelligence believes that all of our political problems 
have been solved, or that the final stage of social 
evolution has been reached. Grave issues in the adjust­
ment of men's social and economic relations are certain 
to call for settlement in the years that are to come; 
and for the right settlement of them mankind will need 
all the wisdom, all the good will, all the soberness 
of mind, and all the knowledge drawn from experience, 
that it can command. Towards this settlement the 
university has potentially its own very great 
contribution to make; for if the adjustment reached 
is to be a wise one, it must take due account of 
economic science, and be guided by that breadth of 
historic vision which it should be one of the functions 
of a university to cultivate. But if the universities 
are to render any such service towards the right solution 
of the social problems of the future, it is the first 
essential that the scholars who carry on the work of 
universities shall not be in a position of dependence 
upon the favor of any social class or group,, that the 
disinterestedness, and impartiality of their inquiries 
and their conclusions shall be, so far as is humanly 
possible, beyond the reach of suspicion.
The special dangers to freedom of teaching in 
the domain of the social sciences are evidently two.
The one which is the more likely to affect the privately 
endowed colleges and universities is the danger of 
restrictions upon the expression of opinions which 
point towards extensive social innovations, or call 
in question the moral legitimacy or social expediency 
of economic conditions or commercial practices in 
which large vested interests are involved. In the 
political, social, and economic field almost every 
question, no matter how large and general it at first 
appears, is more or less affected with private or
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class interests; and, as the governing body of a uni­
versity is naturally made up of men Who through their 
standing and ability are personally interested in 
great private enterprises, the points of possible 
conflict are numberless. When to this is added the 
consideration that benefactors, as well as most of 
the parents who send their children to privately 
endowed institutions, themselves belong to the more 
prosperous and therefore usually to the more con­
servative classes, it is apparent that, so long as 
effectual safeguards for academic freedom are not 
established, there is a real danger that pressure 
from vested interests may, sometimes deliberately 
and sometimes unconsciously, sometimes openly and 
sometimes subtly and in obsure ways, be brought to 
bear upon academic authorities.
On the other hand, in our state universities 
the danger may be the reverse, where the university 
is dependent for funds upon legislative favor, it has 
sometimes happened that the conduct of the institution 
has been affected by political considerations; and 
where there is a definite governmental policy or a 
strong public feeling on economic, social, or 
political questions, the menace to academic freedom 
may consist in the repression of opinions that in 
the particular political situation are deemed ultra­
conservative rather than ultra-radical. The essential 
point, however, is not so much that the opinion is of 
one or another shade, as that it differs from the views 
entertained by the authorities. The question resolves 
itself into one of departure from accepted standards; 
whether the departure is in the one direction or the 
other is immaterial.
This brings us to the most serious difficulty 
of this problem; namely, the dangers connected with 
the existence in a democracy of an overwhelming 
and concentrated public opinion. The tendency of 
modern democracy is for men to think alike, to feel 
alike, and to speak alike. Any departure from the 
conventional standards is apt to be regarded with 
suspicion. Public opinion is at once the chief 
safeguard of a democracy, and the chief menace to 
the real liberty of the individual. It almost seems 
as if the danger of despotism cannot be wholly averted 
under any form of government. In a political autocracy
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there is no effective public opinion, and all are subject 
to the tyranny of the ruler; in a democracy there is 
political freedom, but there is likely to be a tyranny 
of public opinion.
An inviolable refuge from such tyranny should 
be found in the university. It should be an intellectual 
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and 
where their fruit, though still distasteful to the community 
as a whole, may be allowed to ripen until finally, per­
chance, it may become a part of the accepted intellectual 
food of the nation or of the world. Not less is it a 
distinctive duty of the university to be the conservator 
of all genuine elements of value in the past thought 
and life of mankind which are not in the fashion of the 
moment. Though it need not be the "home of beaten 
causes," the university, is, indeed, likely always to 
exercise a certain form of conservative influence. For 
by its nature it is committed to the principle that 
knowledge should precede action, to the caution (by no 
means synonymous with intellectual timidity) which is an 
essential part of the scientific method, to a sense of the 
complexity of social problems, to the practice of taking 
long views into the future, and to a reasonable regard 
for the teachings of experience, one of its most 
characteristic functions in a democratic society is to 
help make public opinion more self-critical and more 
circumspect, to check the more hasty and unconsidered 
impulses of popular feeling, to train the democracy to 
the habit of looking before and after. It is precisely 
this function of the university which is most injured 
by any restriction upon academic freedom; and it is 
precisely those who most value this aspect of the 
university's work who should most earnestly protest 
against any such restriction. For the public may 
respect, and be influenced by, the counsels of prudence 
and of moderation which are given by men of science, 
if it believes those counsels to be the disinterested 
expression of the scientific temper and of unbiased 
inquiry. It is little likely to respect or heed them 
if it has reason to believe that they are the expression 
of the interests, or the timidities, of the limited 
portion of the community which is in a position to 
endow institutions of learning, or is most likely to 
be represented upon their boards of trustees. And a 
plausible reason for this belief is given the public 
so long as our universities are not organized in such 
a way as to make impossible any exercise of pressure
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upon professorial opinions and utterances by governing 
boards of laymen.
Since there are no rights without corresponding 
duties, the considerations heretofore set down with 
respect to the freedom of the academic teacher entail 
certain correlative obligations. The claim to freedom 
of teaching is made in the interest of the Integrity and 
of the progress of scientific inquiry; it is, therefore, 
only those who carry on their work in the temper of the 
scientific inquirer who may justly assert this claim.
The liberty of the scholar within the university to set 
forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is con­
ditioned by their being conclusions gained by a scholar's 
method and held in a scholar's spirit; that is to say, 
they must be the fruits of competent and patient and 
sincere inquiry, and they should be set forth with 
dignity, courtesy and temperateness of language. The 
university teacher, in giving instruction upon contro­
versial matters, while he is under no obligation to 
hide his own opinion under a mountain of equivocal 
verbiage, should, if he is fit for his position, be 
a person of a fair and judicial mind; he should, in 
dealing with such subjects, set forth justly, without 
suppression or innuendo, the divergent opinions of 
other investigators; he should cause his students 
to become familiar with the best published expressions 
of the great historic types of doctrine upon the 
questions at issue; and he should above all, remember 
that his business is not to provide his students with 
ready-made conclusions, but to train them to think for 
themselves, and to provide them access to those materials 
which they need if they are to think intelligently.
It is, however, for reasons which have already 
been made evident, inadmissible that the power of 
determining when departures from the requirements 
of the scientific spirit and method have occurred, 
should be vested in bodies not composed of members 
of the academic profession. Such bodies necessarily 
lack full competency to judge of those requirements; 
their intervention can never be exempt from suspicion 
that it is dictated by other motives than zeal for 
the integrity of science; and it is, in any case, 
unsuitable to the dignity of a great profession that 
the initial responsibility for the maintenance of its 
professional standards should not be in the hands of 
its own members. It follows that university teachers
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must be prepared to assume this responsibility for 
themselves. They have hitherto seldom had the oppor­
tunity, or perhaps the disposition, to do so. The 
obligation will doubtless, therefore, seem to many an 
unwelcome and burdensome one; and for its proper 
discharge members of the profession will perhaps need 
to acquire, in a greater measure than they at present 
possess it, the capacity for impersonal judgment in 
such cases, and for judicial severity when the 
occasion requires it. But the responsibility cannot, 
in this committee's opinion, be rightfully evaded. If 
this profession should prove itself unwilling to 
purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, 
or to prevent the freedom which it claims in the 
name of science from being used as a shelter for 
inefficiency, for superficiality, or for uncritical 
and intemperate partisanship, it is certain that the 
task will be performed by others - by others who 
lack certain essential qualifications for performing 
it, and whose action is sure to breed suspicions and 
recurrent controversies deeply injurious to the internal 
order and the public standing of universities. Your 
committee has, therefore, in the appended "Practical 
Proposals" attempted to suggest means by which judicial 
action by representatives of the profession with respect 
to the matters here referred to, may be secured.
There is one case in which the academic 
teacher is under an obligation to observe certain 
special restraints - namely, the instruction of 
immature students. In many of our American colleges, 
and especially in the first two years of the course, 
the student's character is not yet fully formed, his 
mind is still relatively immature. In these circum­
stances it may reasonably be expected that the 
instructor will present scientific truth with discretion, 
that he will introduce the student to new conceptions 
gradually, with some consideration for the student's 
preconceptions and traditions, and with due regard 
to character-building. The teacher ought also to 
be especially on his guard against taking unfair 
advantage of the student's immaturity by indoctrinating 
him with the teacher's own opinions before the 
student has had an opportunity fairly to examine 
other opinions upon the matters in question, and 
before he has sufficient knowledge and ripeness 
of judgment to be entitled to form any definitive
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opinion of his own. It is not the least service which 
a college or university may render to those under its 
instruction, to habituate them to looking not only 
patiently but methodically on both sides, before 
adopting any conclusion upon controverted issues. By 
these suggestions, however, it need scarcely be said 
that the committee does not intend to imply that it 
is not the duty of an academic instructor to give to 
any students old enough to be in college a genuine 
intellectual awakening and to arouse in them a keen 
desire to reach personally verified conclusions upon 
all questions of general concernment to mankind, or 
of special significance for their own time. There 
is much truth in some remarks recently made in this 
connection by a college president:
"Certain professors have been 
refused reelection lately, 
apparently because they set their 
students to thinking in ways 
objectionable to the trustees.
It would be well if more 
teachers were dismissed because 
they fail to stimulate thinking 
of any kind, we can afford to 
forgive a college professor 
what we regard as the occasional 
error of his doctrine, especially 
as we may be wrong, provided he 
is a contagious center of 
intellectual enthusiasm. It is 
better for students to think 
about heresies than not to think 
at all; better for them to climb 
new trails, and stumble over 
error if need be, than to ride 
forever in upholstered ease in 
the overcrowded highway. It is 
a primary duty of a teacher to 
make a student take an honest 
account of his stock of ideas, 
throw out the dead matter, place 
revised price marks on what is 
left, and try to fill his empty 
shelves with new goods."*
♦President William T. Foster in The Nation, 
November 11, 1915.
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It is, however, possible and necessary that 
such intellectual awakening be brought about with 
patience, considerateness and pedagogical wisdom.
There is one further consideration with 
regard to the classroom utterances of college and 
university teachers to which the committee thinks 
it important to call the attention of members of 
the profession, and of administrative authorities.
Such utterances ought always to be considered 
privileged communications. Discussions in the 
classroom ought not to be supposed to be utterances 
for the public at large. They are often designed 
to provoke opposition or arouse debate, it has, 
unfortunately, sometimes happened in this country 
that sensational newspapers have quoted and garbled 
such remarks. As a matter of common law, it is 
clear that the utterances of an academic instructor 
ajre privileged, and may not be published, in whole 
or part, without his authorization. But our practice, 
unfortunately, still differs from that of foreign 
countries, and no effective check has in this country 
been put upon such unauthorized and often misleading 
publication. It is much to be desired that test 
cases should be made of any infractions of the 
rule.*
in their extra-mural utterances, it is 
obvious that academic teachers are under a peculiar 
obligation to avoid hasty or unverified or exaggerated 
statements, and to refrain from intemperate or 
sensational modes of expression. But, subject to 
these restraints, it is not, in this committee’s
i
*The leading case is Abernethy vs. Hutchinson, 
3, Tj. J., Ch. 209. in this case where damages were 
awarded the court held as follows; "That persons 
who are admitted as pupils or otherwise to hear 
these lectures, although they are orally delivered 
and the parties might go to the extent, if they 
were able to do so, of putting down the whole by 
means of shorthand, yet they can do that only for 
the purpose of their own information and could not 
publish, for profit, that which they had not 
obtained the right of selling."
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opinion, desirable that scholars should be debarred 
from giving expression to their judgments upon 
controversial questions, or that their freedom of 
speech, outside the university, should be limited 
to questions falling within their own specialities.
It is clearly not proper that they should be 
prohibited from lending their active support to 
organized movements which they believe to be in 
the public interest. And, speaking broadly, it may 
be said in the words of a non-academic body already 
once quoted in a publication of this Association, 
that "it is neither possible nor desirable to deprive 
a college professor of the political rights vouchsafed 
to every citizen."*
It is, however, a question deserving of 
consideration by members of this Association, and by 
university officials, how far academic teachers, at 
least those dealing with political, economic and 
social subjects, should be prominent in the management 
of our great party organizations, or should be candidates 
for state or national offices of a distinctly political 
character. It is manifestly desirable that such 
teachers have minds untrammeled by party loyalties, 
unexcited by party enthusiasms, and unbiased by 
personal political ambitions; and that universities 
should remain uninvolved in party antagonisms, on 
the other hand, it is equally manifest that the 
material available for the service of the State 
would be restricted in a highly undesirable way, if 
it were understood that no member of the academic 
profession should ever be called upon to assume the 
responsibilities of public office. This question 
may, in the committee's opinion, suitably be made a 
topic for special discussion at some future meeting 
of this Association, in order that a practical 
policy, which shall do justice to the two partially 
conflicting considerations that bear upon the matter, 
may be agreed upon.
It is, it will be seen, in no sense the 
contention of this committee that academic freedom 
implies that individual teachers should be exempt 
from all restraints as to the matter or manner of
*Report of the Wisconsin State Board of 
Public Affairs, December 1914.
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their utterances, either within or without the uni­
versity. Such restraints as are necessary should in 
the main, your committee holds, be self-imposed, or 
enforced by the public opinion of the profession.
But there may, undoubtedly, arise occasional cases 
in which the aberrations of individuals may require 
to be checked by definite disciplinary action. What 
this report chiefly maintains is that such action can 
not with safety be taken by bodies not composed of 
members of the academic profession. Lay governing 
boards are competent to judge concerning charges of 
habitual neglect of assigned duties, on the part of 
individual teachers, and concerning charges of grave 
moral delinquency. But in matters of opinion, and of 
the utterance of opinion, such boards cannot intervene 
without destroying, to the extent of their intervention, 
the essential nature of a university - without con­
verting it from a place dedicated to openness of mind, 
in which the conclusions expressed are the tested con­
clusions of trained scholars, into a place barred 
against the access of new light, and precommitted 
to the opinions or prejudices of men who have not 
been set apart or expressly trained for the scholar's 
duties, it is, in short, not the absolute freedom 
of utterance of the individual scholar, but the 
absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion 
and of teaching, of the academic profession, that is 
asserted by this declaration of principles. It is 
conceivable that our profession may prove unworthy 
of its high calling, and unfit to exercise the 
responsibilities that belong to it. But it will 
scarcely be said as yet to have given evidence of 
such unfitness. And the existence of this Associ­
ation, as it seems to your committee, must be 
construed as a pledge, not only that the profession 
will earnestly guard those liberties without which 
it can not rightly render its distinctive and 
indispensable service to society, but also that it 
will with equal earnestness seek to maintain such 
standards of professional character, and of scientific 
integrity and competency, as shall make it a fit 
instrument for that service.
II. Practical Proposals
As the foregoing declaration implies, the ends 
to be accomplished are chiefly three:
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First: To safeguard freedom of inquiry and
of teaching against both covert and overt attacks, by 
providing suitable judicial bodies, composed of members 
of the academic profession, which may be called into 
action before university teachers are dismissed or 
disciplined, and may determine in what cases the question 
of academic freedom is actually involved.
Second; By the same means, to protect college 
executives and governing boards against unjust charges 
of infringement of academic freedom, or of arbitrary 
and dictatorial conduct - charges which, when they gain 
wide currency and belief, are highly detrimental to 
the good repute and the influence of universities.
Third: To render the profession more attractive
to men of high ability and strong personality by 
insuring the dignity, the independence, and the 
reasonable security of tenure, of the professional 
office.
The measures which it is believed to be 
necessary for our universities to adopt to realize 
these ends - measures which have already been adopted 
in part by some institutions - are four:
Action by Faculty Committees on Reap­
pointments. official action- relating to reappointments 
and refusals of reappointment should be taken only 
with the advice and consent of some board or committee 
representative of the faculty. Your committee does
not desire to make at this time any suggestion as to
the manner of selection of such boards.
B. Definition of Tenure of office, in every
institution there should be an unequivocal understanding 
as to the term of each appointment; and the tenure of 
professorships and associate professorships, and of all 
positions above the grade of instructor after ten years 
of service, should be permanent (subject to the provisions 
hereinafter given for removal upon charges). In those 
state universities which are legally incapable of making 
contracts for more than a limited period, the governing 
boards should announce their policy with respect to the 
presumption of reappointment in the several classes of 
position, and such announcements, though not legally 
enforceable, should be regarded as morally binding.
No university teacher of any rank should, except in
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cases o£ grave moral delinquency/ receive notice of 
dismissal or of refusal of reappointment, later than 
three months before the close of any academic year, 
and in the case of teachers above the grade of 
instructor, one year's notice should be given,,
C. Formulation of Grounds for Dismissal, in 
every institution the grounds which will be regarded as 
justifying the dismissal of members of the faculty should 
be formulated with reasonable definiteness; and in the 
case of institutions which impose upon their faculties 
doctrinal standards of a sectarian or partisan character, 
these standards should be clearly defined and the body
or individual having authority to interpret them, in 
case of controversy, should be designated. Your com­
mittee does not think it best at this time to attempt 
to enumerate the legitimate grounds for dismissal, 
believing it to be preferable that individual insti­
tutions should take the initiative in this.
D. Judicial Hearings Before Dismissal. Every 
university or college teacher should be entitled, before 
dismissal* or demotion, to have the charges against him 
stated in writing in specific terms and to have a fair 
trial on those charges before a special or permanent 
judicial committee chosen by the faculty senate or 
council, or by the faculty at large. At such trial
the teacher accused should have full opportunity to 
present evidence, and, if the charge is one of 
professional incompetency, a formal report upon his 
work should be first made in writing by the teachers 
of his own department and of cognate departments in the 
university, and, if the teacher concerned so desire, 
by a committee of his fellow specialists from other 
institutions, appointed by some competent authority.
The above declaration of principles and 
practical proposals are respectfully submitted by your 
committee to the approval of the Association, with the 
suggestion that, if approved, they be recommended to the
*This does not refer to refusals of reap­
pointment at the expiration of the terms of office of 
teachers below the rank of associate professor. All 
such questions of reappointment should, as above provided 
be acted upon by a faculty committee.
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consideration of the faculties, administrative officers, 
and governing hoards of the American universities and 
colleges.
APPENDIX B
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OP UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
PRINCIPLES OP ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 
1925 STATEMENT
Academic Freedom
(a) A university or college may not place any 
restraint upon the teacher’s freedom in investigation, 
unless restriction upon the amount of time devoted to it 
becomes necessary in order to prevent undue interference 
with teaching duties.
(b) A university or college may not impose 
any limitation upon the teacher's freedom in the 
exposition of his own subject in the classroom or in 
addresses and publications outside the college, except 
in so far as the necessity of adapting instruction to 
the needs of immature students, or, in the case of 
institutions of a denominational or partisan character, 
specific stipulations in advance, fully understood and 
accepted by both parties, limit the scope and character 
of instruction.
(c) No teacher may claim as his right the 
privilege of discussing in his classroom controversial 
topics outside his own field of study. The teacher is 
morally bound not to take advantage of his position by 
introducing into the classroom provocative discussions 
of irrelevant subjects not within the field of his 
study.
(d) A university or college should recognize 
that the teacher in speaking and writing outside of the 
institution upon subjects beyond the scope of his own 
field of study is entitled to precisely the same freedom 
and is subject to the same responsibility as attach to 
all other citizens. If the extramural utterances of a 
teacher should be such as to raise grave doubts concerning 
his fitness for his position, the question should in all 
cases be submitted to an appropriate committee of the
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faculty of which he is a member. It should be clearly 
understood that an institution assumes no responsibility 
for views expressed by members of its staff; and teachers 
should, when necessary, take pains to make it clear that 
they are expressing only their personal opinions.
Academic Tenure
(a) The precise terms and expectations of 
every appointment should be stated in writing and be in 
the possession of both college and teacher.
(b) Termination of a temporary or short-term 
appointment should always be possible at the expiration 
of the term by the mere act of giving timely notice of 
the desire to terminate. The decision to terminate 
should always be taken, however, in conference with the 
department concerned, and might well be subject to 
approval by a faculty or council committee or by the 
faculty or council, it is desirable that the question 
of appointments for the ensuing year be taken up as 
early as possible. Notice of the decision to terminate 
should be given in ample time to allow the teacher an 
opportunity to secure a new position. The extreme 
limit for such notice should not be less than three 
months before the expiration of the academic year. The 
teacher who proposes to withdraw should also give 
notice in ample time to enable the institution to
make a new appointment.
(c) It is desirable that termination of a 
permanent or long-term appointment for cause should 
regularly require action by both a faculty committee 
and the governing board of the college. Exceptions 
to this rule may be necessary in cases of gross 
immorality or treason, when the facts are admitted.
In such cases summary dismissal would naturally ensue, 
in cases where other offenses are charged, and in all 
cases where the facts are in dispute, the accused 
teacher should always have the opportunity to face 
his accusers and to be heard in his own defense by 
all bodies that pass judgment upon the case, in the 
trial of charges of professional incompetence the 
testimony of scholars in the same field, either 
from his own or from other institutions, should 
always be taken. Dismissal for reasons other than
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immorality or treason should not ordinarily take effect 
in less than a year from the time the decision is 
reachedo
(d) Termination of permanent or long-term 
appointments because of financial exigencies should be 
sought only as a last resort, after every effort has 
been made to meet the need in other ways and to find 
for the teacher other employment in the institution. 
Situations which make drastic entrenchment of this sort 
necessary should preclude expansions of the staff at 
other points at the same time, except in extraordinary 
circumstances.
APPENDIX C
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 
1940 STATEMENT
The purpose of this statement is to promote 
public understanding and support of academic freedom 
and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them 
in colleges and universities. Institutions of higher 
education are conducted for the common good and not to 
further the interest of either the individual teacher'? 
or the institution as a whole. The common good depends 
upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes 
and applies to both teaching and research. Freedom in 
research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. 
Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental 
for the protection of the rights of the teacher in 
teaching and of the student to freedom in learning.
It carries with it duties correlative with rights.
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifi­
cally: (1) Freedom of teaching and research and of
extramural activities, and (2) A sufficient degree of 
economic security to make the profession attractive to 
men and women of ability. Freedom and economic 
security, hence tenure, are indispensable to the 
success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations 
to its students and to society.
Academic Freedom
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom 
in research and in the publication of the results,
The word "teacher" as used in this document is 
understood to include the investigator who is attached 
to an academic institution without teaching duties.
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subject to the adequate performance of his other aca­
demic duties; but research for pecuniary return should 
be based upon an understanding with the authorities of 
the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in 
the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should 
be careful not to introduce into his teaching contro­
versial matter which has no relation to his subject. 
Limitations of academic freedom because of religious 
or other aims of the institution should be clearly 
stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a 
citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an 
officer of an educational institution. When he speaks 
or writes as a citizen, he should be free from insti­
tutional censorship or discipline, but his special 
position in the community imposes special obligations.
As a man of learning and an educational officer, he 
should remember that the public may judge his profession 
and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should 
at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate 
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of 
others, and should make every effort to indicate that
he is not an institutional spokesman.
Academic Tenure
(a) After the expiration of a probationary 
period teachers or investigators should have permanent 
or continuous tenure, and their services should be 
terminated only for adequate cause, except in the case 
of retirement for age, or under extraordinary circum­
stances because of financial exigencies.
In the interpretation of this principle it 
is understood that the following represents acceptable 
academic practice;
(1) The precise terms and conditions of 
every appointment should be stated in writing and be 
in the possession of both institution and teacher 
before the appointment is consummated.'
(2) Beginning with appointment to the rank
of full-time instructor or a higher rank, the probationary
\
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period should not exceed seven years, including within 
this period full-time service in all institutions of 
higher education; but subject to the proviso that when, 
after a term of probationary service of more than three 
years in one or more institutions, a teacher is called 
to another institution it may be agreed in writing that 
his new appointment is for a probationary period of not 
more than four years, even though thereby the person's 
total probationary period in the academic profession is 
extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years.
Notice should be given at least one year prior to the 
expiration of the probationary period if the teacher is 
not to be continued in service after the expiration of 
that period.
(3) During the probationary period a teacher 
should have the academic freedom that all other members 
of the faculty have.
(4) Termination for cause of a continuous ap­
pointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher 
previous to the expiration of a term appointment, 
should, if possible, be considered by both a faculty 
committee and the governing board of the institution.
In all cases where the facts are in dispute, the 
accused teacher should be informed before the hearing 
in writing of the charges against him and should have 
the opportunity to be heard in his own defense by all 
bodies that pass judgment upon his case. He should be 
permitted to have with him an adviser of his own 
choosing who may act as counsel. There should be a 
full stenographic record of the hearing available to 
the parties concerned, in the hearing of charges 
of incompetence the testimony should include that 
of teachers and other scholars, either from his own 
or from other institutions. Teachers on continuous 
appointment who are dismissed for reasons not 
involving moral turpitude should receive their 
salaries for at least a year from the date of noti­
fication of dismissal whether or not they are 
continued in their duties at the institution.
(5) Termination of a continuous appointment 
because of financial exigency should be demonstrably 
bona fide.
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